Condorcet efficiency of two stage constant scoring rules

Previous research has developed a representation for the Condorcet efficiency of plurality and negative plurality rules on three candidates for large electorates under the impartial culture condition. This study considers the two stage voting rules on three candidates, plurality elimination and negative plurality elimination. A representation is obtained for the Condorcet efficiency of each for large electorates under impartial culture. The Condorcet efficiencies of both rules are equal and are shown to be substantially greater than the Condorcet efficiency of plurality and negative plurality.     

Socio‐demographic factors and shared leadership behaviors in dispersed teams: Implications for human resource management

Companies increasingly make use of geographically dispersed teams to capture knowledge residing at different locations. In this context, shared leadership is considered a key enabler of team performance. Taking a functional perspective on shared leadership, we thus investigate the relationship between shared leadership behaviors and team performance in dispersed teams. Furthermore, we analyze how socio‐demographic factors that are characteristic for dispersed teams (i.e., high female‐to‐male ratio, high mean age, and high levels of national diversity) affect shared leadership behaviors. Based on data from 96 dispersed teams, we show that shared leadership behavior fosters team performance. Further, we find the socio‐demographic characteristics typical for dispersed teams to foster shared leadership. Theoretical and managerial implications for human resource management are discussed. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

A Note on the Probability of Having a Strong Condorcet Winner

In an election, a strong Condorcet winner is a candidate who is top-ranked by more than 50% of the voters. The purpose of this note is to provide some algebraic representations for the probability of having a strong Condorcet winner in three-candidate elections. Three alternative procedures for generating voting situations are considered: the Impartial Culture condition, the Impartial Anonymous Culture condition and the Maximal Culture condition. It turns out that the conclusions we obtain strongly depend on the way for generating voting situations.     

Strong measures of group coherence and the probability that a pairwise majority rule winner exists

A Pairwise Majority Rule Winner (PMRW) exists for a voting situation if some candidate can defeat each of the remaining candidates by Pairwise Majority Rule. The PMRW would be very appropriate for selection as the winner of an election, but it is well known that such a candidate does not always exist. This paper concludes a series of studies regarding the probability that a PMRW should be expected to exist in three-candidate elections, by introducing the notion of a strong measures of mutually coherent group preferences. In order for voting situations to be reasonably expected to fail to have a PMRW in a three-candidate election, voters’ preferences must be generated in an environment that is far removed from the situation in which there is a strong-overall-unifying candidate. So far removed, that it is extremely unlikely that a PMRW will not exist in voting situations with large electorates for a small number of candidates.     

A comparative analysis of measures of social homogeneity

Social homogeneity refers to the degree to which the preferences of individuals in a society tend to be alike. A number of studies have been conducted to determine whether or not a relationship exists between various measures of social homogeneity and the probability that a Condorcet winner exists. In this study, it is shown that a strong general relationship of this type does not exist for measures of social homogeneity which account only for the proportions of individuals with various preference rankings. That is, for measures which account for these proportions but not for the preference rankings to which they are assigned. Profile specific measures of homogeneity do account for the preference rankings to which the proportions of voters are assigned. A much stronger relationship exists between profile specific measures of homogeneity and the probability that a Condorcet winner exists than for non-profile specific measures. In particular, Kendall's Coefficient of Condordance is shown to dominate twenty other measures of social homogeneity in terms of the strength of its relationship to the probability that a Condorcet winner exists.     

A progress report on Kelly's majority conjectures

LetC(m, n) be the proportion of n-voter profiles on m alternatives that have a majority winner. Jerry Kelly conjectured that C(m, n) > C(m + 1, n) for m ? 3 and n = 3 and n ? 5, and C(m, n) > C(m, n + 2) for m ? 3 and n ? 3. We prove these for special cases.     

The expected probability of Condorcet's paradox

Let P(n,p) be the probability that there is a Condorcet winner on three alternatives for n (odd) voters. The vector p defines the probability that a randomly selected voter will have any of the six linear rankings on three alternatives as his or her preference ranking. It is shown that if all p vectors are equally likely, the expected value of P(n,p) is given by 15(n+3)²/[16(n+2)(n+4)].     

Constant scoring rules for choosing one among many alternatives

Quality & Quantity - When a group is to select a decision alternative from a finite set of m ⩾ 3 feasible alternatives, it is often desirable to choose the Condorect (majority)...