NATIONAL PRODUCT AT CONSTANT PRICES IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

With few exceptions, only cormmodity flows and values which can be determined by means of commodity flows (flows of goods and services) are calculated in constant prices in the official national accounts of the Federal Republic of Germany. Figures an the industrial origin and the final use of the national product are published, the former according to thirty industries, the latter according to the major types of uses of which in particular private consumption expenditure has been further analysed. The computations at constant prices are based on market prices and not on factor costs. It is only on this basis that a uniform valuation of the production and the expenditure side can be made since the turnover tax, which is the most important indirect tax, is contained in the elements of final demand in varying shares and cannot be eliminated (the tax is part of the price and has cumulative effect). The computation at constant prices presupposes a breakdown of the values in current prices according to quantities and prices. This raises a number of problems, e.g. because seller and buyer may consider differing aspects-production costs, technical attributes, etc., on the one hand, and use etc., on the other hand. In part there exist only vague ideas, or no ideas at all, as to what is to be considered-from a theoretical point of view-as quantity and price. In other cases the two values can only with great difficulties, if at all, be quantified, or there exists no market price and only the production costs are available. The author deals in greater detail with differences in quality and new commodities, the determination and treatment of quantities and prices for services, in particular for trade services (services attached to goods), the computation of government services at constant prices considering the development of productivity in public service, the determination of the values calculated as balances, above all the treatment of changes in the terms of trade for net exports of goods and services, the computation of the contributions of industries to the gross domestic product and, finally, the reconciliation of the production and the expenditure side. In a third section the author deals with index formulae and the base year. In the majority of cases values are deflated; partly, however, they are currently adjusted by means of volume and quantity data. On the production side the two methods are in part combined. In a concluding section a survey is provided of the computation methods used in the Federal Republic of Germany and on the available material for the computations. Mention is made of depreciation at constant prices.     

The price normalization problem in imperfect competition and the objective of the firm

Summary. General equilibrium models of oligopolistic competition give rise to relative prices only without determining the price level. It is well known that the choice of a numéraire or, more generally, of a normalization rule converting relative prices into absolute prices entails drastic consequences for the resulting set of Nash equilibria when firms are assumed to maximize profits. This is due to the fact that changing the price normalization amounts to altering the objective functions of the firms. Clearly, the objective of a firm must not be based on price normalization rules void of any economic content. In this paper we propose a definition of the objective of a firm, called maximization of shareholders' real wealth, which takes shareholders' demand explicitly into account. This objective depends on relative prices only. Real wealth maxima are shown to exist under certain conditions. Moreover, we consider an oligopolistic market and prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium in which each firm maximizes the real wealth of its shareholders. Received: July 10, 1997; revised version: July 27, 1998     

Continuous mean demand functions derived from non-convex preferences

In this paper we show that for a large subset of utility functions in the space of all C¹ utility functions and for all prices the mean demand of those consumers whose taste is represented by a given utility function in that subset is uniquely determined. This implies that for a large set of economies mean demand is a continuous function. Our analysis uses derivatives of first and of higher order. The result is essentially a consequence of the multijet transversality theorem.     

Bedingungen einer neuen ökologischen Industriepolitik

Wirtschaftsdienst - Zur Erreichung der globalen Klimaziele ist eine drastische Emissionsminderung in allen Sektoren wie Energiewirtschaft, Gebäude, Verkehr und Landwirtschaft notwendig. Zudem...     

Drèze equilibria and welfare maxima

We present an example of a production economy with incomplete markets, von Neumann–Morgenstern utility functions, and a unique Drèze equilibrium in order to illustrate and explain the following phenomenon. There exists a transfer scheme such that every shareholder’s utility after transfers and share adjustments increases the more the firm deviates from the Drèze equilibrium. However, shareholders’ welfare decreases the further the firm departs from the Drèze equilibrium. Shareholders’ welfare is defined as the sum of their utilities where every utility function is normalized such that the marginal utility of today’s consumption equals 1 at the Drèze equilibrium.     

Workers’ participation in management in the EC countries

In the last few years the whole area of workers’ participation in management has been much discussed in the countries of the European Community (EC). There are, essentially, two ways of participation, i.e. at shop-floor level where works councils are widespread — though in a variety of types — and at the company board level by representative systems involving workers’ participation in management decisions of a policy nature. The latter will be the main subject of this survey.     

Are incomplete markets able to achieve minimal efficiency?

Summary. We consider economies with incomplete markets, one good per state, two periods, t = 0,1, private ownership of initial endowments, a single firm, and no assets other than shares in this firm. In Dierker, Dierker, Grodal (2002), we give an example of such an economy in which all market equilibria are constrained inefficient. In this paper, we weaken the concept of constrained efficiency by taking away the planners right to determine consumers investments. An allocation is called minimally constrained efficient if a planner, who can only determine the production plan and the distribution of consumption at t = 0, cannot find a Pareto improvement. We present an example with arbitrarily small income effects in which no market equilibrium is minimally constrained efficient.Received: 26 November 2002, Revised: 28 May 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: D2, D52, D61, G1.We are grateful to an anonymous referee for very valuable comments. E. and H. Dierker would like to thank the Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen, for its hospitality and its financial support.     

The development and impact of nationalisation in Britain

The relationship between Government and economy, the best obtainable pattern of public and private sectors in market economies, is an issue of constant interest for economists and politicians of the Western world. Can nationalisation of industries, i.e. the alteration or termination of control or ownership of private property by the state, improve the economic situation of a country and its workers and consumers? Here is a survey on the more than thirty years’ development and impact of nationalisation in Great Britain.     

Equilibria and core of large economies

In this paper we apply results on regular economies to study equilibria and core in a non-differentiable framework. We show that the distributions of agents' characteristics of regular economies form a dense subset of all distributions of agents' characteristics. Therefore ‘most’ economies have equilibria which are contained in finitely many ?-balls. And the core of ‘most’ sufficiently large economies is contained in finitely many ?-balls centered at equilibrium allocations of these economies.