Uncertainty,story-telling and transformative learning: An instructor’s experience of TEFI’s Walking Workshop in Nepal

ABSTRACT

This article recounts three stories from TEFI’s walking workshop in Nepal: the construction of a road through what was once a trekking path; a dance-floor encounter at a Himalayan party; and the arrival of one participant, fatigued by jet lag and disoriented by the new surroundings. These stories of confusion, discomfort and fear are linked by one common theme: the potential of uncertainty to foster deep reflection and nuanced conclusions. The premise that uncertainty is to be valued and even cultivated has been explored in educational theory, spiritual traditions, and research on transformative learning. These sources affirm the role of uncertainty in the process of knowledge creation. However, accepting this role can be challenging for educators because it requires they assume a new identity, one which they may perceive as being at odds with their status as “teacher” the identity of learner. One way for the educator to address this challenge may be through recounting their own stories of uncertainty. Stories of being immersed in unfamiliar situations that challenge, confuse and even frighten – stories, in other words of being a tourist – can foster reflection on an intellectual, emotional and spiritual level, engaging the “whole” person, and thus initiating the educator/learner’s transformative journey.     

Environmental Taxation and Vertical Cournot Oligopolies: How Eco-industries Matter

This article specifies what an optimal pollution tax should be when dealing with a vertical Cournot oligopoly. Polluting firms sell final goods to consumers and outsource their abatement activities to an environment industry. It is assumed that both markets are imperfectly competitive. Thus, the tax is a single instrument used to regulate three sorts of distortions, one negative externality and two restrictions in production. Consequently, the optimal tax rate is the result of a trade-off that depends on the firms’ market power along the vertical structure. A detailed analysis of Cournot-Nash equilibria in both markets is also performed. In this context, the efficiency of abatement activities plays a key-role. It gives a new understanding to the necessary conditions for the emergence of an eco-industrial sector.      

Golden cages for showy birds: Optimal switching costs in labor contracts

Under what circumstances do workers sign contracts with high quitting penalties? Our answer points to market transparency. When the worker's performance is privately observed by the incumbent firm, alternative employers face an adverse selection problem. As a result, efficient separations can only take place through involuntary layoffs and there is no role for quitting fees. In contrast, when performance is public, quitting fees are useful devices to appropriate the surplus from workers’ reallocation. Separations are amicable and take the form of quitting after downwardly renegotiating the fees. Qualitative features of contracts are independent of the distribution of ex-post bargaining power. The impact of switching costs on total welfare and its distribution depends on the degree of market transparency and the ex-ante distribution of market power.     

An Economic Analysis of Auto Compensation Systems: Choice Experiences From New Jersey and Pennsylvania

Nearly since the first automobile traveled on U.S. soil, questions about how best to compensate people injured by their use have been raised. As early as in 1932, in fact, the tort system of imposing costs on negligent drivers was strongly criticized, and a system of compensation without regard to negligence recommended. Yet despite various efforts to identify and implement improved systems during the past more than 70 years, no clear best compensation mechanism has been found. Current discussions have focused on the “choice” system, under which insureds are allowed to select either a tort system or a no‐fault system of compensation at the time of insurance purchase. New Jersey and Pennsylvania, which implemented very similar choice programs in 1989 and 1990, respectively, offer an opportunity to observe the effects of choice on outcomes such as: use of attorneys, speed of payment, and consistency (equity) of payment. Our results indicate outcomes consistent with expectations in New Jersey (NJ), which switched from no‐fault to choice, but inconsistent with expectations in Pennsylvania (PA), which switched from tort to choice. Furthermore, analysis of tort versus no‐fault selectors postchoice in New Jersey and Pennsylvania does not offer clear evidence of no‐fault's lower administrative costs and speedier, more equitable payment in these jurisdictions.     

Book Reviews

Anthony J. Whitten, Sengli J. Damanik, Jazanul Anwar and Nazaruddin Hisyam, The Ecology of Sumatra, Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, Second Edition, 1987, pp. 583 + xx.

Christine Drake, National Integration in Indonesia: Patterns and Policies, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989, pp. 354 + xvi. Cloth: US$ 35.00.

Geoffrey B. Hainsworth (ed.), Environmental Linkages, Halifax: School for Resource and Environmental Studies, Dalhousie University, 1985, pp. 97.

R. Repetto et al., Wasting Assets: Natural Resources in the National Income Accounts, Washington DC: World Resources Institute, June 1989, pp. 69 + vi. Paper: US$10.00.

William E. James, Seiji Naya and Gerald M. Meier, Asian Development: Economic Success and Policy Lessons, Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989, pp. 281 + Xviii.

Robert B. Dickie and Thomas A. Layman, Foreign Investment and Government Policy in the Third World: Forging Common Interests in Indonesia and Beyond, London: MacMillan, 1988, pp. 240 + xxxi. £35.

Alan Gelb and Associates, Oil Windfalls: Blessing or Curse? New York: Oxford University Press, for the World Bank, 1988, pp. 357 + x. $32.50.

Benjamin Higgins, The Road Less Travelled: A Development Economist's Quest, History of Development Studies 2, Canberra: National Centre For Development Studies, the Australian National University, pp. 204 + x. Paper: A$20.00

BRIEFLY NOTED: Sarwar Hobohm, Indonesia to 1993: Breakthrough in the Balance, London: Economist Intelligence Unit, Special Report no. 2012, 1989, pp. 91, £190 for this Plus the Companion Report, Indonesia to 1991: Can Momentum be Regained?

Geoffrey Hainsworth and Hasan Poerbo (eds), Local Resource Management: Towards Sustainable Development, Halifax: School for Resource and Environmental Studies, Dalhousie University, 1987, pp. 69 + xii.

H.W. Dick, Industri Pelayaran Indonesia: Kompetisi dan Regulasi, Jakarta: LP3ES, 1990, 306 + xxv.     

Delegation and polarization of platforms in political competition

Summary. We consider a model of political competition among two ideological parties who are uncertain about the distribution of voters. The distinguishing feature of the model is that parties can delegate electoral decisions to candidates by nomination. It is shown that if the credible platform commitments of the candidates is feasible, then at least one of the parties nominates in equilibrium to a candidate who has an ideology that is more radical than the delegating party's ideology. In a variety of circumstances, this, in turn, yields a polarization of equilibrium policy choices of the candidates. It is thus argued formally here that strategic nomination of the candidates may well be one of the major reasons behind the well documented observation that the platforms associated with the political parties in two-party democracies are often surprisingly polarized. Received: January 10, 2002; revised version: May 8, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We thank Alberto Alesina, Levent Ko?kesen, Antonio Merlo, Ronny Razin, Vijay Krishna, Alessandro Lizzeri, and seminar participants at Alicante, Columbia, Copenhagen, and NYU for helpful comments. We also thank an anonymous referee for its useful suggestions. A good fraction of this research was conducted while Ok was a visitor in the Department of Economics at University of Alicante; he thanks for the kind hospitality of this institution. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education through grant CICYT BEC2001-0535 (Faulí-Oller) and BEC2001-0980 (Ortu?o-Ortín). Correspondence to:I. Ortu?o-Ortin     

Welfare reducing licensing

In this paper, we characterize situations where licensing a cost reducing innovation to a rival firm using two-part tariff contracts (a fixed fee plus a linear per unit of output royalty) reduces social welfare. We show that it occurs if (i) the firms compete in prices, (ii) the innovation is large enough but not drastic, and (iii) the goods are close enough substitutes. Moreover, we show that, regardless of the type of competition, first, the optimal contract always includes a positive royalty and, second, even drastic innovations are licensed whenever the goods are not homogeneous.     

Product differentiation and dynamic price behavior in fish markets

The objective of this paper is to estimate the dynamics of aquaculture and fish prices as a response to price shocks. The vector autoregression approach will be used to explain the dynamics of the sea bream market in both cultured and wild fishing. The main result is that changes in public regulation or in production conditions could stimulate production responses which may take time to settle. Usually, the change is a matter of adjusting between equilibria over a period of time, with the pattern and speed of the adjustment, depending on the nature and degree of disequilibrium in the fishing system. Comments from reviewers have been incorporated into the paper and are gratefully acknowledged. Financial support was provided by Direcció General de Recerca, Departament d'Universitats, Recerca i Societat de la Informació project N^o SGR2001-160.     

All in the family or public? Law and appropriative costs as determinants of ownership structure

We examine how the legal protection of outside shareholders and the appropriative costs that they induce influence the incentives for private firms to go public. A higher degree of protection of shareholders can increase the appropriative costs associated with the conflict between managers and shareholders. To counteract this effect the managers/owners increase the share of the firm they retain so that, overall, higher protection of outsiders increases the likelihood of going public. In addition, we examine how the share of funds raised used to finance the firm affects both appropriative costs and the decision to sell.For helpful comments we thank participants at the conference on Corporate Governance at UC Irvine (February 2002), seminar participants at the Athens University of Economics and Business, and worskshop participants on the New Organization of Labour at the 2002 CESifo summer Institute in Venice. Skaperdas gratefully acknowledges support from a grant for Research and Writing from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.