Inequality and entrepreneurial thresholds

We explore the relationship between inequality and entrepreneurial activity. Drawing on cross-sectional data from a largescale survey of the economic conditions of individuals across India, we develop a number of dimensions of inequality to explore empirically how inequality interacts with entrepreneurship, operationalized as self-employment or as employing other people. We find compelling evidence that there are thresholds to becoming self-employed, and even more so to assembling the combinations of resources and personal attributes required to become an employer. Greater inequality leaves more people unable to make the transition to self-employment, leaving casual laboring as the occupation of necessity. At the same time, inequality increases the number of employers in a society, by concentrating resources - particularly land and finance - enough for significant numbers of people to be able to cross this higher threshold. Lastly, greater differentiation into social or religious groups curtails the ability to cross either entrepreneurial threshold, presumably by limiting the extent and benefits of social networks of value for entrepreneurship.     

Re‐Examining Advances in Occupational Licensing Research: Issues and Policy Implications

Much has changed in the realms of occupational licensing since BJIR last ran a special issue on the subject in 2010. The number of occupations subject to licensing has been growing, the data available to investigate the incidence and effects of licensing have improved immeasurably, and the policy environment surrounding licensing has changed. This issue reflects these changes with eight papers from North America and Europe covering the incidence of licensing, and its effects on wages, inequality, employment, quality of service provision and rent extraction by the organizations who undertake licensing.     

The capital structure implications of pursuing a strategy of innovation

In this paper, we argue that consideration of firm strategy can help illuminate the choices managers make between debt and equity financing. Within an industry, the form of competition that each firm chooses will determine the strategic value to the firm of maintaining financial slack. Our empirical analysis yields strong support for the proposition that financial slack should be a particularly critical strategic imperative for firms pursuing a competitive strategy premised on innovation. We also demonstrate that firms pursuing such a strategy that fail to recognize the value of financial slack are likely to perform poorly. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Managing Price Risk in the Pakistan Wheat Market

The government intervenes in the wheat market in Pakistan toensure food security for consumers and to provide adequate andstable incomes for producers. The cost of this interventionis high, and its impact on the performance of agriculture hasbeen significantly negative. The World Bank is urging policychanges such as removing agricultural trade restrictions, pricesupports, and subsidies. However, policymakers often resistsuch reforms, fearing that they will expose the domestic marketto fluctuating international commodity prices. This article assesses the risk management needs of the sectorand evaluates whether using financial instruments—suchas commodity hedging using futures, options, or swaps—wouldimprove risk management. Simulations based on monthly data for1994 show that market-based methods of risk management couldreduce the impact of international price volatility on the domesticmarket without incurring high government cost or distortingprice signals.     

Restraining Unions' industrial action: A new consumer right

This paper discusses the revolutionary new right introduced by the Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act 1993 for consumers to seek a court order to halt unlawful industrial action which disrupts the supply of goods or services, regardless of whether they have any enforceable right to the goods or services in question. Even more unusually, public funding is available to conduct these proceedings irrespective of the applicant's means where the industrial action is organised by a trade union. The paper analyses the nature of the right, locates it within the broader framework of remedies for the non-provision or inadequate provision of goods or services, and assesses the wider implications of the right for consumer policy.     

Who are the world's most successful companies?

It seems that everybody wants to know which companies are the most successful. To help throw light on the issue, and to do so more reliably than the plethora of league tables and charts produced by most business magazines, the London Business School have teamed up with The Economist to compile an assessment of the top performers of the 1980's.     

The relationship between governance structure and risk management approaches in Japanese venture capital firms

This paper attempts to understand what drives Japanese venture capital (JVC) fund managers to select either active managerial monitoring or portfolio diversification to manage their firms' investment risks [J. Bus. Venturing 4 (1989) 231]. Unlike U.S. venture capitalists that use active managerial monitoring to gain private information in order to maximize returns [J. Finance 50 (1995) 301], JVCs have traditionally used portfolio diversification to attenuate investment risks [Hamada, Y., 2001. Nihon no Bencha Kyapitaru no Genkyo (Current State of Japanese Venture Capital), Nihon Bencha Gakkai VC Seminar, May 7]. We found that performance pay is positively related to active monitoring and that management ownership is positively related to active monitoring and negatively related to portfolio diversification. The managerial implication of our study is that venture capitalists should be as concerned about the structure of their incentive systems for their fund managers as they are for their investee-firm entrepreneurs. Agency theory says that contingent compensation is a self-governing mechanism for individual effort that is difficult to measure and verify. When properly applied, equity ownership and performance-based pay can have powerful influencing effects on the strategic choices of managers.