长期股权投资权益法核算下会计与税法的差异

由于我国实行的是税会分离模式,因此税法上在确定应纳税所得额和会计在确认利润的时候,二者之间必然有很多的差异,既有永久性的差异也有时间性的差异,长期股权投资权益法导致的差异比较难以把握,因为当会计对长期股权投资采用权益法核算的情况下从取得长期股权投资到最后的处置每一个环节都存在会计处理和税法规定不相一致的地方。     

地方政府利益、地方政府行为与经济增长

目前,对中国地方政府的经济行为的研究强调了在经济转型过程中地方政府在多样化的地方经济发展模式中的主导作用,注意到了地方政府目标的多重性,本地区社会福利最大化,政府利益最大化以及中央政府的满意程度等。对地方政府在公共产品的提供、就业、收入分配、实现社会公平等方面行为不到位方面的研究是从定性方法来论证。本文试图在定性分析基础上建立一些基本的数学模型为将来的计量研究提供一个模型框架。     

Small Leading Firms*

We formally analyze the question of whether a price leader must control a large share of the market. Our main result is that if other producers have rising marginal costs and behave as price takers, even the smallest firm in a competitive industry with a rising supply curve can enhance its profits by cutting output and raising price, becoming a price leader. Therefore, we would expect pure competition to be destroyed under these technological conditions.     

AHP在生产企业构建电子废弃物逆向物流体系中的应用

电子废弃物逆向物流指电子产品从消费者返回到生产者的物流过程。随着经济的发展，中国电子废弃物数量急剧上升，并对生态环境造成巨大的破坏。同时，电子废弃物逆向物流的实施可以带来巨大的经济效益。此外，发达国家封电子废弃物的规制政策对中国电子产品生产企业产生了极大影响。在上述背景下，探讨生产企业如何构建电子废弃物逆向物流系统，进行相关指标分析及通过层次分析法作出模式选择有着重要的现实意义。     

Effect of diversification on capital structure

Previous empirical financial studies have paid little attention to the role of diversification strategy on financial choices. This study analyses the financing strategies of multibusiness firms, suggesting the relevance of sorting the diversification phenomena into its related and unrelated components. The implications of our findings are important because they explain earlier contradictory results on capital‐structure determinants and offer an explanation of how the degree of product specialization/diversification and the direction of diversification (related or unrelated) translate into different corporate financial behaviours.     

Does asymmetric information affect the premium in mergers and acquisitions?

We test the influence of information asymmetry on the premium paid for an acquisition. We analyze mergers and acquisitions as English auctions. The theory of dynamic auctions with private and common value predicts that more informed bidders may pay a lower price. We test that prediction with a sample of 1,026 acquisitions in the United States between 1990 and 2007. We assume that blockholders of the target's shares are better informed than other bidders because they possess privileged information on the target. Our empirical results show that blockholders pay a much lower premium than do other buyers