Author Order and Research Quality

We observe a great deal of heterogeneity in the manner in which author orderings are assigned both across and within academic markets. To better understand this phenomenon, we develop and analyze a stochastic model of author orderings. In our model, authors work equally hard to obtain priority in listings but final contributions are stochastic. Further, research outlets differ in their quality hurdles. In this setting, our simulation results are consistent with two empirical regularities. First, we find that the rate of alphabetization increases with the stringency with which papers are accepted for publication. Second, conditional on clearing the publication hurdle, quality increases with alphabetization. These findings arise because increases in the publication hurdle make it more likely that authors will exceed this threshold only when both contribute a high amount. This, in turn, leads to roughly equal contributions (alphabetization) and also generates a positive correlation between alphabetization and quality.     

New Estimates of Economies of Scale and Scope in Higher Education

Following Colin, Rhine, and Santos (1989), we reeslimate cost functions for 1492 private and 1450 public institutions of higher education (IHEs) in the United States, using data for fiscal year 1995-1996. Costs are modeled as a function of the level of production of three outputs: undergraduate education, graduate education, and externally funded research. We find that public and private IHEs are characterized by significantly different cost functions. At the sample means of the variables, we estimate that public and private IHEs enjoy both ray economics of scale and product-specific economies with respect to production of all three outputs. However, we also find that, at the sample means, both public and private institutions are characterized by diseconomies of scope in the production of these three outputs. Our findings suggest that both public and private IHEs could reduce their unit costs of operation by growing relative to the current mean levels of production.     

Restriction of Farm Ownership as Rent-seeking Behavior: Family Farmers Have It Their Way

A bstract . Restriction of foreign ownership of U.S. farmland has an obvious cost of foregone capital gains to farmers Yet their push to achieve state regulation of foreign investment in agricultural land has a sound economic basis. If required acreage expansion and high prices for land combine to force small, family farmers out of business, the value of their accumulated human capital falls precipitously, since it is soil specific With a large foreign demand for farmland which induces a tremendous rate of land price inflation , capital gains on their land swamp potential human capital losses. However, marginal participation in the U.S. farmland market by foreigners creates capital gains on land which are insufficient to compensate farmers for lost human capital, and creates a rationale for regulation The empirical results demonstrate that the pattern of legislative restrictions against foreign ownership of farmland is a function of the relative political power wielded by family farmers.     

Macroeconomic conditions in the U.S. and congressional voting on environmental policy: 1970-2008

Using the Environmental Scorecard ratings of Congressmen and Senators published annually by the League of Conservation Voters, we explore empirically whether political support for pro-environment legislation, aggregated across each legislative body, is sensitive over time to changing economic conditions — that is, whether there is a political trade-off between economic conditions and the environment. Using LCV scorecard ratings from 1970 to 2008, we find evidence, consistent across both the House and Senate, that political support for the environment is related to per capita income, but this general tendency can be decomposed into sharp differences by party.