Rent Sharing and the Compensation of Head Coaches in Power Five College Football

The monopoly and monopsony power of intercollegiate sports create significant rents, but previous studies of intercollegiate football coaches’ salaries implicitly assume that coaches are paid their marginal revenue products. In a two-stage estimation, we show that coaches share in these rents. The first stage shows that several common measures of coaches’ productivity do not affect an athletic department’s variable revenue. When we include these measures in the second-stage salary equation, their impact on pay reflects bargaining power, not productivity. We also find that several measures of fixed revenue, which are independent of the coach’s performance, increase the coach’s pay.     

PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTING IN EMERGING MARKETS

After a proliferation of emerging market funds in the 1990s, growth has slowed drastically due to disappointing preliminary results. Private sector funds initially appeared promising because of the burgeoning demand for capital in emerging markets, the new receptivity of governments to foreign investors, and the prospect of high returns. But in many cases, the regulatory and legal frameworks did not provide adequate investor protection, and dramatic differences in accounting standards, corporate governance, and exit potential created problems. These problems are often accentuated because local owners are adept at navigating the legal and accounting systems, placing investors at a disadvantage.
As global competition intensifies, local policies, regulations, and business practices are becoming increasingly important in attracting investors. Local governments must institute the reforms necessary to improve the investment environment, including the strengthening of shareholder rights and corporate governance standards and improving access to public equity markets. Development finance institutions must provide direction and leadership in these areas. And fund managers must align their business models more closely with emerging market realities by establishing a local presence, adopting a more hands-on approach to monitoring their investments, and developing creative exit strategies.     

Spousal Complementarity in Home Production

A bstract .   Economists have increasingly recognized the growing role of married women in the labor market by treating the labor supply decisions of married couples as joint decisions. However, they have yet to apply the same reasoning to home production. We build a more complete model of household time allocation that consists of a system of simultaneous equations estimating hours of labor supply and home production. Using data on white couples from Wave XXV of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we find that working wives act as if their husbands are substitutes for home production while other wives do not. Husbands' responses to their wives' behavior depends upon whether children are present.     

Rank-order tournaments and worker incentives

Conclusion It has been shown that a single rank-order tournament fails to provide incentives after the completion of the tournament. The firm may attempt to monitor workers afterwards, but this undercuts the rationale for tournaments—the minimization of monitoring costs. Proper incentives are possible in the context of tournaments only if they are continuously repeated. The nature of these secondary tournaments depends, however, on the information gleaned from tournament results. If the result of the tournament reflects random luck, winners and losers continuously compete for a prize equal to their expected marginal revenue product. If firm-specific aptitudes are revealed, the firm may seek to exploit its monopsony power over winners of the initial contest by reducing the prize structure of later tournaments below expected marginal revenue product. If the results reflect individual-specific differences in ability, a hierarchy of tournaments results.     

Property values and pension underfunding in the local public sector

This paper reexamines the empirical implication of the C. Tiebout (J. Pol. Econ.64, 416–424 (1956)) hypothesis, taking account of the fact that many municipal pensions are grossly underfunded. OLS results show that underfunding has no impact on local property values. The motives for incomplete funding of pensions are also examined and are built into a simultaneous equation model. The OLS results are confirmed and some light is shed on factors leading to the underfunding of pensions.     

Why are mortgage rates so uniform?

Conclusion Any reasonable model of mortgage lending concludes that interest rates depend on loan and borrower characteristics. In this paper, the rate is a function of the loan-to-value ratio, the parameters of the densities of future price of housing and income, deposit rate, and cost of foreclosure. Nevertheless, in practice, each lender charges only one rate to all borrowers. This is first explained by the difficulty of estimation of the parameters of the density functions. Since lenders cannot categorize their borrowers, they treat them uniformly and set minimum standards to minimize the risk of default by each borrower. Mortgage insurance, moreover, enables lenders to lend risklessly outside of the range in which they can operate risklessly on their own. Second, mortgage rate uniformity is explained by the lenders' risk aversion. Third, when borrowers are separated into discrete categories, uniform rates can result from perfect categorization of borrowers with respect to the future value of the relevant random variables. It is more likely, however, that lenders cannot categorize borrowers perfectly and that interest rates vary substantially among categories. As rates jump from one category to the next and borrowers are reluctant to gain small increases in loan size at significantly higher rates, lenders respond by offering only the basic category of loans.     

Models of disequilibrium and shortage in centrally planned economies Christopher Davis and Wojciech Charemza,editors Chapman and Hall,London and New York, 1989, 501 pp.

Portes applied the econometric disequilibrium model of market economies to Centrally Planned Economies (CPEs) to show that the consumer goods sector was in equilibrium. Kornai considered these models inapplicable to CPEs and regarded CPEs as chronic shortage economies. Arguments on both sides of the debate are presented in this book. The conflict between Portes and Kornai lies in their microeconomic view of CPEs. While Portes acknowledges the welfare loss from shortages, Kornai analyzes and emphasizes it. Portes' view implies that changes in relative prices can reestablish equilibrium in CPEs. Kornai disagrees because CPEs do not respond to price changes like market economies. Only total reform, now attempted in many transition economies, can eliminate the imbalances.