Challenges in approximating the Black and Scholes call formula with hyperbolic tangents

Decisions in Economics and Finance - In this paper, we introduce the concept of standardized call function and we obtain a new approximating formula for the Black and Scholes call function through...     

POVERTY AND INCOME INEQUALITY IN PUERTO RICO, 1969–89: TRENDS AND SOURCES

The paper examines Puerto Rican trends in income distribution during the 1970s and 1980s, then attempts to ascertain the source of the changes in income inequality through a decomposition of the Gini coefficient by factor income source. The study finds that poverty and inequality declined unambiguously during the twenty-year period. The source of the fall in income concentration was found to have been tied, not to changes in the distribution or share of earned income, but to that of unearned income, particularly transfers. These appear to have also accounted for the decline in poverty.     

Thought experimentation and the Phillips curve

This paper offers the rationale for presenting a particular type of Phillips curve and develops the dynamic behavior of an economy where such a Phillips curve relation is observed. The specific kind of relation that is explored has similarities with the sticky-information Phillips curve of the Mankiw-Reis framework. Nevertheless, it adds an important dimension: firms need to form expectations about current events on past time periods not because of infrequent optimal updating of information but because producers want to evaluate the possibility of taking advantage of information deficiencies on the consumers’ side. A positive probability of ‘fooling’ consumers with a price above the one imposed by market conditions re-shapes the dynamic relation between the inflation rate and the output gap.     

Multi-level governance for sustainable innovation in smart communities: an ecosystems approach

International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal - This paper analyses the TrentoSmartCity project to redefine Trento (an Italian municipality) as a smart community according to an ecosystems...     

The impact of entrepreneurial orientation on firm performance: the role of CEO position tenure and industry tenure

The relationship between Entrepreneurial Orientation (EO) and firm performance, despite generating significant scholarly interest, has remained mixed. These results may be attributed, at least in part, to the failure to sufficiently examine the potential impact of top management characteristics. The present study investigates how CEO characteristics (i.e. CEO industry and position tenure), impact the relationship between EO and firm performance within a sample of 579 US banks. As predicted, some support for a positive EO to performance relationship was found. In addition, the results strongly support, as posited, that CEO industry tenure positively moderates, and CEO position tenure negatively moderates, the EO to performance relationship. We also report evidence supporting the effect of EO, configured with CEO position tenure and industry tenure on firm performance. Our study suggests the EO–performance relationship is more complex than previous studies indicate. Implications for future research and practice are provided.     

Stability under learning: The endogenous growth problem

A local dynamic analysis, in the neighborhood of the steady state, is developed for one and two-sector endogenous growth models. The problem differs from the conventionally assumed growth setups because one considers that expectations concerning the next period value of the control variable (consumption) are formed through adaptive learning. In such scenario, the found stability conditions reveal that convergence to the unique steady state point is feasible if a minimum requirement regarding the quality of learning in the long run equilibrium is fulfilled. Therefore, stability of growth under learning is dependent on the efficiency with which expectations are generated.     

Barriers to network-specific investment

We examine incentives for network-specific investment and consider the implications for network governance. We model a two-sided market in which participants making payments over a network platform can invest in a technology that reduces the marginal cost of using the platform. A network effect results in multiple equilibria—either all agents invest and use of the platform is high or no agents invest and use of the platform is low. The high-use equilibrium can be implemented if commitment is feasible. When the platform cannot commit to usage fees, investment in the platform-specific technology will be held up, thus implementing the low-investment equilibrium. As a result, governance structures necessary to achieve commitment will be preferred to those necessary merely to achieve coordination. For example, mutual ownership by users of a network platform may emerge where users face risk of ex post renegotiation. Such a governance structure will also be sufficient to avoid low investment attributable to the network effect.