Comparing Environmental Policy Instruments in the Presence of Imperfect Compliance – A Case Study

In this paper, we aim to include rule making, implementation, monitoring and enforcement costs into the cost comparison of policy instruments. We use a simple partial equilibrium model and apply it to the textile industry. The model includes discrete abatement functions and costly monitoring and enforcement. The case study uses individual firm data to simulate the differences in abatement costs and compliance decisions between firms. We compare combinations of regulatory instruments (emission taxes, emission standards and technology standards) and enforcement instruments (criminal fines, civil fines and transaction offers). We show that the inclusion of information, monitoring and enforcement costs indeed alters the relative cost efficiency of the different instruments.     

The political economy of pricing and capacity decisions for congestible local public goods in a federal state

This paper studies the political economy of pricing and investment for excludable and congestible public goods in a federal state. Although the model applies to many local congestible public facilities (such as libraries, museums and public swimming facilities), our main motivation is the problem of providing and pricing road infrastructure in federal states. The two-region model we develop allows for spill-overs between regions, it takes into account congestion, and it captures demand heterogeneity both between and within regions. Regional decisions are taken by majority voting; federal decisions are taken by a minimum winning coalition in a legislature of regionally elected representatives. We have the following results. First, when users form the majority in at least one region, decentralized decision making performs certainly better than centralized decision making if spill-overs are not too large. Centralized decisions may yield higher welfare than decentralization only if users have a large majority and the infrastructure in a given region is intensively used by both local and outside users. Second, if non-users form a majority in both regions, centralized decision making and decentralized decision making yield the same socially undesirable outcome, with prices that are much too high. Third, the performance of decentralized supply is strongly enhanced by local self-financing rules; this prevents potential exploitation of users within regions.     

Road Transport Externalities

During the last decade much progress has been made in defining & measuring the external costs of transport. As the cost of tolling equipment falls, the set of realistic policy options to internalise these externalities will continue to grow. This will determine the research and policy agenda. We make three points. Firstly, empirical work is still necessary to better identify marginal external costs, including congestion, accident and environmental costs. Secondly, any assessment of policy options should treat externalities simultaneously. The use of pricing instruments and emissions standards are discussed within this framework. Thirdly, we emphasise the role of government. Designing the optimal road-pricing institutions requires consideration of horizontal and vertical tax competition, while double-dividend arguments are central to the question of securing public support.     

Trip Chaining: Who Wins Who Loses?

This paper studies how trip chaining (combining commuting and shopping or commuting and child care) affects market competition: in particular, pricing and the equilibrium number of firms as well as welfare. We use a monopolistic competition framework, where firms sell differentiated products as well as offering differentiated jobs to households, who are all located at some distance from the firms. The symmetric equilibriums with and without the option of trip chaining are compared. We show analytically that introducing the trip chaining option reduces the profit margin of the firms in the short run, but increases welfare. The welfare gains are, however, smaller than the transport cost savings. In the free-entry long-run equilibrium, the number of firms decreases but welfare is higher. A numerical illustration gives orders of magnitude of the different effects.     

The geneva hydrocarbon protocol: Economic insights from a belgian perspective

This paper extends the methodology for the economic analysis of tropospheric ozone regulation reported in Repetto (1987). Firstly, the acid rain objective is explicitly incorporated by assigning an additional benefit to the acidifying precursors of ozone. Secondly, we introduce the transboundary dimension which is of particular importance to Europe. The methodology is applied to the evaluation of the costs and benefits of the Geneva Protocol on hydrocarbons for Belgium.     

Optimal location of new forests in a suburban region

This paper looks at the optimal location of new forests in a suburban region under area constraints. The methodology takes into account use benefits, non-use benefits (both bequest and existence values), opportunity costs of converting agricultural land, as well as planting and management costs of the new forest. The recreational benefits of new forest sites are estimated using function transfer techniques. We show that the net social benefit of the total afforestation project varies up to a factor 6. The recreational value of a site varies considerably with the available substitutes.     

The double dividend and the role of inequality aversion and macroeconomic regimes

The introduction of the European Community's carbon-energy tax in a small open economy is analyzed by comparing two kinds of revenue recycling. We use a dynamic general-equilibrium model with different regimes for the labor market, several income groups, and a crude valuation of environmental benefits. This allows for a more comprehensive empirical test of the double-dividend hypothesis, including equity aspects. It is shown that the weak double-dividend hypothesis can fail when equity aspects are taken into account.     

Informational Benefits of International Treaties

International treaties allow a minister in one country to learn about the beliefs held by a minister in another country, so allowing each to make better decisions. When the net benefits of environmental policy are uncertain, a country which participates in negotiating an environmental treaty, or which supports strong environmental action, thereby provides information to another country that such action can be worthwhile. This dimension of international environmental agreements helps explain why countries negotiate treaties, why these treaties often implement the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium, why agreement to a treaty by a country deemed not particularly favorable to it can strengthen environmental action, and why treaties may invoke a minimum participation clause. The informational mechanism we discuss holds even if physical spillovers are absent, and even if monitoring and enforcement are infeasible. Our approach can explain additional phenomena: how requirements for approval by several bodies within a country can increase support for a policy, and why simultaneous action can lead to better outcomes than sequential action.     

Optimal Tax and Public Investment Rules for Congestion Type of Externalities

Optimal government policy is considered in a second-best framework where consumers and producers cause an externality of the congestion type and income distribution issues are taken into account. The theoretical results of the optimal tax literature are adapted using the concept of the net social Pigouvian tax. An illustrative AGE model uncovers the relative importance of its components. The model demonstrates that the level of the externality tax does not depend strongly on distribution concerns, as reoptimization of the other taxes ensures that the income distribution objective is reached. The model also allows us to study the interaction between externality taxes and public abatement.