On durable goods markets with entry and adverse selection

Abstract. We investigate the nature of trading and sorting induced by the dynamic price mechanism in a competitive durable good market with adverse selection and exogenous entry of traders over time. The model is a dynamic version of Akerlof (1970) . Identical cohorts of durable goods, whose quality is known only to potential sellers, enter the market over time. We show that there exists a cyclical equilibrium where all goods are traded within a finite number of periods after entry. Market failure is reflected in the length of waiting time before trade. The model also provides an explanation of market fluctuations. JEL classification: D82 A propos des marchés de biens durables quand il y a entrée de nouveaux commerçants et sélection adverse. Les auteurs analysent la nature du commerce et du triage engendrés par le mécanisme dynamique des prix dans un marché concurrentiel de biens durables quand il y a sélection adverse et entrée exogène de nouveaux commerçants dans le temps. Ce modèle est une version dynamique du modèle d’ Akerlof (1970) . Des cohortes identiques de biens durables, dont la qualité est connue seulement des vendeurs potentiels, arrivent sur le marché dans le temps. Il semble qu’il y ait plus de commerce actif que ce qui est prévu par un modèle statique. En particulier, on montre qu’il existe un équilibre cyclique où tous les biens sont transigés à l’intérieur d’un nombre fini de périodes après leur arrivage et que, à chaque phase du cycle, l’éventail de qualité des biens transigés s’accroît. Les commerçants qui transigent des produits de plus haute qualité attendent plus longtemps et l’imperfection du marché se traduit par la longueur de temps d’attente avant la transaction. Le modèle fournit aussi une explication des fluctuations du marché.     

All–Pay Auctions with Variable Rewards

We study all–pay auctions with variable rewards under incomplete information. In standard models, a reward depends on a bidder's privately known type; however, in our model it is also a function of his bid. We show that in such models there is a potential for paradoxical behavior where a reduction in the rewards or an increase in costs may increase the expected sum of bids or alternatively the expected highest bid.     

Crafting Internal Hybrids: Complementarities,Common Change Initiatives,and the Team-Based Organization

Hybrid governance forms that seek to meld the virtues of both market control and traditional hierarchical control are alluring. Comparatively little research, outside of the M-form literature, has examined internal hybrids - hierarchical forms infused with elements of market control. This paper contends that common change initiatives, such as TQM, re-engineering, autonomous work teams, and group-based rewards, are appropriately viewed as attempts to craft internal hybrids by selectively infusing elements of market control within hierarchy. However, these change initiatives are often implemented in isolation and, as a consequence, violate patterns of complementarity that sustain traditional hierarchy or support the stable infusion of market control.The paper argues that these violations of complementarity often spiral hierarchies toward fundamental transformation. The clear trajectory of these transformations is to quite radically disaggregated organizations structured around teams. The paper presents both theory and evidence supporting the existence of complementarities among these common change initiatives.     

Entrepreneurship and Unemployment in the UK

The influence of industrial structure, more specifically of entrepreneurship, is investigated on the level of unemployment in the UK. The question is to what extent entrepreneurship, i.e., business ownership can reduce the level of unemployment. The alleged differences between the managed and the entrepreneurial economy will be discussed as well as the links between entrepreneurship and unemployment. It will be concluded that the UK is a relative outlier when using a simple model of the relationship between unemployment and the rate of business ownership. The model is calibrated using recent data of some 23 OECD countries. It underestimates the decrease in unemployment in the UK in the period 1982–1990. Some arguments are brought forward why this might be the case.     

Reporting Discretion and Private Information Communication through Earnings

We model a two-period pure exchange economy where a risk averse manager, who has private information regarding future earnings, is required to issue an earnings report to investors at the end of each period. While the manager is prohibited from directly disclosing her private information, she is allowed to bias reported earnings in the first period, subject to GAAP rules that require that a specified proportion of the bias be reversed subsequently. We show there is a minimum threshold of reversal, such that, when the proportion of required reversal is above this threshold, the manager smooths income and communicates her private information through reported earnings. Consequently, the market attaches greater weight to reported earnings than under a regime that allows no discretion. When the required reversal is below the minimum threshold, the manager increases reported earnings without limit and the equilibrium degenerates. When the manager is not endowed with any private information, the market unravels the "true" earnings and price is unaffected by earnings management. Our results underscore the importance of both allowing and restricting reporting discretion through formal mechanisms.     

Comparing Sunspot Equilibrium And Lottery Equilibrium Allocations: The Finite Case*

Sunspot equilibrium and lottery equilibrium are two stochastic solution concepts for nonstochastic economies. We compare these concepts in a class of completely finite, (possibly) nonconvex exchange economies with perfect markets, which requires extending the lottery model to the finite case. Every equilibrium allocation of our lottery model is also a sunspot equilibrium allocation. The converse is almost always true. There are exceptions, however: For some economies, there exist sunspot equilibrium allocations with no lottery equilibrium counterpart.     

Temporary controls on capital inflows

During the past decade a number of countries imposed capital controls that had two distinguishing features: they were asymmetric, in that they were designed principally to discourage capital inflows, and they were temporary. This paper studies formally the consequences of these policies, calibrates their potential effectiveness, and assesses their welfare implications in an environment in which the level of capital inflows can be sub-optimal. In addition, motivated by the fact that these types of controls have often been left in place after the dissipation of the shock that lead to the controls being implemented, the paper evaluates the welfare cost of procrastination in removing these types of controls.     

Competitive effects of Basel II on US bank credit card lending

We analyze the potential competitive effects of the proposed Basel II capital regulations on US bank credit card lending. We find that bank issuers operating under Basel II will face higher regulatory capital minimums than Basel I banks, with differences due to the way the two regulations treat reserves and gain-on-sale of securitized assets. During periods of normal economic conditions, this is not likely to have a competitive effect; however, during periods of substantial stress in credit card portfolios, Basel II banks could face a significant competitive disadvantage relative to Basel I banks and nonbank issuers.     

Characteristics of Risk and Return in Risk Arbitrage

This paper analyzes 4,750 mergers from 1963 to 1998 to characterize the risk and return in risk arbitrage. Results indicate that risk arbitrage returns are positively correlated with market returns in severely depreciating markets but uncorrelated with market returns in flat and appreciating markets. This suggests that returns to risk arbitrage are similar to those obtained from selling uncovered index put options. Using a contingent claims analysis that controls for the nonlinear relationship with market returns, and after controlling for transaction costs, we find that risk arbitrage generates excess returns of four percent per year.