Is there an economic system based on sovereignty of each consumer?

Conclusion One could add to these examples and show that systems based on consumer sovereignty can range from some historical realizations oflaissez-faire all the way to certain conceivable forms of (Lange) socialism. In every case an analysis of the individual incentive systems that fuel and of the welfare rationale that shapes the economic and political structures would be required before actual systems could be classified in a welfare relevant sense.Pareto optimality and actual or planner-simulated perfect competition certainly cannot be mandatory if systems based on consumer sovereignty are to exist. Freedom of consumers as a group regarding their choice of political and economic constitution and freedom of action for each individual who is protected by the Pareto criterion within some statistical confidence interval under each constitution suffice for consumer sovereignty. As long as the government remains demonstrably representative of the qualified majority in constitutional questions and respectful of all voters in its parliamentary processes, the consumer-predilected scope of government activities may differ from case to case, but the welfare basis is the same.In a second-best world, consumers and their representatives may even choose to delegate many or most allocative decisions to the executive branch of government, if they see no superior and feasible alternative. Extreme caution is justified if it is feared that such voluntary delegation of powers may prove irreversible; yet systems based on consumer sovereignty can take varying forms. In general, ideological labels, or terms based on characteristic details, institutional parameters, or formal organization are therefore insufficient for systems classification on the welfare basis which may well be regarded as the single most important respect in which economic systems can differ.     

Uncertainty and markets for renewable resources

The market allocation of renewable resources is examined when growth rates are affected by random disturbances. Given free access to a renewable resource, environmental disturbances are shown to affect the biological survival of the resource. The optimal solution is then examined and it is shown to be achieved by a competitive allocation when property rights are clearly defined given rational expectations or a complete set of contingent futures markets. The stochastic dynamics are shown in each case to differ considerably from the deterministic model.     

The economics of markets and platforms

Advances in the study of both markets and platforms contribute to economics. Platforms are typically digital markets, although platforms can designate markets generally. So, the economics of markets and the economics of platforms are one and the same. Platforms show the critical role of intermediaries in endogenous price adjustment and market clearing. The platform model remedies problems with general equilibrium analysis by combining and extending the basic Walrasian and Marshalian market models. The analysis of platforms provides explanations for the bid–ask spread, including market power, search costs, matching costs, adverse selection, and moral hazard. The study of platforms demonstrates the importance of participation and coordination in the formation of markets. The discussion emphasizes that platforms have significant implications for the theory of the firm. The analysis further considers how platforms affect innovation and entrepreneurship.     

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGY: A SURVEY

The survey classifies economic theories of the firm into four categories based on the level of aggregation in economic models: (1) neoclassical, (2) industrial organization, (3) contractual, and (4) organizational incentive. Economic theories of the firm are evaluated on the basis of their potential application to problems of management decision making. The survey suggests that a management perspective can be useful in developing an integrated theoretical analysis of the firm that addresses both competitive strategy and organizational design.     

The quality of innovation and the extent of the market

I present a comprehensive model of international trade in technology that considers both the demand for inventions and the supply of inventions. On the demand side, domestic and foreign firms make strategic technology adoption decisions. On the supply side, inventors compete to sell licenses for their technology to domestic and foreign firms. Countries benefit from international trade in technology because they obtain the best invention from a larger pool of inventions. International trade in technology increases the extent of the market for inventions and thereby improves the quality of innovation. Technology trade lowers prices, increases outputs, and increases the volume of trade in differentiated products. When traded products are not close substitutes, international markets for technology generate gains from trade. The results of the analysis are robust to the possibility of technology transfer either through expropriation or imitation. Protection of intellectual property rights preserves incentives for entry of inventors and improves the quality of innovation.