Gamified interactions: whether,when, and how games facilitate self–brand connections

Firms increasingly use games to interact with their customers. Yet, surprisingly little is known about whether, when, and how such “gamified” interactions engage consumers with a firm’s brand, thereby facilitating self–brand connections. Building on flow theory, we show that gamified interactions that are highly interactive and optimally challenging facilitate self–brand connections, because such games lead to emotional and cognitive brand engagement. A field study and three experiments across various product domains and game designs support our theory. We also identify conditions under which consumers do not become engaged with a brand, namely when firms restrict their decisional control either to voluntarily participate in the game (i.e., compulsory play) or to spend as much time as desired playing the game (i.e., time pressure). Our findings advance existing knowledge about the use of games in marketing and provide important implications for how marketers can harness their potential to build self–brand connections.     

Policy Uncertainty and the Dual Role of Corporate Political Strategies

Firms use active political strategies not only to mitigate uncertainty emanating from legislative activity, but also to enhance their growth opportunities. We find that a firm's systematic risk (beta) can be hedged away by employing various political strategies involving the presence of former politicians on corporate boards of directors, contributions to political campaigns, and corporate lobbying activities. The hedging effect is greater when firms operate in more uncertain industries. In addition, active political strategies are associated with greater firm heterogeneity and make real options more value relevant as potential drivers of competitive advantages in uncertain environments.     

Plausible versus implausible tensile price claim: Selective accessibility model approach

Retailers frequently use exaggerated price discount advertisements with a tensile price claim (TPC; e.g., “Save up to 70%”) to attract consumers because they expect that once consumers enter a store, they will purchase low‐ or medium‐discounted products. Drawing on the selective accessibility model, this study investigated the way in which an implausibly high maximum level of savings stated in a TPC influences consumers’ expected price discount (EPD) and perceptions of actual price discounts across different types of TPCs (i.e., TPC stating a maximum level and TPC stating a range of savings). This study also investigated two situations in which consumers have previous knowledge of a product’s price discount versus when they have less or no knowledge of the discount. For both conditions, a single‐anchor TPC (i.e., “Save up to Y%”) that stated an implausible maximum level of savings led to a higher EPD and lower perceptions of the deal (i.e., perceived savings, price fairness, and perceived value) with respect to the actual price discount than did a TPC with a plausible maximum level of savings. In contrast, when the TPC stated two anchors (i.e., “Save X–Y%”) and consumers had knowledge of the price discount, their EPDs assimilated only toward the plausible anchor (X), and ignored the implausibly high maximum price discount (Y), resulting in a lower EPD and higher perceptions of the deal of the actual price discounts than a TPC that stated a plausibly high maximum level of savings. In contrast, when consumers had no knowledge of the price discount, their EPDs only adjusted toward the more plausible anchor (X), regardless of whether they perceived the maximum anchor as plausible or implausible. Thus, there was no difference in consumers’ perceptions of “Save X–Y%” between implausibly and plausibly high Y%.     

Migration Policy in a Small Open Economy with a Dual Labor Market

The paper uses a two–sector efficiency–wage model to analyze the consequences of immigration for a small open economy with a dual labor market. Immigrants are characterized by an (exogenous) return probability. Legal regulations impose preferential hiring of natives or "old" immigrants. As a result, there is sectoral segregation between natives and immigrants, leading to discrimination of the type equal pay for equal work,but unequal "work." In the short run (with sector–specific capital), immigration has a positive first–order impact on natives' welfare if migration policy favors segregation through high return rates or restrictive hiring practices ("guest–worker system"). In the long run, its effect is only determined by factor intensities (2 ¥ 2 model). Finally, the improved integration of migrants yields efficiency gains and improves aggregate welfare of all residents.     

The curse of natural resources in the transition economies*

The curse of natural resources is a well‐documented phenomenon for developing countries. Economies that are richly endowed with natural resources tend to grow slowly. Among the transition economies of the former ‘Eastern Bloc’, a similar pattern can be observed. This paper shows that a large part of the variation in growth rates among the transition economies can be attributed to the curse of natural resources. After controlling for numerous other factors, there is still a strong negative correlation between natural resource abundance and economic growth. Among the transition economies the prime reasons for the curse of natural resources were corruption and a neglect of basic education. In order to overcome the curse of natural resources and move to a sustainable path of development, the resource abundant transition countries should fight corruption and ensure that their resource revenues are invested in human capital or the preservation of natural capital.     

Applied Welfare Economics with Bounded Rationality: Public Policies Toward Remote Sensing

Earlier experimental evidence indicates that some decision makers under-invest in information when it is costly. This insight is applied to the cost–benefit analysis of the provision of data obtained by satellites. In fields like agriculture, remotely sensed information of great precision can be provided to additional farmers at minimal extra costs if a service for farmers with similar information needs is set up. Here, the tendency to under-invest in information asks for creative solutions by the private sector: bankers may work together with rational producers in setting up the information service and promoting it. However, if producers financial resources are insufficient, public intervention, in the form of a free information service may be necessary.The author would like to thank an anonymous referee, Stephan von Cramon-Taubadel, Sean Flynn, Daniel Heller, and Carlos Lenz and participants of the Lisbon Conference of the International Atlantic Economic Society, particularly Asatoshi Maeshiro, for helpful comments.