Migration Policy in a Small Open Economy with a Dual Labor Market

The paper uses a two–sector efficiency–wage model to analyze the consequences of immigration for a small open economy with a dual labor market. Immigrants are characterized by an (exogenous) return probability. Legal regulations impose preferential hiring of natives or "old" immigrants. As a result, there is sectoral segregation between natives and immigrants, leading to discrimination of the type equal pay for equal work,but unequal "work." In the short run (with sector–specific capital), immigration has a positive first–order impact on natives' welfare if migration policy favors segregation through high return rates or restrictive hiring practices ("guest–worker system"). In the long run, its effect is only determined by factor intensities (2 ¥ 2 model). Finally, the improved integration of migrants yields efficiency gains and improves aggregate welfare of all residents.     

The curse of natural resources in the transition economies*

The curse of natural resources is a well‐documented phenomenon for developing countries. Economies that are richly endowed with natural resources tend to grow slowly. Among the transition economies of the former ‘Eastern Bloc’, a similar pattern can be observed. This paper shows that a large part of the variation in growth rates among the transition economies can be attributed to the curse of natural resources. After controlling for numerous other factors, there is still a strong negative correlation between natural resource abundance and economic growth. Among the transition economies the prime reasons for the curse of natural resources were corruption and a neglect of basic education. In order to overcome the curse of natural resources and move to a sustainable path of development, the resource abundant transition countries should fight corruption and ensure that their resource revenues are invested in human capital or the preservation of natural capital.     

Herstellung von Wettbewerb durch Übertragung der Alterungsrückstellung in der Privaten Krankenversicherung

The system of individual prospective aging reserve enables the insured persons irrespectively of their individual risk to change their Private Health Insurance. Besides the presentation of an implementation concept it is shown that there is no inducement to miscalculate the extent of the individual prospective aging reserve on purpose.     

Further Results on Bayesian Method of Moments Analysis of the Multiple Regression Model

In this article we extend previous BMOM results by showing how information about a variance parameter and its relation to regression coefficients produces a rich class of postdata densities for regression parameters. Prediction and model selection techniques are also described. We also discuss the well-documented link between cross-entropy and the average log odds and then use this criterion in an experiment to compare results obtained from BMOM and Bayes approaches using data generated from known models.     

Interne Revision &; Controlling — Instrumente moderner Unternehmensführung in Kooperation

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Gamified interactions: whether,when, and how games facilitate self–brand connections

Firms increasingly use games to interact with their customers. Yet, surprisingly little is known about whether, when, and how such “gamified” interactions engage consumers with a firm’s brand, thereby facilitating self–brand connections. Building on flow theory, we show that gamified interactions that are highly interactive and optimally challenging facilitate self–brand connections, because such games lead to emotional and cognitive brand engagement. A field study and three experiments across various product domains and game designs support our theory. We also identify conditions under which consumers do not become engaged with a brand, namely when firms restrict their decisional control either to voluntarily participate in the game (i.e., compulsory play) or to spend as much time as desired playing the game (i.e., time pressure). Our findings advance existing knowledge about the use of games in marketing and provide important implications for how marketers can harness their potential to build self–brand connections.     

Australian momentum: performance,capacity and the GFC effect

This paper assesses the performance of momentum strategies in Australia, and how they were affected by the GFC. This paper is the first to address the issue of the dollar capacity of momentum strategies in the Australian market. We find evidence of a strong momentum effect in Australia amongst the S&P/ASX200 constituents. We find that momentum portfolios suffered during the GFC, but the effect was not persistent. Finally, we show that the capacity of the momentum effect in Australia is large enough in dollar terms to reject the assertion that momentum is more of a theoretical than a practical construct.     

Flexible collective bargaining agreements: Still a moderating effect on works council behaviour?

We analyse the interaction between different labour market institutions in Germany, namely, industry‐level bargaining and firm‐level codetermination by works councils. In particular, we are interested in the moderating effect of flexibility measures on the link between the existence works councils and collective agreements on wages and productivity. In presence of institutional changes, the question is whether works councils in covered plants still generate rather than redistribute rents, given recent decentralisation processes in the German system of industrial relations. We augment a theoretical model to provide hypotheses, which are then tested using empirical analysis of representative German plant level data. We find that the existence of flexibility provisions in collective bargaining agreements does not alter the effect of works council on firms' wages. We find, however, that with flexibility provisions works council presence is associated with higher productivity levels than without such provisions. These findings, however, depend on the level of collective bargaining: they can only be observed in plants covered by industry‐level contracts, but do not hold in plants covered by firm‐level contracts.