Tunneling and propping: A justification for pyramidal ownership

This paper links existence of the pyramidal ownership structure to tunneling and propping. Tunneling refers to a transfer of resources from a lower-level firm to a higher-level firm in the pyramidal chain, whereas propping concerns a transfer in the opposite direction intended to bail out the receiving firm from bankruptcy. We show that tunneling alone cannot justify the pyramidal structure unless outside investors are myopic, since rational outside investors anticipate tunneling and adjust their willingness-to-pay for the firm’s shares accordingly. With propping, however, they may be willing to be expropriated in exchange for implicit insurance against bankruptcy.     

Welfare Financing: Grant Allocation and Efficiency

Welfare is often administered locally, but financed through grants from the central government. This raises the question how the central government can prevent local governments from spending more than necessary. We analyze block grants used in The Netherlands, which depend on exogenous spending need determinants and are estimated from previous period welfare spending. We show that, although these grants give rise to perverse incentives by reducing the marginal costs of welfare spending, they are likely to be more efficient than a matching grant, and more equitable than a fixed block grant.     

Interfirm and Intrafirm Switching Costs in a Vertical Differentiation Setting: Green versus Nongreen Products

In a vertical differentiation model where both duopolists supply the same two qualities of an otherwise homogeneous product, we derive the critical level of the interfirm switching cost needed to sustain monopoly pricing. In particular, we show how a decrease in the intrafirm switching cost may cause a decrease in this critical value, thereby facilitating monopoly pricing. We apply the results to a setting with green and nongreen products—in particular electricity—and discuss implications for policy measures intended to stimulate the production and consumption of green products.     

Sound taxation? On the use of self-declared value

In the 16th century, foreign ships passing through the Sound had to pay ad valorem taxes, known as the Sound Dues. To give skippers an incentive to declare the true value of their cargo, the Danish Crown reserved the right to purchase it at the declared value. We show that this rule does not induce truth-telling, but does allow the authorities to effectively implement a given tax rate.     

CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY INVESTMENT AND SOCIAL OBJECTIVES: AN EXAMINATION ON SOCIAL WELFARE INVESTMENT OF CHINESE STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES

We apply the theory of corporate social responsibility to analyse social welfare investment undertaken by Chinese State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). We present a simple theoretical model to illustrate how the presence of social objectives in the firm's objective function changes its investment behaviour. Our theoretical model accommodates special features of Chinese SOEs, whose social welfare investment is driven by both social objectives and profit concerns. The model is then tested using a panel of Chinese enterprises during the period 1995–1999. The empirical analysis indicates that despite of the corporatization reform social welfare investment undertaken by Chinese SOEs is still inefficient due to the lack of profit concerns, suggesting that social objectives still dominate profit concerns in motivating the SOEs' social welfare investment. However, we do obtain clear-cut evidence showing that social objectives become less important as time progresses.