Equivalence of the weak and strong axioms of revealed preference without demand continuity assumptions: A “regularity condition” approach

The main result of this paper is that, provided the range of the demand function is convex and the whole budget is spent, the strong axiom of revealed preference holds if and only if the weak axiom of revealed preference and a certain “regularity” condition both hold. The regularity condition is a relationship between two definitions of expenditure compensation function that must hold if the strong axiom holds. The paper distinguishes itself from previous work in that no continuity assumptions are made on the demand function. It also discusses the relationship of the regularity condition used in this paper to the one used by Uzawa and van Moeseke.     

Revealed favorability,indirect utility,and direct utility

This paper studies the axiomatic foundations of the indirect utility function, based upon a revealed preference approach. A chain of comparisons of budgets is regarded as giving a relation on the price-income space (a revealed favorability relation) rather than a relation on the commodity space (a revealed preference relation). The weak and strong axioms of revealed favorability are introduced by analogy with the weak and strong axioms of revealed preference, and the relationship between the former two axioms is investigated. The indirect and direct utility functions are then derived on the basis of the strong axiom of revealed favorability. Neither the continuity property of the demand function nor the convex property of its range is required for the approach taken in the paper.     

Pareto-improving social optimal pricing schemes based on bottleneck permits for managing congestion at a merging section

Akamatsu, Sato, and Nguyen (2006 Akamatsu, T., Sato, S., &; Nguyen, X. L. (2006). Tradable time-of-day bottleneck permits for morning commuters (in Japanese). JSCE Journal of Infrastructure Planning 62(4), 605–620.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) proposed a first-best pricing scheme based on the concept of bottleneck permits. The scheme allows permit holders to pass a bottleneck at specified times and is shown to be able to minimize social cost. However, the scheme is not always Pareto-improving in that it may harm some drivers. The objective of this study is to design Pareto-improving pricing scheme with bottleneck permits for a V-shaped two-to-one merge bottleneck. First, the paper formulates the morning commute model in the network and describes the arrival time choice equilibrium in the network with merging bottleneck. Secondly, we show that the first-best pricing scheme with bottleneck permits for this V-shaped network does not always achieve a Pareto improvement, with the cost of one group of drivers is increased by the permit pricing, a phenomena akin to the bottleneck paradox of Arnott, de Palma, and Lindsey (1993 Arnott, R., de Palma, A., &; Lindsey, R. (1993). Properties of dynamic traffic equilibrium involving bottlenecks, including a paradox and metering. Transportation Science 27(2), 148–160.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). We propose three implementations of bottleneck permits for Pareto-improving: (1) merging priority rule is included in the bottleneck permits scheme by creating different market for each origin; (2) the permit revenues are refunded as monetary compensation to drivers whose cost is increased; and (3) the permit revenues are used to expand bottleneck capacity. For each implementation, we derive their equilibrium solutions and demonstrate that the Pareto improvement is achieved and social cost is decreased by using the permit revenues for expanding the bottleneck capacity.     

Measuring US sectoral shocks in the world input–output network

I measure the importance of sectoral shocks in US aggregate output by using the World Input–Output Table (WIOT). The WIOT allows me to correct potential sub-graph bias in previous literature, caused by using only the US industrial production input–output table. I report results from three closely related models to show how sensitive the analyses are to different specifications. The estimates vary from 10% to 45%.     

Dual Technology Management Model of design and production utilizing CAE ＆ experiment

At present, one of the specific measures taken is an urgent improvement of intelligent productivity for the purpose of offering highly reliable products to create customer value in a short period of time. Against this background, the author focuses on the New Japan Production Model for establishing a development designing and production engineering system in the automotive industry. This paper presents the Dual Technology Management Model of design and production for establishing a development designing and production quality assurance system that is indispensable for CAE （Computer-Aided Engineering） and experiment in the automotive industry and its effectiveness is verified.     

The role of information in profit-maximizing and labor-managed duopoly models

This paper analyzes the welfare implications of acquiring information for profit-maximizing and labor-managed duopolies. We invent a unified method of exploring the role of information in a two-person game under uncertainty on the basis of comparative static analysis, and then apply the method to both the PMF and the LMF. It is shown that whereas the LMF's behavior is analogous to that of the PMF twin in some circumstances, the former may be entirely different from the latter in others. Because a special status is accorded to labor as a variable factor of production, the informational analysis of the LM economy requires special care for both computations and interpretations.     

ANALYZING PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORTS OF DESTINATION MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS' ACTIONS AND OUTCOMES

As past research has considered the major stages of the consumer behavior model separately, it is hardly possible to evaluate the most effective factor over final decision making. Thus, this study has a special significance, as it evaluates every stage, makes a comparison between stages, and puts forward the relationship between them. The discussion of findings is related to the assessment of data collected through a questionnaire survey among Turkish domestic tourists. Study findings have concluded a positive interrelationship among all stages of the consumer behavior model in tourism, and these findings can be regarded as sufficient evidence to support the 10 research hypotheses proposed in the study. In light of these findings, the paper also addresses both theoretical and practical implications.     

Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations

Auction theory usually assumes the quasi-linearity of individual preferences. We drop this assumption and define an extension of second price mechanisms that applies to general preferences. It turns out that the extended second price mechanisms are the only rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, and a mild non-imposition property. Their definition is simple just as much as the definition of usual second price mechanisms: everyone reports his maximum willingness to pay and the bidder whose reported value is highest buys the auctioned object for the price equal to the second highest reported value. The characterization is valid if efficiency is replaced by envy-freeness. I gratefully acknowledge an associate editor and two anonymous referees for their very helpful comments. Hiroki Saitoh and Shigehiro Serizawa independently obtain a result that is closely related to my main result (see, Remark in Sect. 1). I thank them for sending me the paper and communication, and Yuji Fujinaka for informing me about their work. I also thank the financial support by KAKENHI (19310031).     

Fairness and implementability in allocation of indivisible objects with monetary compensations

This paper introduces a general framework for the fair allocation of indivisible objects when each agent can consume at most one (e.g., houses, jobs, queuing positions) and monetary compensations are possible. This framework enables us to deal with identical objects and monotonicity of preferences in ranking objects. We show that the no-envy solution is the only solution satisfying equal treatment of equals, Maskin monotonicity, and a mild continuity property. The same axiomatization holds if the continuity property is replaced by a neutrality property.