More on Middlemen: Equilibrium Entry and Efficiency in Intermediated Markets

This paper generalizes Rubinstein and Wolinsky's (1987) model of middlemen (intermediation) by incorporating production and search costs, plus more general matching and bargaining. This allows us to study many new issues, including entry, efficiency, and dynamics. In the benchmark model, equilibrium exists uniquely and involves production and intermediation for some parameters but not others. Sometimes intermediation is essential: the market operates if and only if middlemen are active. If bargaining powers are set correctly equilibrium is efficient; if not there can be too much or too little economic activity. This is novel, compared to the original Rubinstein–Wolinsky model, where equilibrium is always efficient.     

Counterfeiting as Private Money in Mechanism Design

We describe counterfeiting activity as the issuance of private money, one that is difficult to monitor. Our approach, which amends the basic random‐matching model of money in mechanism design, allows a tractable welfare analysis of currency competition. We show that it is not efficient to eliminate counterfeiting activity completely. We do not appeal to lottery devices, and we argue that this is consistent with imperfect monitoring.     

Near-sighted Justice

Chapter 11 structures complex negotiations between creditors and debtors that are overseen by a bankruptcy court. We identify conditions where the court should sometimes err in determining which firms should be liquidated. Such errors affect actions by both good and bad entrepreneurs. We first characterize the optimal error rate without renegotiation. When creditors and debtors can renegotiate to circumvent an error‐riven court, for one class of actions a blind court that ignores all information is optimal. For another class, the court should place the burden of proof on the entrepreneur. The robust feature is that the court should sometimes err.     

Industrial Relations Climate and Union Commitment: An Evaluation of Workplace‐Level Effects

This paper examines the relationship between industrial relations (IR) climate and union commitment. Using a multi‐workplace sample from North East England, aggregation analysis provided support for treating IR climate as a workplace‐level variable, and workplace IR climate was negatively associated with union commitment. However, IR climate moderated none of the relationships between individual‐level antecedents and union commitment.     

Can the U.S. Interbank Market Be Revived?

The U.S. interbank market essentially disappeared as the reserve supply dramatically increased after the 2007–2008 crisis. We build a model to study whether the interbank market can revive if the reserve supply decreases sufficiently. The market may not revive due to balance sheet costs associated with recent banking regulations. Although interbank volume may initially increase as reserves decline from abundant levels, the balance sheet costs may engender changes in market structure that completely replace interbank trading by nonbank lending to banks. This nonmonotonic response could lead to misleading forecasts about future interbank volumes.     

Why Do Individual Investors Disregard Accounting Information? The Roles of Information Awareness and Acquisition Costs

We investigate the frictions that impede individual investors’ use of accounting information and, in particular, their costs of monitoring and acquiring accounting disclosures. We do so using an archival setting in which individuals are presented with automated media articles that report both current earnings news and past stock returns. Although these investors have earnings information readily available, we find no evidence that their trades incorporate it. Instead we find that their trading responds to the trailing stock returns presented in the articles. Our study raises questions about the efficacy of regulations that aim to aid less sophisticated investors by increasing their awareness of and access to accounting information.     

Economic Incentives,Business Cycles,and Long‐Term Sickness Absence

We investigate long‐term absenteeism in Norway, on the basis of register data covering 8 years and more than two million absence spells. Key findings are that: (1) a tighter labor market yields lower work resumption rates for persons who are absent, and higher relapse rates for persons who have already resumed work; and (2) the work resumption rates increase when sickness benefits are exhausted, but work resumptions at this stage tend to be short‐lived.     

Cross-selling across stores or within a store? Impacts of cross-buying behavior in online shopping malls

Abstract

This study investigates the impacts of cross-buying behavior in an online shopping mall where customers can purchase from additional product categories from various independent stores. We focus on the extent to which store loyalty and relationship duration moderate the cross-buying effects on three behavioral traits: customers’ purchase rate, lifetime duration, and spending. The results reveal that customers who engage in cross-buying more intensely purchase more frequently, have longer expected lifetime duration, and spend higher amounts in each transaction. The impacts on purchase frequency and customer retention are even greater for customers who exhibit higher behavioral loyalty toward some stores. However, store loyalty is found to weaken the association between cross-buying and average spending. Further, relationship duration appears to weaken the effects of cross-buying on purchase rate and spending. These results provide new insights into the impacts of cross-buying on customer value as well as managerial implications for shopping mall owners.