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Does the competition mode influence the delegation decisions of the firm owners? By constructing a vertical negotiation game model, we find that under Cournot competition in the downstream market, the downstream firm's owner will not choose delegation, whereas under Bertrand competition, the downstream firm's owner will choose delegation. If the product substitution is relatively large, the adoption of delegation management by the owners of downstream firms under Bertrand competition will bring higher profits. It further shows that compared with the situation of no delegation, delegation management may reverse the social welfare ranking under Bertrand and Cournot competitions. 相似文献
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Jie Li Xingtang Wang Baomin Dong Eden S. H. Yu 《Review of International Economics》2019,27(4):1108-1125
Would a foreign firm’s consumer‐oriented corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities be rewarded by an importing country’s voluntary tariff reduction? The current paper addresses this question in an import‐competing duopoly model with vertical product differentiation. It is shown that the tariff will decrease if the foreign firm switches from a purely profit‐driven firm to a CSR firm. A consumer‐oriented CSR strategy will always hurt the domestic firm’s profit, whereas the relationship between the foreign firm’s profit and CSR sensitivity (the degree to which a firm cares about consumer welfare) is invertedly U‐shaped. When firms’ decisions to switch to CSR are endogeneized, only the foreign firm will become a CSR firm. 相似文献
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农作物秸秆饲料加工利用技术 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
农作物秸秆是一种十分宝贵的生物资源。本文简述农作物秸秆的化学组成及营养价值、农作物秸秆饲料加工利用技术和提高农作物秸秆饲料利用率及营养价值的新方法。 相似文献
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Review of Economic Design - This paper reconsiders the effects of monopolistic third-degree price discrimination on welfare in a vertical market. The results indicate that monopolistic downstream... 相似文献
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Xingtang Wang 《Managerial and Decision Economics》2023,44(1):608-618
In this paper, we introduce quality differences in vertical market and compare the managerial delegation contracts of downstream firms. We find that the owner of a downstream firm that produces low-quality products induces the manager to behave more aggressively when the marginal cost coefficient is low. While when marginal cost coefficient is high, the owner of a downstream firm that produces high-quality products induces the manager to behave more aggressively. It is further found that managerial delegation can improve the profits of downstream firms but reduce the consumer surplus and social welfare. 相似文献
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