Explaining Eastern Germany's Wage Gap: The Impact of Structural Change

Since Eastern Germany's conversion to a market economy wages have remained considerably below the West German wage level. This article looks at the role of establishment-specific factors—such as sectoral affiliation and size of the labour force—in this process. A non-parametric decomposition that has played a prominent role in the gender wage gap literature is applied to breakdown the East–West wage gap into its constituent components. Using establishment data from German employment statistics, the article demonstrates that the catching-up process of Eastern Germany's wage level is hindered by the shift in its economic structure towards lower-paying types of companies, which has caused the lagging behind in the adjustment of wages.     

Do Markets Care about Central Bank Governor Changes? Evidence from Emerging Markets

Based on a new daily data set for 20 emerging markets over the period 1992–2006, we examine the reactions of foreign exchange markets, domestic stock markets, and sovereign bond spreads to central bank governor changes. We find that the replacement of a central bank governor negatively affects financial markets on the announcement day, which is in line with the hypothesis that newly appointed central bank governors suffer from a systematic credibility problem at the beginning of their tenure. We also find some evidence that changes in perceived central bank independence affect markets.     

DISCOUNT RATE VALUE AND CASH FLOW DEFINITION: A NEW RELATIONSHIP AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

This article uses different standpoints to approach the question of the consistency of project valuation methods. It shows that the NPV of a project can be obtained by discounting adjusted operating cash flows at a different rate from the risk-adjusted discount rate which should normally be used. Each of the conventional project valuation methods (standard WACC, equity residual, Arditti-Levy, APV) accordingly corresponds to a specific choice of the discount rate. Thus the convergence of these methods is obvious when the risk-adjusted discount rate integrates a debt ratio equal to the one of the project. Moreover, we obtain the Modigliani-Miller relationship generalized to the case of a project of any duration.     

Dynamic Matching and Evolving Reputations

This paper introduces a general model of matching that includes evolving public Bayesian reputations and stochastic production. Despite productive complementarity, assortative matching robustly fails for high discount factors, unlike in Becker (1973) . This failure holds around the highest (lowest) reputation agents for "high skill" ("low skill") technologies. We find that matches of likes eventually dissolve. In another life-cycle finding, young workers are paid less than their marginal product, and old workers more. Also, wages rise with tenure but need not reflect marginal products: information rents produce non-monotone and discontinuous wage profiles.     

Are Employee Selection and Incentive Contracts Complements or Substitutes?

There is a debate in the literature as to whether employee selection is a substitute or complement to incentive contracting. We argue that incentive contracts and selection can be both complements and substitutes conditional on the contracting difficulty faced by the firm. We examine these control choices in a setting where contracting difficulties arise due to the firm's choice of strategy and from the volatility created by the firm's external environment. We select a firm's commitment to organizational learning (OL) as our strategic choice variable as this provides a useful proxy for identifying settings where explicit incentive contracting is difficult. The results show that, as firms become increasingly committed to OL, incentive contracts and employee selection operate as complements. However, with a high commitment to OL and an increasing level of external volatility, contracting on performance measures will become less effective. In this context, our results indicate that there is a substitution effect toward employee selection.