System and management problems of the electric power industry’s development in Russia

The current management system of Russia??s electric power industry??s development, including industry regulatory documents and mechanisms by which generating capacities are built up, is considered in the article. The management problems of the industry??s development are analyzed. Ways of its further improvement are suggested.     

A proposal for social pricing of water supply in Côte d'Ivoire

We consider the design of a nonlinear social tariff for residential water in Côte d'Ivoire, which is a case of a monopolistic private operator supplying a population of heterogeneous consumers. The proposed optimal tariff includes an initial “social” block with a low unit price, and higher consumption blocks with a monopoly pricing rule. This optimal nonlinear tariff is calibrated using econometric estimates of a panel-data residential water demand equation. Welfare changes associated with moving from the actual tariff to approximations of the optimal pricing system are computed under different tariff scenarios. We find that gains in consumer welfare would outweigh losses in producer surplus in a majority of Ivorian local communities.     

Technological Progress and Sectoral Shares

This paper studies the effect of differences in the rate of technological progress between sectors on their relative sizes. There are two sectors: a stagnant sector, where productivity does not change over time, and a progressive sector, where costs decrease over time. We consider a conjectural variation approach which encompasses perfect competition, oligopoly and monopoly. The evolution of the relative shares of the stagnant and progressive sectors over time depends on the type of competition, cost levels and the price elasticity of demand. The relationship with the cost disease literature is discussed.     

Historical simulation approach to the estimation of stochastic discount factor models

We propose an approach to the estimation of the parameters of stochastic discount factor (SDF) models which is based on the idea that the next period joint distribution of the variables in a SDF and asset returns can be well approximated by their joint historical distribution. The estimates of the SDF parameters may therefore be found as the values of the parameters at which the mean of the historical distribution of the product of the SDF with an asset return equals one. Each time period, the estimates are updated using the most recent periods of data and hence can change over time. This method can be viewed as an alternative to the approaches that specify a particular functional form relating the SDF parameters to proxies for the state of the world.     

Common agency with risk-averse agent

In a common agency model with a risk-averse agent and private information distortion in the equilibrium policy from the first-best is greater compared to the case of a risk-neutral agent. The principals are unable to screen completely the agent’s preferences if he is sufficiently risk-averse: there is bunching in the contract. The contribution schedules keep track of informational externality. However, when the coefficient of risk-aversion goes to zero the contributions become truthful as in the complete information case.     

Financial systems,financing constraints and investment: empirical analysis of OECD countries

This paper investigates the influence of cash flow on corporate investment in 11 OECD countries. We find that the sensitivity of investment levels to internally available funds differs significantly across countries, and is lower in countries with predominantly close bank–firm relationships than in countries with predominantly arm's-length bank–firm relationships. At the same time, we find no relationship of the levels of financial constraints to indicators of overall financial development. Our results are consistent with the view that information and incentive problems in the capital market have important effects on corporate investment, and that close bank–firm relationships can reduce these problems and thus improve the access of firms to external finance.     

Forecasting student admissions,graduations, and numbers in institutions of vocational education

This article presents a mathematical model for long-term high-precision forecasting based on statistical data on student admissions, graduations, and numbers in institutions of vocational education for the period until 2020.     

Delegation to a possibly ignorant agent

In a delegation problem, an uninformed principal delegates decision‐making powers to a biased and possibly ignorant agent. The principal cannot use monetary payments but can restrict the set of the agent's choices. I show that in the general case, the principal may offer a disconnected set of choices. In a setting with arbitrary bias the uncertainty principle holds—the principal benefits as the likelihood that the agent is informed increases. When the bias is constant, I show that the ally principle holds—the principal benefits as the bias becomes smaller. Finally, when the likelihood of the agent being informed is determined by the agent's effort, then for small biases the principal benefits from limiting the agent's choice. When the agent is sufficiently biased, the principal gives more choice to the agent, so as to to improve incentives for information acquisition.     

The informational effects of competition and collusion in legislative politics

We use a mechanism design approach to study the organization of interest groups in an informational model of lobbying. Interest groups influence the legislature only by communicating private information on their preferences and not by means of monetary transfers. Interest groups have private information on their ideal points in a one-dimensional policy space and may either compete or adopt more collusive behaviors. Optimal policies result from a trade-off between imposing rules which are non-responsive to the groups' preferences and flexibility that pleases groups better. Within a strong coalition, interest groups credibly share information which facilitates communication of their joint interests, helps screening by the legislature and induces flexible policies responsive to the groups' joint interests (an informativeness effect). Competing interest groups better transmit information on their individual preferences (a screening effect). The socially and privately optimal organization of lobbying favors competition between groups only when their preferences are not too congruent with those of the legislature. With more congruence, a strong coalition is preferred. Finally, within a weak coalition, interest groups must design incentive compatible collusive mechanisms to share information. Such weak coalitions are always inefficient.     

Exclusion via Non‐Exclusive Contracts

We establish that non‐linear vertical contracts can allow an incumbent to exclude an upstream rival in a setting that does not rely on the exclusivity of the incumbent's contracts with downstream firms or any limits on distribution channels available to the incumbent or rival. The optimal contract we describe is a three‐part quantity discounting contract that involves the payment of an allowance to a downstream distributor and a marginal wholesale price below the incumbent's marginal cost for sufficiently large quantities. The optimal contract is robust to allowing parties to renegotiate contracts in case of entry.