Does educational diversity of managers matter for the performance of team‐managed funds?

We study the effect of the educational diversity of managers on the performance of team‐managed mutual funds using a large sample of U.S. equity funds from 1994 to 2013. We consider diversity in terms of both final educational degree and field of educational specialisation. We find that, in general, both types of diversity have a positive impact on fund performance, and our results are robust over a wide range of performance metrics and changes in market conditions.     

On efficiency of the ratio estimator

Summary The exact mean square error for the ratio estimator of a finite population total based on simple random sampling without replacement is shown to have an expected value less than that of the variance of the ratio estimator based on Midzuno’s scheme, under a usual super-population model.     

民营企业员工敬业度影响因素研究

当前,在国内企业中普遍存在员工敬业度低的现象。中国民营企业在现阶段的人力资源开发和人才培养体系创建上缺乏有效的机制。同时,员工敬业度和忠诚度对企业发展有着重要意义。民营企业作为国民经济和社会发展的主力军,为了适应市场中激烈的竞争,只有吸引、留住和用好人才,建立行之有效的人力资源管理体系,才是民营企业发展、生存的关键。论文综合了部分国内外的文献资料,阐述了员工敬业度的概念,指出了影响员工敬业度的因素,提出了解决民营企业员工敬业度问题的方法。     

Industrial relations law,employment security and collective bargaining in India: myths,realities and hopes

This article examines the debate on reforms in industrial relations law in India, needed to support its economic liberalisation programme. Analysing a distinctively Indian experience of state intervention in industrial relations, it concludes that the thrust of the reform should be towards entrusting union recognition and promotion of dispute settlement to an authority that is independent of the state executive.     

Tariffs, licensing and market structure

This paper challenges the conventional wisdom that exclusive owners of an advanced technology are always better off when producing as a monopolist than when competing against another firm. Competition against a less-efficient firm weakens the power that a host country can exert on the incumbent in the form of its tariff policy. We show that this gives a motive for a monopolist to license its technology to another foreign firm. A host country gains more from increased competition if it can induce the foreign incumbent to transfer technology to the host country firm. We show that the host country can do so by tariff commitment. We also discuss the implications of bargaining under licensing and Bertrand competition in the product market. Hence, this paper qualifies and extends the recent work of Kabiraj and Marjit [Protecting consumers through protection: The role of tariff-induced technology transfer. European Economic Review 47, 113-124].     

The demand for game day attendance in college football: an analysis of the 1997 Division 1‐A season

This paper develops a predictive model which includes game, team and university specific factors that are likely to influence game day demand for Division 1‐A college football. Attendance during the 1997 regular season is used as the dependent variable. Tobit estimates of two separate equations reveal that the quality of both teams, traditional rivalry and membership of specific conferences have a significant influence on demand. In addition, colleges with lower enrollments and a higher percentage of off‐campus students attract smaller crowds. The presence of a nearby professional football team also detracts from a college team's drawing power. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Bank lending rules for managing sovereign risk

A simple domestic lending rule is one that ensures that the loan rate exceeds the bank's cost of capital and the borrower's expected cashflows exceed the terminal value of the loan. Because a sovereign loan is not collateralized and lacks recourse, the domestic lending rule is not adequate for making sovereign lending decisions. Three modifications are suggested. First, the sovereign borrower's time preference for consumption needs to be considered. Second, the domestic borrower's decision to default voluntarily is made after observing the value of the collateral whereas the sovereign borrower's decision is made after observing earnings. In this paper, the sovereign borrower upgrades expectations in a Bayesian manner. Although no lending rule will completely prevent a default, the probability of default can be managed leading to a third modification.     

An experimental study of strategic information transmission

Summary We examine strategic information transmission in an experiment. Senders are privately informed about a state. They send messages to Receivers, who choose actions resulting in payoffs to Senders and Receivers. The payoffs depend on the action and the state. We vary the degree to which the Receivers' and the Senders' preferences diverge. We examine the relationship between the Senders' messages and the true state as well as that between actions and the true state and contrast the ability of different equilibrium message sets to explain the data.When preferences are closely aligned Senders disclose more. We assess two comparative statics: (i) as preferences diverge, state and action are less frequently matched, and (ii) messages tend to become less informative as preferences diverge. The first result is weakly confirmed for adjacent treatments but is considerably stronger when non-adjacent treatments are compared. We find that as preferences diverge messages become less informative. While the ex-ante Pareto-optimal Bayesian Nash Equilibrium does not explain our conditions, the equilibrium message sets supported by the data are similar to the ex-ante Pareto Optimal message sets.We would like to thank seminar participants at the Economic Science Association meetings, the University of Iowa, the University of Minnesota, Northwestern University and the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory meetings for their comments. We would like to thank Beth Allen, Joyce Berg, Robert Forsythe, Yong-Gwan Kim, Antonio Merlo, Leonard Mirman, In-Uck Park, Charles Plott, Jennifer Reinganum and an anonymous referee for their suggestions. Financial support from the Accounting Research Center at the University of Minnesota is also acknowledge.     

试论财政优化资源配置的作用

资源配置客观上包含宏观、中观、微观三个层次。尽管市场在资源配置中应发挥基础性作用，但为了实现三个层次的资源配置的优化，政府财政都应发挥重要的调节作用。