Motivating Through Delegating Tasks or Giving Attention

An important role of managers is to motivate subordinates. Monetaryrewards have been the focus of economic analysis. Managers alsouse other means to influence subordinates. If a manager canbetter assess the subordinate's ability than the subordinatehimself, and if ability and effort are complements, the managerfinds it hard not to overstate a junior's ability. Talk is cheap.We analyze under what conditions a manager can use organizationalpractices such as delegation and the selective provision ofattention to credibly communicate his assessment. We comparetheir desirability. Delegation is preferable in case the manager'sassessment is fairly accurate; attention is inescapable if itis inaccurate.     

Argumentation-Based Qualitative Preference Modelling with Incomplete and Uncertain Information

This paper presents an argumentation-based framework for the modelling of, and automated reasoning about multi-attribute preferences of a qualitative nature. The framework presents preferences according to the lexicographic ordering that is well-understood by humans. Preferences are derived in part from knowledge. Knowledge, however, may be incomplete or uncertain. The main contribution of the paper is that it shows how to reason about preferences when only incomplete or uncertain information is available. We propose a strategy that allows reasoning with incomplete information and discuss a number of strategies to handle uncertain information. It is shown how to extend the basic framework for modelling preferences to incorporate these strategies.     

In Defense of Boards

It is often assumed that bad corporate performance means a bad CEO. The task of a board of directors is then simple: dismiss the executive. If it fails to do so, the board is said to be indolent. We take a kinder approach to observed board behavior and point to the problems even well-intended boards would encounter. They face the twin task of disciplining and screening executives. We analyze the nature of the retention contract a board uses to discipline and screen executives. Consistent with empirical observation, we find that executives may become overly active to show their credentials, and that the link between bad performance and dismissal is weak.