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Abstract. Differences in regional unemployment rates are often used to describe regional economic inequality. This paper asks whether changes in regional unemployment differences in West Germany are persistent over time. Understanding the persistency of regional unemployment differences helps us to assess how effective regional policy can be. While univariate tests suggest that changes in regional unemployment differences are persistent in West Germany, more powerful panel tests lend some support to the hypothesis that regional unemployment rates converge. However, these tests reveal a moderate speed of convergence at best. Because there is a structural break following the second oil crisis, we also use tests that allow for such a break. This provides evidence for both convergence and quick adjustment to an equilibrium distribution of regional unemployment rates that is, however, subject to a structural break.  相似文献   
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This paper proposes to exploit a reform in legal rules of corporate governance to identify contractual incentives from the correlation of executive pay and firm performance. In particular, we refer to a major shift in the legal and institutional environment, the reform of the German joint-stock companies act in 1884. We analyze a sample of executive pay for 46 firms for the years 1870–1911. In 1884, a legal reform substantially enhanced corporate control, strengthened the monitoring incentives of shareholders, and reduced the discretionary power of executives in Germany. The pay–performance sensitivity decreased significantly after this reform. While executives received a bonus of about 3–5% in profits before 1884, after the reform this parameter decreased to a profit share of about 2%. At least the profit share that is eliminated by the reform most likely was incentive pay before. This incentive mechanism was replaced by other elements of corporate governance.  相似文献   
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Ohne ZusammenfassungAus dem Italienischen übersetzt von M. St. Braun, WienAus dem Russischen übersetzt von A. GerschenkronAus dem Italienischen übersetzt von Erich Allina  相似文献   
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Ohne ZusammenfassungAus dem Italienischen übersetzt von M. St. Braun, WienAus dem Italienischen übersetzt von E. Allina, WienAus dem Russischen übersetzt von A. GerschenkronÜbersetzt von Paul Brüll, Wien.  相似文献   
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Using restricted Census microdata that link households to the Census block in which they live, this paper re-examines the question of whether racial differences in sociodemographic characteristics can explain observed levels of racial segregation. We develop a simple measurement framework designed to make use of the rich joint distribution of individual and neighborhood characteristics that these data provide, analyzing segregation patterns in the San Francisco Bay Area. The results indicate that racial differences in the collective set of characteristics we consider do have the potential to explain a considerable amount of the observed segregation, although more so for Asians and especially Hispanics than whites and blacks. Different sociodemographic factors emerge as potentially important for each race.  相似文献   
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