Making EMU Work: Some lessons from the 1990s

This paper investigates what lessons may be learned from Europe's convergence process of the 1990s. The paper challenges the conventional focus on labour market institutions and 'structural rigidities' as the root cause behind Europe's poor employment record. Instead, it is argued that macro demand management played the key role, particularly monetary policy. Concentrating on Germany, the analysis shows that fiscal consolidation was accompanied by monetary tightness of an extraordinary degree and duration. This finding is of interest regarding the past as well as the future. For the Maastricht regime much resembles the one that produced the unsound policy mix of the 1990s: a constrained fiscal authority paired with an independent monetary authority free to impose its will on the overall outcome. The analysis thus highlights a key asymmetry in the Maastricht regime that is likely to continue to inflict a deflationary bias on the system. It is argued that this policy bias may be overcome only if the ECB deliberately assumed its real role of generating domestic demand-led growth, thereby resolving Euroland's key structural problem: asymmetric monetary policy. As regards the conventional structuralist theme, the analysis debunks the 'Dutch myth' of supply-led growth through structural reform. Depicting a popular fallacy of composition, we stress that the peculiar Dutch strategy of demand-led growth does not present itself as an option for Euroland.     

On the origin and rise of central bank independence in West Germany∗

Abstract

This paper investigates the (re-)establishment of central banking in West Germany after 1945 and the history of the Bundesbank Act of 1957. The main focus is on the early emphasis on central bank independence, which at the time represented a German peculiarity. The paper inquires whether contemporary German economic thought may have provided a theoretical case for this peculiar tradition and scrutinizes the political calculus that motivated some key actors in the play. Contrary to conventional wisdom, important contradictions between the postulate of central bank independence and Ordoliberalism are identified.

JEL Classification Codes: B22, B31, E50     

Reflections on the current fashion for central bank independence

This paper challenges the time-inconsistency case for centralbank independence. It argues that the time-inconsistency literaturenot only seriously confuses the substance of the rules vs discretiondebate, but also posits an implausible view of monetary policy.Most worryingly, the inflationary bias featured prominentlyin the time-inconsistency literature has encouraged the developmentof a dangerously one-sided approach to central bank independencewhich entirely ignores the potential risks involved in maximisingcentral bankers' latitude for discretion. The analysis showsthat a more balanced and symmetric approach to central bankindependence is urgently needed. The views of Maynard Keynesand Milton Friedman are shown to shed some illuminating anddisconcerting light on a fashionable free-lunch promise thatis based on rather shallow theoretical foundations and empiricalevidence.     

The Monetary Policies of the European Central Bank and the Euro's (Mal-)Performance: A stability-oriented assessment

The stability-oriented macroeconomic framework established in the Treaties on European Union, especially the unparalleled status of independence and peculiar mandate of the European Central Bank (ECB), were promised virtually to guarantee price stability and a strong euro. Shattering these hopes and promises in a rather drastic way, the euro's external value has declined markedly while consumer price inflation has quadrupled since the new currency's inception. This paper assesses the ECB's role in relation to the euro's (mal-)performance. It challenges the truly odd conventional wisdom that, despite these dismal monetary developments, neither the Maastricht regime nor the ECB might possibly be at fault. Reviewing the ECB's interest rate policies and scrutinising its rationale, a conspicuous anti-growth bias is diagnosed that has produced rather perverse consequences.This stability-oriented assessment concludes that the ECB has been key to the 'euro puzzle', propagating euro weakness and pushing up inflation. Euroland's democratically elected representatives are therefore urged to reform Europe's key structural problem, namely, the ECB, an independent monetary policymaker whose unbounded discretion allows it to pursue ill-guided and thoroughly idiosyncratic policies without being held to account for the consequences.     

How Germany’s anti-Keynesianism has brought Europe to its knees

This paper investigates the (lack of any lasting) impact of John Maynard Keynes’s General Theory on economic policy-making in Germany. The analysis highlights the interplay between economic history and the history of ideas in shaping policy-making in postwar (West) Germany. The paper argues that Germany learned the wrong lessons from its own history and misread the true sources of its postwar success. Monetary mythology and the Bundesbank, with its distinctive anti-inflationary bias, feature prominently in this collective odyssey. The analysis shows that the crisis of the euro today is largely the consequence of Germany’s peculiar anti-Keynesianism.     

The Euroland crisis and Germany’s euro trilemma

This paper investigates the causes behind the Euroland crisis, particularly Germany’s role in it. It is argued that the crisis is not primarily a ‘sovereign debt crisis’, but rather a (twin) banking and balance of payments crisis. Intra-area competitiveness and current account imbalances, and the corresponding debt flows that such imbalances give rise to, are at the heart of the matter, and they ultimately go back to competitive wage restraint on Germany’s part since the late 1990s. Germany broke the golden rule of a monetary union: commitment to a common inflation rate. As a result, the country faces a trilemma of its own making and must make a critical choice, since it cannot have it all – perpetual export surpluses, a no transfer/no bailout monetary union, and a ‘clean,’ independent central bank. Misdiagnosis and the wrongly prescribed medication of austerity have made the situation worse by adding a growth crisis to the potpourri of internal stresses that threaten the euro’s survival. The crisis in Euroland poses a global ‘too big to fail’ threat, and presents a moral hazard of perhaps unprecedented scale to the global community.     

The loanable funds fallacy: exercises in the analysis of disequilibrium

This essay analyses the core proposition of loanable funds theorythat changes in technology and time preferences directly andimmediately affect interest rates. Applying what may be seenas a generalised financial-buffers approach to the analysisof disequilibrium, we find that loanable funds theory is flawedand should therefore be abandoned. A challenge to the neo-Walrasiangeneral equilibrium approach to monetary theory remains: thatof justifying the idea that—by some mechanism— intertemporalprices correctly reflect technology and time preferences.     

Uncertainty, Conventional Behavior, and Economic Sociology

A bstract    This paper addresses the problem of the conceptualization of social structure and its relationship to human agency in economic sociology. The background is provided by John Maynard Keynes's writings on uncertainty and conventional behavior on the stock market, and the analysis consists of a comparison of the social ontologies of the French Intersubjectivist School and the Economics as Social Theory Project in the light of these observations. The theoretical argument is illustrated with concrete examples from a prominent study of the stock market boom of the 1990s.     

On exogenous money and bank behaviour: the Pandora's box kept shut in Keynes' theory of liquidity preference?

This essay examines Keynes' views on banking behaviour and the relationships between central banks and banks as they evolved from his Tract on Monetary Reform to The General Theory. The objective is to clarify in what sense money may be exogenous in his final work. We identify a distinctly Keynesian position on the money-supply process, featuring money exogeneity due to bank behaviour. Our findings run counter to both neoclassical synthesis view on exogenous money cum passive banks as well as the post Keynesian challenge of endogenous money cum passive banks.