Labor Flexibility,Ownership and Firm Performance in China

Developed and developing countries alike areprivatizing or corporatizing state owned enterprises(SOEs), often citing the flexibility to hire and shedlabor as an advantage. However, there is littleempirical evidence on the extent to which thisimproves firm performance. This paper investigates thelinkage between labor flexibility, ownership and firmperformance using China as a case study. We find thatSOEs are much less able to adjust quickly to demandshocks than are other ownership forms and that thedegree of worker input into hiring and firingdecisions slows the ability of firms to adapt,negatively affecting firm performance.     

Corruption and Policy: Back to the Roots

Corruption is now recognized to be a pervasive phenomenon that can seriously jeopardize the best-intentioned reform efforts. This paper presents an analytical framework for examining the role basic market institutions play in rent-seeking and illicit behavior. The empirical results suggest that high barriers to new business entry and soft budget constraints on incumbent firms are particularly important institutional factors engendering opportunities for corruption. The findings also support the notion that economic development and maturation of democratic processes both temper corruption, as does, to a lesser extent, openness to international trade.     

Seeds of Corruption – Do Market Institutions Matter?

Ten years into the transition process, corruption is now recognized to be a pervasive phenomenon thatcan seriously jeopardize the best intentionedreform efforts. Because of the complex anddeep political economy dynamics surroundingthe process transition economies areundergoing it is essential for policy-makersto understand the causes of corruption. Thispaper develops an integrated analyticalframework of the role basic marketinstitutions play as determinants ofrent-seeking and illicit behavior intransition economies. Using data onlyrecently available on the incidence ofcorruption and institutional development inthese economies, we provide preliminaryevidence on both the systemic links betweendevelopment of market institutions andincentives for corruption and the relativeimportance of such institutions. The mainlesson from our analysis is that awell-established system of marketinstitutions – one characterized by clear andtransparent rules, fully functioning checksand balances, including strong enforcementmechanisms, and a robust competitiveenvironment – reduces rent-seekingopportunities and, in turn, the incentives forcorruption. The empirical results suggestthat high barriers to new business entrantsand soft budget constraints on incumbent firmsare particularly important institutionalfactors engendering opportunities andincentives for corruption. As in otherstudies, the empirical results also supportthe notion that economic development andmaturation of democratic processes both tempercorruption, as does, to a lesser extent,openness to trade.     

Do Labour Strategies Matter? An Analysis of Two Enterprise-Level Data Sets in China

This paper examines the effect of labour strategies and management types on firm performance in Chinese enterprises. We use two large panel surveys on Chinese enterprises, spanning almost two decades of transition. Our findings suggest that, as commonly thought, there are significant differences across ownership types in China in the degree to which flexible labour market strategies are utilized; and more flexible strategies (such as bonus-reward systems) do seem to significantly enhance performance. However, after controlling for different degrees of labour market flexibility, ownership differences have little influence on enterprise performance (with the exception that foreign joint ventures clearly outperform other types in growth and labour productivity). This important result suggests that the impact of Chinese ownership types on performance is felt through cost-impacts rather than via direct differences in competitive behaviour or the goals of enterprise decision-makers.     

Reducing Structural Dominance and Entry Barriers in Russian Industry

While many industrial firms in Russiahave undergone ownership change, relatively few havecompetitively restructured. This paper, using survey and other data, suggests much of Russian industry is immune from robust competition due to seller/buyer concentration in select markets, a high degree of vertical integration, and geographic segmentation. Regulatory constraints protect incumbent firms from entrants, both domestic and foreign. The absence of new businesses is striking. Restructuringanti-competitive structures and reducing barriers to entry should be key items in Russia'spost-privatization program, and the paper sketches out a reform agenda. The nascent rules-based framework for competition policy should be strengthened to reduce discretion, increase transparency and enhance accountability.     

The Business(es) of the Chinese State

The state industrial sector is the Achilles heel of China's otherwise remarkable economic performance over the past two decades. Most other countries in transition from socialism have transformed SOEs into commercial entities through systematic, market‐driven restructuring and privatisation to become more efficient and competitive. In China, a series of innovative, if often administrative, insitutional reforms since 1978 have begun to achieve the Chinese authorities' goal of ‘separating governemtn from business.’ But the Chinese State still maintains ownership of key enterprises, and government agencies carry out shareholder functions typically performed by private owners in a market economy. Although privatisation and restructuring of SOEs is occurring, it mostly pertains to small and medium sized firms. For the principal businesses, by contrast, the creation of large state enterprise groups and holding companies (and experiments in other forms of ‘state asset management’) have become the main form of restructuring. Today, China's SOEs still account for more than one‐quarter of national production, two‐thirds of total assets, more than half of urban employment and almost three‐quarters of investment. While direct budgetary subsidies have declined, explicit and implicit subsidies are still making their way to prop up loss‐making SOEs through the financial system and other routes. At the same time, SOEs are still producing non‐marketable products, resulting in a sizeable inventory overhang. These inefficiencies and distortions represent a drain on the country's resources and thus present a challenge to the Chinese leadership for reform. This paper sheds light on these challenges by analysing the incentives and constraints on China's SOE reform programme. Four critical aspects of the reforms are highlighted and evaluated against the backdrop of international experience: clarification of property rights; establishment of large group/holding companies and other new organisational structures; improved corporate governance incentives; and implementation of international financial accounting and auditing practices. The paper concludes with policy recommendations.