Adjustment costs and time-to-build in factor demand in the U.S. manufacturing industry

In order to explain cyclical behavior of factor demand, the static neoclassical model of the firm has been extended to include either adjustment costs (e.g. Lucas (1967)) or time-to-build considerations as in Kydland and Prescott (1982). This paper presents an intertemporal factor demand model which accounts for adjustment costs and gestation lags. The closed form solution of the model is a highly restricted vector ARMA-process that is estimated using quarterly data for the manufacturing industry in the U.S., 1960–1988. The main conclusion is that both sources of dynamics of factor demand are identifiable and found to be empirically of importance.     

Capital Mobility, Agglomeration and Corporate Tax Rates: Is the Race to the Bottom for Real?

Based on a data set for 19 OECD countries for the period 1981–2001,we estimate the impact of FDI on corporate tax rates, wherechanges in FDI are a measure for changes in capital mobility.So far the literature has been concerned with the related butrather different question as to the sensitivity of FDI to taxrates. Our article takes an opposite perspective and asks whatthe impact of capital mobility is on corporate tax rates. Indoing so, we explicitly take the role of agglomeration intoaccount. In theory, core countries can afford a higher tax ratecompared to peripheral countries. In our estimation strategy,we instrument capital mobility to deal with reverse causality.The main conclusion is that increased international capitalmobility, measured by FDI flows, implies a lower corporate taxrate. But we also find that agglomeration matters: core countrieshave a higher corporate tax rate than peripheral countries.If there is a race to the bottom, it seems that it is more realfor some countries than others. (JEL code: H25)     

Intertemporal market division:: A case of alternating monopoly

In this paper, we report on an equilibrium with market dominance that exists in a simple two-firm model that features neither entry barriers nor sophisticated punishment strategies. This equilibrium induces an intertemporal market division in which the two firms alternate as monopolists - despite the fact that the model also sustains a Cournot duopoly. Even when initially both firms are active in the market, the alternating monopoly reveals itself rather quickly. Moreover, it Pareto dominates the Cournot equilibrium - as it is close to the cartel outcome. Several examples of what well may be such alternating monopolies are presented.     

Childhood preventive care,adult healthcare and economic growth: The role of healthcare financing

We analyze the impact of healthcare financing on economic growth, focusing on the issue of the joint public–private financing of healthcare (co-payment). We use an overlapping-generations model with endogenous growth based on health human capital accumulation, where families pay for childhood preventive care and the government can either fully finance or co-finance adulthood curative care. From a growth maximizing perspective, distortionary taxes give an advantage to co-financing. Nevertheless, we prove that, if agents are assumed to be heterogeneous in preferences, full financing can become the best option.     

Can tourism be part of the decarbonized global economy? The costs and risks of alternate carbon reduction policy pathways

Global leaders agree on the need to substantially decarbonize the global economy by 2050. This paper compares potential costs associated with different policy pathways to achieve tourism sector emission reduction ambitions (?50% by 2035) and transform the sector to be part of the mid-century decarbonized economy (?70% by 2050). Investment in emissions abatement within the tourism sector, combined with strategic external carbon offsets, was found to be approximately 5% more cost effective over the period 2015–2050 than exclusive reliance on offsetting. The cost to achieve the ?50% target through abatement and strategic offsetting, while significant, represents less than 0.1% of the estimated global tourism economy in 2020 and 3.6% in 2050. Distributed equally among all tourists (international and domestic), the cost of a low-carbon tourism sector is estimated at US$11 per trip, equivalent to many current travel fees or taxes. Exclusive reliance on offsetting would expose the sector to extensive and continued carbon liability costs beyond mid-century and could be perceived as climate inaction, increasing reputational risks and the potential for less efficient regulatory interventions that could hinder sustainable tourism development. Effective tourism sector leadership is needed to develop a strategic tourism policy framework and emission measurement and reporting system.     

A dismal science; An essay on new classical economics

Summary Does new classical economics constitute a scientific achievement? Are its basic concepts demonstrably appropriate representations of fundamental characteristics of economic reality? An inspection of the relevant models shows that this is not the case. There exists hardly any empirical evidence which can be interpreted as foundational for the concepts employed in new classical microeconomics. It is more accurate to view the latter as mathematically convenient constructions which yield desired results - which often means: results that seem to be relevant for policy making. Finally, the new classical approach to macroeconomics appears to originate in substantial confusions about the nature of this subject.I am grateful to Pieter Stobbe for long and frequent discussions about economic theory which have helped to shape the views I put forward in this article. I should also like to thank Jan Marc Berk who provided research assistance. I alone am responsible for what follows.     

Is the EU ETS a Just Climate Policy?

The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is in dire straits. Prone to design problems and suffering from the effects of the economic crises the scheme is criticised for its poor achievements. In this paper we will analyse some of the features of this situation from an ethical perspective. The major part is dedicated to the complications within each phase of the EU ETS and to the recent developments it has undergone. We will briefly discuss the remedies suggested by prominent commentators. Furthermore, any policy tool to tackle climate change should be evaluated in view of the profound equity issues that are inherent to the climate problem. We will evaluate the EU ETS according to two justice-based criteria, related to effectiveness and the distribution of the duties involved in climate change, respectively. We will conclude that the EU ETS, in its current form, clearly lacks fairness on both criteria. However, the biggest problem is the unwillingness of EU leaders to mend, what could be, a commendable climate policy tool. To that extent, we argue, those leaders are acting unjustly.     

Comparing Regulations to Protect the Commons: An Experimental Investigation

In a laboratory experiment we test three regulations imposed on a common-pool resource game with heterogeneous users: an access fee and subsidy scheme, transferable quotas and non-transferable quotas. We calibrate the game so that all regulations improve users’ profits compared to free-access extraction. We compare the regulations according to five criteria: resource preservation, individual profits, profit difference, Pareto-improvement from free-access and sorting of the most efficient users. One of the main findings is that, even though it performs better in sorting out the most efficient subjects, the fee and subsidy scheme is not more profitable than tradable quotas.     

Global Drivers of and Local Resistance to French Shareholder Activism

Shareholder activism in France has made significant advances during the past 25 years even as it continues to face formidable sources of local resistance. But if the list of corporate governance improvements since 1989 described by the authors might lead one to conclude that France now has minority shareholder protection and shareholder activism comparable to those of the U.S. or U.K., powerful local interests, including much of French management, labor, and government, continue to mount effective resistance to such forces for change. The French government still works closely with French business elites and unions to manage both individual companies and the general economy. And government officials continue to speak publicly of “protecting” French firms from “illegitimate” foreign shareholders. Accordingly, the authors characterize French corporate governance as a “hybrid” model of shareholder activism, one that incorporates the perspectives and interests of the classic French stakeholder model as well as an emerging shareholder value movement. Although foreign institutional investors have increased their shareholdings in French companies and promoted “best practice” governance rules, particularly with respect to voting rights, local forces will continue to resist aggressive shareholder activism. Such a hybrid model makes the outcomes of shareholder activism less predictable, a risk that foreign investors and companies often respond to by seeking alliances with local proxy advisers and investor associations to gain “legitimacy.”