Effects of Firm Size,Financial Leverage and R&D Expenditures on Firm Earnings: An Analysis Using Quantile Regression Approach

As documented in the literature, the effects of firm size, financial leverage, and R&D expenditures on firm earnings are inclusive. Our hypothesis is that the inconsistent empirical results of such effects may be driven by the regression models implemented in data analysis. Using the quantile regression (QR) approach developed by Koenker and Basset (1978), this study analyses S&P 500 firms from 1996 to 2005. We find that the effects of firm size, financial leverage and R&D expenditures on firm earnings differ considerably across earnings quantiles. Comparing the results from the QR approach with those from the ordinary least squares (OLS) and least absolute deviation (LAD) methods, this study further explains the puzzling relationship between firm size, financial leverage, R&D expenditures and firm earnings.     

控制高管薪酬

就目前而言,制定长期激励计划的公司还是极少数。如果它们是出于战术原因才这样做的,那么随着经济发展速度的回升,仅有的硕果恐将不保。     

Lock‐In Effects in Relationship Lending: Evidence from DIP Loans

Do prior lending relationships result in pass‐through savings (lower interest rates) for borrowers, or do they lock in higher costs for borrowers? Theoretical models suggest that when borrowers experience greater information asymmetry, higher switching costs, and limited access to capital markets, they become locked into higher costs from their existing lenders. Firms in Chapter 11 seeking debtor‐in‐possession (DIP) financing often fit this profile. We investigate the presence of lock‐in effects using a sample of 348 DIP loans. We account for endogeneity using the instrument variable (IV) approach and the Heckman selection model and find consistent evidence that prior lending relationship is associated with higher interest costs and the effect is more severe for stronger existing relationships. Our study provides direct evidence that prior lending relationships do create a lock‐in effect under certain circumstances, such as DIP financing.     

Cheap Credit,Lending Operations,and International Politics: The Case of Global Microfinance

The provision of subsidized credit to financial institutions is an important and frequently used policy tool of governments and central banks. To assess its effectiveness, we exploit changes in international bilateral political relationships that generate shocks to the cost of financing for microfinance institutions (MFIs). MFIs that experience politically driven reductions in total borrowing costs hire more staff and increase administrative expenses. Cheap credit leads to greater profitability for MFIs and promotes a shift toward noncommercial loans but has no effect on total overall lending. Instead, the additional resources are either directed to promoting future growth or dissipated.     

Yield Approximations: A Historical Perspective

This paper traces the historical developments of the efforts to find simple and accurate methods of approximating an annuity's implicit yield and a bond's yield to maturity. It is shown that the little known history of yield approximations is nevertheless very rich, with contributions dating as far back as the late seventeenth century. It is also shown that the standard textbook approximation formula for the bond's yield to maturity is the least accurate of a large family of formulas, some of which were suggested as early as 1855.     

The Effect of Business Risk on Corporate Capital Structure: Theory and Evidence

Under corporate and personal taxation, we demonstrate that the relation between optimal debt level and business risk is roughly U-shaped. This result follows from the fact that the tax liability is an option portfolio that is long in the corporate tax option and short in the personal tax option. Therefore, the net effect of a change in business risk on the optimal debt level depends upon the relative magnitudes of the resultant marginal changes in the values of these two options. Results of empirical tests offer support for the predicted U-shaped relationship.     

Bad Apples: Political Paralysis and the Quality of Politicians

Why do elected officials often suffer from political paralysis and fail to implement the best policies available? This paper considers a new and intuitive explanation that focuses on the quality of the politicians competing for office. The key insight is that a “good” incumbent with preferences identical to those of a representative voter will want to keep rent‐seeking politicians out of office; he may do so by distorting his policy choices to signal his type and win reelection. The value of signaling and staying in office increases with the fraction of rent‐seeking types in the population of politicians. Electing good types may therefore not be enough to ensure that the best policies are implemented, especially when rent seeking is widespread. This provides a new explanation for why political failure is particularly severe in corrupt democracies.