Corporate criminal law and organization incentives: a managerial perspective

Corporate criminal liability puts a serious challenge to the economic theory of enforcement. Are corporate crimes different from other crimes? Are these crimes best deterred by punishing individuals, punishing corporations, or both? What is optimal structure of sanctions? Should corporate liability be criminal or civil? This paper has two major contributions to the literature. First, it provides a common analytical framework to most results presented and largely discussed in the field. Second, by making use of the framework, we provide new insights into how corporations should be punished for the offenses committed by their employees. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Ronald Coase and law and economics in Europe

Ronald Coase himself never wrote about law and economics in Europe. Yet many of his insights about the development of the discipline in the United States are extremely useful to our understanding of the methodological and practical challenges faced by European law and economics (as in most civil law jurisdictions). This paper argues that a careful consideration of Coase’s insights might address some of the current limitations.     

Explaining divorce rate determinants: new evidence from Spain

This article examines the main determinants of divorce rates in Spain for the period 1995 to 2010. According to the results, the so-called Express Divorce Law (passed in 2005) seems to be positively associated with divorce rates in the short term. Income level and growth, female employment rate, and the proportion of foreign population are also positively related to divorce rates. However, as expected, the percentage of conservative vote seems to have a negative impact.     

The English rule with payments upfront

This paper extends the economic model of litigation under the English rule for allocation of costs by considering payments upfront. Implications are derived for current legal reforms in Portugal.     

Optimal law enforcement when victims are rational players

The economic analysis of crime usually views a victim as a passive party whose role is limited to suffering harm. In this paper, we extend the economic theory of law enforcement by modeling victims as an active party in criminal deterrence. First, they may take some precautions to avoid victimization. Second, they may or may not report their victimization. The lack of reporting weakens law enforcement and criminal deterrence by reducing detection rates. This suggests that victims could be encouraged to report by being paid a compensation. Nevertheless, compensating victims certainly reduces precaution. We argue that such effect never offsets the gains obtained in terms of criminal detection and apprehension. Received: December 1998 / Accepted: January 2000     

The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement

The economic literature on optimal law enforcement is very recent. Becker's seminal paper on crime and law enforcement dates from 1968 and most papers which are the focus of this survey have been published in the last ten years.The core result presented by Becker is the following: the probability and the severity of punishment deter crime. Therefore, the fine should be maximal since it is a costless transfer whereas the probability of detection and conviction is costly. Much of the recent work has attempted to show why Becker's result may not hold.     

US‐style contingent fees and UK‐style conditional fees: agency problems and the supply of legal services

Under contingent fees, the attorney gets a share of the judgment; under conditional fees, the lawyer gets an upscale premium if the case is won which is, however, unrelated to the adjudicated amount. We compare conditional and contingent fees in a principal–agent framework where the lawyer chooses unobservable effort after she has observed the amount at stake. Contingent fees provide better incentives than conditional fees independently of whether upfront payments are restricted to be non‐negative or not. Under contingent fees, the attorney uses her information about what is at stake more efficiently. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An empirical analysis of constitutional review voting in the polish constitutional tribunal, 2003–2014

Different theories have been developed, mainly in the context of the United States, to explain judicial decision-making. In this respect, there is an important ongoing debate over whether judges are guided by the law or by personal ideology. The analysis of the decision-making in the Polish Constitutional Tribunal seems to support the existence of some party alignment. It is to say that judicial behavior is influenced by the ideology, either because judges’ preferences coincide with the interests of a specific party or because the judges are incentivized to show their loyalty to a party. Party alignment exists but subject to institutional influences. These results are in line with previous findings for other constitutional courts in Europe.     

Least-Cost Avoidance: The Tragedy of Common Safety

This article shows that the least-cost avoider approach in tortis not necessarily the optimal way to attain least-cost avoidancewhen accidents can be avoided by either of two parties. Whenparties do not observe each other's costs of care at the timeof the accident and are unable to determine which party is theleast-cost avoider, they fail to anticipate the outcome of theadjudication. Under these circumstances, accident avoidancebecomes a commons problem because care by each individual partyreduces the prospect of liability for both parties. As a result,parties suboptimally invest in care. We show that regulationremoves this problem and is superior to tort liability bothwhen parties act simultaneously and when they act sequentially.We further examine how different liability rules perform inthis respect. (JEL K13, K32)     

Reputation, Honesty, and Efficiency with Insider Information: an Experiment

We conduct an experimental study of sales of insider information about an asset's future value, where the insiders cannot purchase the underlying asset. We examine whether such information is purchased, the quality of the information provided, and the subsequent accuracy of purchase decisions in the underlying asset market. Our design explores whether reputation, in a repeated game of finite (but uncertain) duration, is an effective constraint on deliberate strategic misinformation. The insiders have an immediate incentive to state that the asset value is high when its true value is low. We suggest an application to insider trading in financial information markets. With fixed matching, cooperative outcomes featuring truthful revelation are frequently achieved and sustained, even though this suggests subjects have sophisticated beliefs about the beliefs and behavior of others. As a comparison, we also conduct a control treatment with random rematching. Here, information purchase is less frequent, the rate of truthful revelation decreases, and efficiency is diminished. Our results suggest that most people anticipate that others realize the potential value of a good reputation.