How to be a Value-Free Advocate of Laissez Faire

A bstract .   Ludwig von Mises is often regarded as a "champion" of laissez faire. This characterization seems to contradict Mises's clear statement that economics is value free. The aim of this paper is to resolve this apparent contradiction. We accomplish this by distinguishing, as Mises did, between the advocacy of specific laissez-faire policies and the advocacy of a laissez-faire ideology vis-à-vis the alternative ideologies of socialism and interventionism. Mises argued that the logic of a value-free economics could be used to show that socialist and interventionist policies would not achieve a goal that the socialists and interventionists implicitly or explicitly aim to achieve, that of progress in terms of material wealth for the members of society. Thus, Mises resolved the contradiction by shifting the debate from the welfare analysis of particular policies to a logical analysis of the ends of a particular ideology and the means available to achieve those ends.
In a seminal paper in neo-Austrian economics, Murray Rothbard criticized Mises. We analyze Rothbard's argument partly as a means of elucidating Mises's views and argue that Rothbard misinterpreted Mises and quoted him out of context. Rothbard failed to adequately support his claim that Mises held the beliefs that Rothbard attributed to him. Moreover, Rothbard's paper undermined the value freedom that Mises regarded as a crucial characteristic of economics.     

Ronald Coase's Method of Building More Realistic Models of Choice

This paper argues that Ronald Coase's major contributions to economic theory are best understood in terms of the distinct method he used to build more realistic models of choice. We call his method the benchmark-comparison method. It consists of building models of choice and then using them as benchmarks in the further investigation of economic interaction, either by comparing the benchmark models with observed interaction or by building additional models of choice, which may themselves function as benchmarks. The paper first describes the method then demonstrates how Coase used it in his two most famous papers. We go on to show how an understanding of the method confirms Coase's own statements about the continuity of his thought. Finally, we assess Coase's critique of Milton Friedman's positivist methodology and discuss a recent paper on Coase's methodology.     

Investment in Africa's Manufacturing Sector: A Four Country Panel Data Analysis

Firm level data for the manufacturing sector in Africa, presented in this paper, shows very low levels of investment. The importance of profit effects on investment is investigated using a flexible accelerator, a specification based on the Euler equation and a simple generalisation of these specificiations. There are controls for firm fixed effects. It is shown that the profit effect is very similar for both the accelerator and Euler equation specifications. A comparison with other studies shows that, for small firms, the effect is much smaller in Africa than for other countries. Reasons for the relative insensitivity of investment to profits in African firms are suggested. For the most general specification tested there are no significant differences in the size of the profit effect across the four countries in the study.     

Professor Caldwell on Ludwig von Mises' methodology

The Review of Austrian Economics -     

Fiscal Response to a Temporary Trade Shock: The Aftermath of the Kenyan Coffee Boom

The appropriate fiscal response to a temporary terms of tradewindfall is difficult to determine, even in an unregulated economy.But controls, such as those in force during the 1976–79coffee boom in Kenya, introduce special problems. For example,foreign exchange controls make the private investment of boomincome inefficient by causing it to be undertaken too rapidly.In Kenya the boom induced a massive increase in public expenditure,far in excess of the increase in public revenue. The net effecton capital formation was negative because the fiscal responseexacerbated the rise in the relative price of nontraded capitalgoods, and because resources were preempted for government consumption.     

Credit Constraints in Manufacturing Enterprises in Africa

We investigate the question of whether firms in Africa's manufacturingsector are credit constrained. The fact that few firms obtaincredit is not sufficient to prove constraints, since certainfirms may not have a demand for credit while others may be refusedcredit as part of profit maximising behaviour by banks. To investigatethis question, we use direct evidence on whether firms had ademand of credit and whether their demand was satisfied in theformal credit market, based on panel data on firms in the manufacturingsector from six African countries. Of those firms with a demandfor credit, only a quarter obtained a formal sector loan. Ouranalysis suggests that while banks allocate credit on the basisof expected profits, micro or small firms are much less likelyto get a loan than large firms. We also find that outstandingdebt is positively related with obtaining further lending. Therole of outstanding debt is likely to be a reflection of inefficiencyin credit markets, while the fact that size matters is consistentwith a bias as well, although we cannot totally exclude thatthey reflect transactions costs on the part of banks. We presentan analysis showing how much more profitable small firms mustbe to obtain a loan than large firms.     

Rationing in an open economy: Fix-price equilibrium and two-gap models

Two-gap models have been criticized severely for the lack of realism of their assumptions but are still prominent in development planning and, implicitly, in discussions of short-run policy problems. Here the model's applicability outside a command economy is considered by comparing it with a rationing model with proper micro-foundations. It is shown that the two-gap model in general violates fix-price equilibrium properties but that the fix-price model generates quite similar results.     

Risk and savings: A taxonomy

The effect of risk on savings depends not just on preferences but also on the type of risk. This helps to explain why the empirical literature reports positive effects for developed countries but negative effects for developing countries.     

Trade Blocs: Relevant for Africa?

African trade blocs are largely pursued for political reasons.The economic effects are dubious: a bloc may well reduce thewelfare of its members, particularly if the rest of the worldis the marginal supplier. Even if the bloc raises aggregatewelfare it is likely to be problematic, leading to a divergenceof income levels with the poorer members of the bloc losing.Far from promoting regional trust and cooperation the bloc canthen cause tensions between the member countries. An importantpositive effect is improved product variety. This makes theadjustment of the production structure less painful than iscommonly assumed. In Africa there has seldom been clarity onthe objectives of preferential trading arrangements. This matterssince many objectives (scale and competition effects, improvedvariety and regional cooperation on infrastructure projects)do not require the formation of a trade bloc. If a trade blocis set up for political reasons (e.g. to improve security) thenit is desirable that it unilaterally lowers external tariffsso as to reduce trade diversion and income divergence.