排序方式: 共有42条查询结果,搜索用时 18 毫秒
1.
How different is Japanese corporate finance? An investigation of the information content of new security issues 总被引:16,自引:0,他引:16
This article studies the shareholder wealth effects associatedwith 875 new security issues in Japan from January 1, 1985,to May 31, 1991. The announcement of convertible debt issueshas a significant positive abnormal return of 1.05 percent.There is an abnormal return of 0.45 percent at the announcementof equity issues that is off-set by an abnormal return of 1.01percent on the issue day. Abnormal returns are negatively relatedto firm size, so that large Japanese firms have abnormal returnsless different from those of U.S. firms than small Japanesefirms. Our evidence is consistent with the view that Japanesemanagers decide to issue shares based on different considerationsthan American managers. 相似文献
2.
3.
4.
Jacques H. Drèze P. Jean-Jacques Herings 《International Journal of Economic Theory》2008,4(2):207-246
The label "Keynes–Negishi equilibria" is attached here to equilibria in a monetary economy with imperfectly competitive product and labor markets where business firms and labor unions hold demand perceptions with kinks: as posited in Negishi's 1979 book Microeconomic Foundations of Keynesian Macroeconomics . Such equilibria are defined in a general equilibrium model, and shown to exist. Methodological implications are briefly discussed in a concluding section. 相似文献
5.
P. Jean-Jacques Herings 《Economic Theory》1997,10(2):361-367
Summary. An extremely simple proof of the K-K-M-S Theorem is given involving only Brouwer’s fixed point theorem and some elementary
calculus. A function is explicitly given such that a fixed point of it yields an intersection point of a balanced collection
of sets together with balancing weights. Moreover, any intersection point of a balanced collection of sets together with balancing
weights corresponds to a fixed point of the function. Furthermore, the proof can be used to show -balanced versions of the K-K-M-S Theorem, with -balancedness as introduced in Billera (1970). The proof makes clear that the conditions made with respect to by Billera can be even weakened.
Received: January 22, 1996; revised version June 9, 1996 相似文献
6.
7.
This paper presents a survey of the use of homotopy methods in game theory. Homotopies allow for a robust computation of game-theoretic
equilibria and their refinements. Homotopies are also suitable to compute equilibria that are selected by various selection
theories. We present the relevant techniques underlying homotopy algorithms. We give detailed expositions of the Lemke–Howson
algorithm and the van den Elzen–Talman algorithm to compute Nash equilibria in 2-person games, and the Herings–van den Elzen,
Herings–Peeters, and McKelvey–Palfrey algorithms to compute Nash equilibria in general n-person games. We explain how the main ideas can be extended to compute equilibria in extensive form and dynamic games, and
how homotopies can be used to compute all Nash equilibria. 相似文献
8.
The paper addresses the following question: how efficient is the market system in allocating resources if trade takes place at prices that are not competitive? Even though there are many partial answers to this question, an answer that stands comparison to the rigor by which the first and second welfare theorems are derived is lacking. We first prove a “Folk Theorem” on the generic suboptimality of equilibria at non-competitive prices. The more interesting problem is whether equilibria are constrained optimal, i.e. efficient relative to all allocations that are consistent with prices at which trade takes place. We discuss an optimality notion due to Bénassy, and argue that this notion admits no general conclusions. We then turn to the notion of p-optimality and give a necessary condition, called the separating property, for constrained optimality: each constrained household should be constrained in each constrained market. If the number of commodities is less than or equal to two, the case usually treated in the textbook, then this necessary condition is also sufficient. In that case equilibria are constrained optimal. When there are three or more commodities, two or more constrained households, and two or more constrained markets, this necessary condition is typically not sufficient and equilibria are generically constrained suboptimal. 相似文献
9.
We examine the notion of the core when cooperation takes place in a setting with time and uncertainty. We do so in a two-period general equilibrium setting with incomplete markets. Market incompleteness implies that players cannot make all possible binding commitments regarding their actions at different date-events. We unify various treatments of dynamic core concepts existing in the literature. This results in definitions of the Classical Core, the Segregated Core, the Two-stage Core, the Strong Sequential Core, and the Weak Sequential Core. Except for the Classical Core, all these concepts can be defined by requiring the absence of blocking in period 0 and at any date-event in period 1. The concepts only differ with respect to the notion of blocking in period 0. To evaluate these concepts, we study three market structures in detail: strongly complete markets, incomplete markets in finance economies, and incomplete markets in settings with multiple commodities. Even when markets are strongly complete, the Classical Core is argued not to be an appropriate concept. For the general case of incomplete markets, the Weak Sequential Core is the only concept that does not suffer from major defects. 相似文献
10.
This paper introduces time-inconsistent preferences in a multicommodity general equilibrium framework with incomplete markets. The standard concept of competitive equilibrium is extended in order to allow for changes in intertemporal preferences. Depending on whether or not agents recognize that their intertemporal preferences change, agents are called sophisticated or naïve. This paper presents competitive equilibrium notions for economies with naïve agents and economies with sophisticated agents and provides assumptions under which both types of equilibria exist. Surprisingly, the set of naïve equilibria in societies populated by time-consistent households is not allocationally equivalent to the set of competitive equilibria. For sophisticated equilibria, the equivalence holds. Time-inconsistency also raises conceptual issues about the appropriate concept of efficiency. Choices have to be made concerning the incorporation of future preferences and the appropriate instruments to create Pareto improvements. For both naïve and sophisticated societies, we present four possible efficiency concepts. Suitable conditions are specified for which both naïve and sophisticated equilibria satisfy appropriate efficiency concepts. 相似文献