Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics

We develop a general model of lending in the presence of endogenous borrowing constraints. Borrowing constraints arise because borrowers face limited liability and debt repayment cannot be perfectly enforced. In the model, the dynamics of debt are closely linked with the dynamics of borrowing constraints. In fact, borrowing constraints must satisfy a dynamic consistency requirement: the value of outstanding debt restricts current access to short-term capital, but is itself determined by future access to credit. This dynamic consistency is not guaranteed in models of exogenous borrowing constraints, where the ability to raise short-term capital is limited by some prespecified function of debt. We characterize the optimal default-free contract—which minimizes borrowing constraints at all histories—and derive implications for firm growth, survival, leverage and debt maturity. The model is qualitatively consistent with stylized facts on the growth and survival of firms. Comparative statics with respect to technology and default constraints are derived.     

Dutch housing allowances: social housing at risk

This article deals with the vulnerability of the Dutch housing allowance scheme. This scheme can be compared with the British housing benefit. The vulnerability of the scheme has been augmented by the current less favourable economic conditions (stagnating household incomes, increasing unemployment) and the Dutch government's announcement that it plans to reduce housing allowance expenditure. Two scenarios are outlined, which may serve to resolve the danger of exploding housing allowances expenditure in the coming years. If a market‐led scenario is chosen, whereby housing associations strive to achieve market rents, the housing allowance will be transformed into a form of housing voucher, the value of which is not directly related to the actual rental price of the property. In this American‐style model, the value of the vouchers would be linked to a ‘virtual’ rent, say 40% of the average rental price in the region. The housing associations would then lose their special semi‐public status. Under the social housing model, the housing associations would retain their special status provided they aimed to achieve rents somewhat lower than the market level. The housing allowance would remain directly linked to the actual rental price. However, some marked changes would be required to render this system sustainable. The Netherlands cannot avoid having to make this choice. Cet article porte sur la vulnérabilité du régime hollandais d'aide au logement. Celui‐ci est comparable aux prestations britanniques. La fragilité du régime a été accrue par les conditions économiques actuelles moins favorables (stagnation du revenu des ménages, augmentation du chômage) et par l'annonce du gouvernement néderlandais relative à la réduction prévue des dépenses d'allocation‐logement. Sont présentés deux scénarios susceptibles de limiter le risque d'explosion des dépenses d'allocations dans les années à venir. Si l'option choisie est un scénario de marché où les associations pour le logement luttent pour atteindre les loyers du marché, l'allocation‐logement se transformera en ‘bon’ dont la valeur ne sera pas directement liée au montant réel du loyer. Selon ce modèle de type américain, la valeur des ‘bons’ sera fonction d'un loyer ‘virtuel’, soit environ 40% du prix moyen dans la région; les associations perdraient alors leur statut particulier semi‐public. Selon le modèle de logement social, elles conserveraient leur statut, à condition qu'elles cherchent à atteindre des loyers légèrement inférieurs au niveau du marché; l'allocation‐logement serait alors directement liée au montant réel du loyer. Toutefois, pour que le régime subsiste, il faudrait procéder à d'importants changements. Les Pays‐Bas ne peuvent s'épargner ce choix.     

Golden Parachutes: Incentive Aligners,Management Entrenchers,or Takeover Bid Signals?

In this paper we investigate the effect of golden parachute (GP) adoptions on shareholder wealth. We control for the potential effect a GP adoption has on the probability that a firm will receive a takeover bid by investigating the wealth effects for firms that are in play when the GP is adopted. We find that announcements are wealth neutral when firms are in play and wealth increasing when firms are not in play when a GP is adopted. The results suggest that GPs have no influence on the success of a tender offer, refuting the hypotheses that they either align manager and shareholder interests or that they entrench inefficient managers. The difference in the results for in-play and not-in-play firms is consistent with the hypothesis that GPs signal an increased likelihood that a firm will receive a takeover bid.     

How Does a Development Moratorium Affect Development Timing Choices and Land Values?

This paper investigates how a development moratorium affects choices of development timing and land values in a framework where both the value of developed property evolves stochastically and the development costs are fully irreversible. We assume that a regulator initially announces that land is not allowed to be developed during a finite period of time in the future. A developer, thus, must decide whether to develop land before the timing ordinance is imposed, or after it expires. The development moratorium reduces the developer’s option value from waiting and, thus, accelerates development. We also use simulation analysis to demonstrate how the other factors that relate to the demand and supply conditions of the real estate market affect this accelerating effect.     

THE ECONOMETRICS OF THE HOLY GRAIL — A REVIEW OF ECONOMETRICS: ALCHEMY OR SCIENCE? ESSAYS IN ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY

Books reviewed in this article: David F. Hendry (1993) Econometrics: Alchemy or Science? Essays in Econometric Methodology     

Managers’ Corporate Entrepreneurial Actions and Job Satisfaction

Through the development and extension of theories and scholars’ subsequent empirical analyses of significant, theoretically grounded research questions, the knowledge about corporate entrepreneurship (CE) and its successful use continues to advance. Moreover, the literature suggests important relationships between the corporate environment, managers’ entrepreneurial behavior and successful implementation of corporate entrepreneurship actions. In an attempt to test some of those relationships, we describe an empirical study of 523 managers that examines the relationships among the antecedents to managers’ entrepreneurial behavior, a decision to implement entrepreneurial actions, and resulting job satisfaction and reinforcement practices.