A noncooperative model of contest network formation

In this paper we study a model of weighted network formation. The bilateral interaction is modeled as a Tullock contest game with the possibility of a draw. We describe stable networks under different concepts of stability. We show that a Nash stable network is either the empty network or the complete network. The complete network is not immune to bilateral deviations. When we allow for limited farsightedness, a stable network immune to bilateral deviations must be a complete $M$-partite network, with partitions of different sizes. We provide several comparative statics results illustrating the importance of the structure of stable networks in mediating the effects of shocks and interventions. In particular, we show that an increase in the likelihood of a draw has a nonmonotonic effect on the level of wasteful contest spending in the society. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to model weighted network formation when the actions of individuals are neither strategic complements nor strategic substitutes.     

Corporate Governance and Financial Constraints on Strategic Turnarounds*

abstract The paper extends the Robbins and Pearce (1992 ) two‐stage turnaround response model to include governance factors. In addition to retrenchment and recovery, the paper proposes the addition of a realignment stage, referring specifically to the realignment of expectations of principal and agent groups. The realignment stage imposes a threshold that must be crossed before the retrenchment and hence recovery stage can be entered. Crossing this threshold is problematic to the extent that the interests of governance‐stakeholder groups diverge in a crisis situation. The severity of the crisis impacts on the bases of strategy contingent asset valuation leading to the fragmentation of stakeholder interests. In some cases the consequence may be that management are prevented from carrying out turnarounds by governance constraints. The paper uses a case study to illustrate these dynamics, and like the Robbins and Pearce study, it focuses on the textile industry. A longitudinal approach is used to show the impact of the removal of governance constraints. The empirical evidence suggests that such financial constraints become less serious to the extent that there is a functioning market for corporate control. Building on governance research and turnaround literature, the paper also outlines the general case necessary and sufficient conditions for successful turnarounds.     

Soviet all-union enterprises as new multinationals of the CIS

This paper examines the restructuring of the former Soviet economy provoked by the break-up of the USSR and the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Particular attention is devoted to the changes taking place in the former All-Union enterprises that have now essentially become new multinationals. The pressures influencing the two parallel developments of internalization and divestment are examined and illustrated using two case studies. © 1993 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Corporate governance in family-controlled firms in Taiwan

This paper examines the effects of ownership structure and board characteristics on performance in publicly traded Taiwanese firms that are controlled by founding families. Results show that when shares are owned by institutional investors, particularly foreign financial institutions, firms perform better. However, where families are the major shareholders, this is not the case. In addition, boards that are independent of the financial interests of the founding family have a positive impact on performance, whether measured by accounting ratios, operating performance or the stock market. (JEL: P52, G32)     

The Austrian theory of the cooperative firm

This paper draws on Wicksell's Value, Capital and Rent. The (comparative-statics) response of the cooperative to a change in its parameters (capital stock, rate of interest paid on capital stock, and production function) is examined. Severe employment problems may be expected if, in a cooperative setting, the rate of interest is, by macroeconomic management, kept at a relatively low level. Technological progress also may lead to a contraction in employment and even, under some circumstances, cause a decline in output per man. The cooperative is throughout contrasted with its capitalist counterpart.     

Valuing Mortgage Insurance Contracts in Emerging Market Economies

We develop a new option-based method for the valuation of mortgage insurance contracts in closed form in an economy where agents are risk neutral. While the proposed valuation method is general and can be used in any market, it may be particularly useful in emerging market economies where other existing methods may be either inappropriate or are too difficult to implement because of the lack of relevant data. As an application, we price a typical Serbian government-backed mortgage insurance contract.     

Analysis of Domestic Factors Affecting Outward Foreign Direct Investment in Brazil

Developing markets have increasingly gained prominence in the world economy, but the domestic factors behind this success are not well established. This uncertainty may interfere with multinational expansion plans. In this article, we examine several macroeconomic and institutional factors affecting Brazilian outward foreign direct investment in 17 destination countries. We applied a pooled ordinary least squares regression over the 2001–2014 period. The findings suggest that macroeconomic factors are still statistically significant to explain investment abroad, but several institutional factors such as corruption have emerged, having a negative effect and political violence having a positive effect on Brazilian outward foreign direct investment.     

Financial Support from the Family Network and Illegal Immigration

Barriers to immigration of low‐skilled workers from developing countries into the advanced countries prevent many potential migrants from leaving their countries of origin. With very low home‐country wages in relation to the cost of undocumented migration, the opportunity to migrate often hinges on the possibility of obtaining credit from a human smuggling organization or family and friends. This paper examines the conditions under which migration is optimal for an individual who lacks liquid assets, with a focus on alternative options for financing migration costs. One is by accumulating the required amount of savings out of source‐country income, with or without financial support from the family or social network. The other is debt‐bonded migration, which involves borrowing from a smuggling organization and paying off the loan while working in the host country. I find that greater financial support from the family network increases the attractiveness of debt‐bonded relative to self‐financed migration.