Farewell to the intelligentsia: political transformation and changing forms of leisure consumption in the former communist countries of eastern Europe

This paper refers to evidence from studies of young adults conducted in eight different ex‐communist countries from 1993 onwards, but it is based primarily on data gathered in Ukraine, Georgia and Armenia in 2002. The evidence is used to chart the disintegration of the intelligentsia strata that were consolidated under communism. Members were highly educated and were unified by an intelligentsia lifestyle that included the consumption of state‐subsidized high culture and typically involved interest and participation in public affairs. The evidence that is presented shows that under post‐communism higher education graduates continue to be distinguished by their consumption of high culture. However, their occupations are more diverse in terms of work and market situations. Many, especially those in the more intellectual occupations, have been impoverished, state subsidies for their lifestyles having been withdrawn or reduced, making their lifestyles more expensive. The better‐off are now even more exposed to and involved in the new consumer cultures. This paper explains how the cessation of the intelligentsia’s reproduction as a lifestyle group, and the spread of commercial leisure, will have contributed to the post‐1989/91 decline in political interest and activity among young people in the former communist countries of eastern Europe.     

TESTING THE BAUMOL–NORDHAUS MODEL WITH EU KLEMS DATA

Baumol's (1967 ) seminal model of structural change predicts that large service industries financed mainly through taxes and social contributions—like health care and education, for instance—will acquire ever‐larger shares of total expenditures and that, concomitantly, overall productivity growth will decline. Applying a new testing strategy for Baumol's model, Nordhaus (2008 ) finds strong evidence in favor of the “cost and growth diseases” in U.S. GDP‐by‐industry data (published by the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Economic Analysis). The aim of the present paper is twofold. The first is to check whether Nordhaus's results can be reproduced using U.S. industry data from the EU KLEMS database. Second, Nordhaus's testing methodology is applied to European Union data from the same database. The results suggest that—although there are differences vis‐à‐vis the U.S.—the EU also shows symptoms of “Baumol's diseases.”     

The Effects of Oil Supply and Demand Shocks on U.S. Consumer Sentiment

This paper investigates how the University of Michigan's Index of Consumer Sentiment responds to oil price shocks. While oil supply shocks play only a limited role, the effect of aggregate demand shocks is positive for the first few months and negative thereafter. A typical other oil demand shock has a significant negative impact for up to 2 years. By studying the responses of individual survey questions, we find that expectations of future inflation and a change in real household income as well as perceived vehicle and house buying conditions are the main transmission channels of oil supply and demand shocks.     

Fixed‐price contracts,learning, and outsourcing: explaining the continuous growth of output and labour productivity in the German aircraft industry during the Second World War1

In this article it is claimed that, at least in the aircraft industry, the development of German armament production and productivity was much more continuous than Wagenführ's armament index and both the Blitzkrieg thesis and the inefficiency thesis suggest. In order to prove this new thesis of continuity, we show on the basis of firm‐level data, firstly, that investment in production capacities had already started before the war and was especially high in the early phase of the war, and secondly, that the regulatory setting of aircraft production management was rather constant and was not dramatically changed after 1941. In addition, we demonstrate that the driving forces of productivity growth were primarily learning‐by‐doing and outsourcing, the latter being generally neglected by economic historians.