Minimum Quality Standards under Asymmetric Duopoly with Endogenous Quality Ordering: A Note

In this note, we revisit minimum quality standards (MQS) under a vertically differentiated duopoly. We generalize the model in Ronnen (1991) and Valletti (2000) by introducing asymmetry into the fixed cost of quality improvement and by explicitly taking into account the endogeneity of quality ordering. In the generalized model, we show that the results derived by Ronnen (1991) and Valletti (2000) are largely robust.     

Is the development of the agro-processing industry pro-poor?: The case of Thailand

We examine how the development of the agro-processing industry contributed to poverty reduction in Thailand. The effects on farmers’ income are emphasized because most of the poor in Thailand are farmers. The development of the agro-processing industry could improve farmers’ income through two channels: (i) the purchase of agricultural products; and (ii) the employment of the poor farmers at factories. We show that the development of the agro-processing industry, which also played a leading role in the high economic growth of the Thai economy, contributed to poverty reduction through both of the two channels. It was hence pro-poor.     

Strategic Investment Subsidies under Asymmetric Oligopoly

This paper examines strategic investment subsidies in an international oligopoly. A general oligopoly model is constructed in which firms compete in two stages and governments commit to investment subsidies prior to firms' actions. The paper considers asymmetry among firms that arises from the nature of goods they produce rather than their cost structures. When firms produce asymmetrically differentiated goods, it is found that a change in the number of foreign competitors may alter the sign of the optimal unilateral investment subsidy. An example of policy reversal is provided in the case of strategic research and development subsidies for a quality‐differentiated industry.     

关于改进我省高校教师高级职务评审方法的设想

针对目前我省高校在教师高级职务评审过程中,评审方法存在的种种缺陷,本文试图提出改进评审方法的设想,以求评审方法更加科学、合理、可行.     

A Note on Strategic Trade Policy and Endogenous Quality Choice*

This paper shows that some of the main policy implications in Park (2001 ) and Zhou, Spencer, and Vertinsky (2002 ) are sensitive to their assumptions on marginal production costs. The unilaterally optimal policy for investment towards quality improvement is analyzed, assuming constant and non‐negative marginal production costs under vertically differentiated international duopoly. If marginal production costs are different across firms, the optimal policy for each exporting country may be opposite in its sign from that shown by the existing papers under Bertrand competition. The policy reversal may also occur for the low‐quality exporting country under Cournot competition.     

Optimal Rules of Origin with Asymmetric Compliance Costs under International Duopoly

We examine the optimal rules of origin (ROO) in a free trade area/agreement (FTA) by employing a stylized three-country partial equilibrium model of an international duopoly. We incorporate compliance costs of the ROO into the model. In particular, compliance costs are higher for a firm located in a non-member country of the FTA than for a firm (an internal firm) located in an FTA member country, whereas marginal production costs are lower for the former. The FTA member countries set the optimal level of ROO to maximize their joint welfare. An importing country within the FTA imposes tariffs on imports that do not comply with the ROO. We show that the optimal ROO may have a protectionist bias in the sense that they are set for only the internal firm to comply. ROO may also cause low utilization of FTAs when they are set such that even the internal firm does not comply with them. These cases arise depending on parameter values.     

STRATEGIC MANDATORY LABELING OF BIOTECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS IN THE ABSENCE OF QUALITY DIFFERENCE

This article examines the strategic use of mandatory labeling of biotechnology products, such as genetically modified food. A foreign dominant firm produces a biotechnology product and foreign competitive firms produce a conventional one. It is shown that if other trade measures such as tariffs are also available, the government of an importing country may impose mandatory labeling even in the case where there is no quality difference between biotechnology and conventional products. A combination of a discriminatory tariff on the biotechnology product and mandatory labeling shifts rents from the foreign dominant firm to the domestic economy.     

Patent citations, technology diffusion, and international trade: evidence from Asian countries

In this paper, we examine international technology diffusion by using patent citations as a proxy for technology diffusion. We focus on some Asian economies, i.e., Korea, Taiwan, China and India, to investigate the relationship between technology diffusion and their trade experience with the U.S., Japan, and other G7 countries. Our empirical results reveal that trade specialization has a significant correlation with technology diffusion. Some policy implications are discussed.     

Tariff Revenue Competition in a Free Trade Area: The Case of Asymmetric Large Countries

The striking result has been shown by Richardson that tariff revenue competition between two symmetric member countries of a free trade area (FTA) results in complete elimination of external tariffs if there exists a pure‐strategy Nash equilibrium at all. Richardson also conjectures without building a model that if member countries are asymmetric in market size, there exists a pure‐strategy Nash equilibrium in which both countries set positive external tariffs. We explicitly extend his tariff competition model into the case of asymmetric FTA member countries, and confirm his conjecture. We also show that there exists a mixed‐strategy Nash equilibrium in the case of symmetric countries.     

International trade and renewable resources under asymmetries of resource abundance and resource management

This paper examines the interaction between relative resource abundance and resource management regimes in determining trade patterns and gains from trade in a two-country model with a renewable resource. A model developed by Brander and Taylor [Brander JA, Taylor MS (1997b) Resour Energy Econ 19:267–297] is extended. It is shown that relative resource abundance determines trade patterns if resource abundance is similar in both countries and the relative demand for the resource good is moderate, or if resource abundance is sufficiently different and the relative demand is not so high. Otherwise, a difference in resource management regimes determines trade patterns. Even under an open-access regime, the resource-scarce country gains from trade unless resource abundance is similar and the relative demand is low.