MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION WITH EFFICIENCY GAPS AND A HECKSCHER‐OHLIN TRADE PATTERN*

We develop a two‐factor, three‐sector model of international trade in which the monopolistically competitive firms are characterized by different fixed production costs. We show that, depending on the pattern of the international distribution of factor endowments, the trade pattern is determined not only by relative factor endowments as suggested by Heckscher and Ohlin, but also by absolute factor endowments via a mechanism of competitive selection in the monopolistically competitive sector.     

ASIAN FINANCIAL LINKAGE: MACRO‐FINANCE DISSONANCE

How are Asian financial markets interlinked and how are they linked to markets in developed countries? What is the main driver of fluctuations in Asian financial markets as well as real economic activity? To answer these questions, we estimate the spillover index proposed by Diebold and Yilmaz and gauge the degree of interaction in both financial markets and real economic activity among Asian economies. We first show that the degree of the international spillover in stock markets is uniform, irrespective of the groups of countries concerned, such as the G3 and ASEAN4. This suggests the importance of global common shocks in stock markets. We then discuss the macro‐finance dissonance. In stock and bond markets, the United States has been the main driver of fluctuations. However, China has emerged as an important source of fluctuations in real economic activity.     

The Value Relevance of Management Forecasts and Their Impact on Analysts' Forecasts: Empirical Evidence From Japan

A major financial disclosure feature in Japan is that stock exchanges require firms to provide next year's earnings forecasts. This study investigates the value relevance of Japanese management earnings forecasts and their impact on analysts' earnings forecasts. First, the value relevance of management forecasts is investigated using a valuation framework provided by Ohlson (2001 ), in which firm value is expressed as a function of book value, current earnings and next year's expected earnings. The analysis yields that of the three accounting variables examined, management forecasts have the highest correlation and incremental explanatory power with stock price.
Next, the impact of management forecasts on analysts' forecasts is examined. The results show that more than 90% of changes in analysts' forecasts are explained by management forecasts alone. Further analysis reveals that the heavy dependence of financial analysts on management forecasts in formulating their own forecasts may partially be attributed to the relatively high accuracy of management forecasts. At the same time, financial analysts also somewhat modify management forecasts when certain financial factors indicate that the credibility of management forecasts is in doubt.
Overall, this study presents empirical evidence that Japanese management forecasts provide useful information for the market and have a significant influence on analysts' forecasts.     

DUALITY WITH SECTOR‐SPECIFIC EXTERNALITIES UNDER SOCIAL CONSTANT RETURNS*

We develop dual approaches to quantity and price relationships of production in a general multisectoral model with sector‐specific externalities. The production of each good exhibits socially constant returns to scale but privately decreasing returns. We find that the Stolper‐Samuelson theorem holds for factor intensity ranking from the social perspective and that the Rybczynski theorem holds for factor intensity ranking from the private perspective. The price‐output dual fails to hold in general. Moreover, we re‐establish the Heckscher‐Ohlin theorem in the two‐sector case, as well as the factor endowment–factor price and price‐output comparative statics in the high‐dimension case under proper conditions.     

EFFECTS OF ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION WITHIN A FIRM ON OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKET OUTCOMES

I analyze the implications of the Laffont–Tirole type agency problems on oligopolistic market outcomes. In the model, a firm's marginal cost is decreasing in managerial effort and is subject to an additive shock. Both managerial effort and the realization of the shock are a manager's private information. A firm first offers a menu of contract to its manager, and then competes in the product market. As in the model of single principal and single agent, the incentive contracts implement efforts that are distorted downward relative to full information. In this model, with multiple agency relationships, an additional source for upward distortion of effort emerges as a result of the interaction in the product market. The results are robust to whether firms compete in price or quantity.     

PANEL DATA ANALYSIS OF JAPANESE RESIDENTIAL WATER DEMAND USING A DISCRETE/CONTINUOUS CHOICE APPROACH*

Block rate pricing is often applied to income taxation, telecommunication services, and brand marketing, in addition to its best‐known application in public utility services. Under block rate pricing, consumers face piecewise‐linear budget constraints. A discrete/continuous choice approach is usually used to account for piecewise‐linear budget constraints in demand and price endogeneity. A recent study proposed a method to incorporate a separability condition ignored by previous studies, by implementing a Markov chain Monte Carlo simulation based on a hierarchical Bayesian approach. To extend this approach to panel data, our study proposes Bayesian hierarchical models incorporating random and fixed individual effects.