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After a long period of awarding spectrum licenses inefficiently, changes in the budget and budgetary process coupled with increases in the value of the spectrum for non-broadcast use led Congress to allow the Federal Communications Commission to award licenses through competitive bidding. Contrary to the perceived view of government bureaucracies as excessively cautious, the FCC used the newfound authority to adopt a novel approach to auction design—simultaneous multiple round auctions. The innovative auction design would not have been adopted without the successful collaboration between government economists and academic economists, who helped to formulate and refine the design so that decision makers at the FCC could be convinced that the novel technique was both superior and practical. The FCCs implementation of competitive bidding was not only rapid as mandated by Congress, but also much less costly than outside alternatives and allowed the integration of spectrum policy decisions and auction design. Experience from several auctions has led to a number of open questions and refinements. The FCC is trying to replicate the success with the original auction design by facilitating dialog between the agency and outside auction experts in order to address these issues. 相似文献
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The past year in economics at the Federal Communications Commission covered a broad range of topics in telecommunications policy. This paper highlights the economic issues that are addressed in the following key areas: spectrum management, universal service and intercarrier compensation reform, and merger review. In spectrum management, the FCC received congressional authority to implement an ??incentive auction?? to repurpose television broadcasting spectrum into flexible-use licenses that will be suitable for mobile wireless service providers. We discuss some important issues in designing the auction. We next address some aspects of the FCC??s comprehensive reforms of intercarrier compensation, which mainly involves call termination rates, and of universal service. Finally, we discuss the economic analysis of two major mergers: AT&T-T-Mobile, which the FCC staff recommended should be referred to an administrative hearing, and Level 3/Global Crossing, which was cleared with no conditions. 相似文献
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Kwerel Evan Levy Johathan Pepper Robert Sappington David Stockdale Donald Williams John 《Review of Industrial Organization》2002,21(4):337-356
This article reviews some of the key economic issues that face the Federal Communications Commission. These issues include those that underlie the design of broadband policy, spectrum policy, competition policy, and media ownership policy. 相似文献
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This article focuses on media ownership and spectrum auction design. These two issues have not only been particularly important
at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) over the last year, but also are being informed by economic analysis either
completed at the FCC or commissioned by the FCC. 相似文献
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In any given year, the Federal Communications Commission confronts many issues of interest to economists. This paper summarizes
four issues of interest during the last year: Spectrum Auctions, Media Ownership, Quality-Adjusted Cable Prices, and Leased
Access. It highlights the role that economic analysis played in each and identifies areas where further research would be
fruitful.
This article was drafted while the first author was Chief Economist at the Federal Communications Commission. The opinions
expressed here are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Communications Commission,
its Commissioners, or its staff. We would like to thank Larry White and Tracy Waldon for helpful comments. 相似文献
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Evan Kwerel Paroma Sanyal Katja Seim Martha Stancill Patrick Sun 《Review of Industrial Organization》2017,51(4):451-486
The Federal Communications Commission is responsible for federal regulation in the telecommunications and electronic media sectors, and for management of the nation’s non-federal radio frequency spectrum. During the past year, Commission economists contributed to the agency’s ongoing efforts to use market-based mechanisms—such as auctions—to allocate spectrum and distribute universal service subsidies efficiently. This includes repurposing broadcast television spectrum for more efficient use by wireless service providers through the recently concluded Broadcast Incentive Auction and structuring auction mechanisms to promote efficient allocation of universal service subsidies for the increased build-out of mobile wireless and fixed broadband service in unserved and underserved areas. 相似文献
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Evan?Kwerel Jonathan?LevyEmail author Chuck?Needy Martin?Perry Mark?Uretsky Tracy?Waldon John?Williams 《Review of Industrial Organization》2004,25(4):395-430
This article reviews a number of the major economic issues confronting the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) over the past year and discusses new analytic techniques that FCC economists applied to some of those issues. The article also identifies several areas in which further academic research would be valuable to this agency.Martin Perry is serving as FCC Chief Economist on leave from Rutgers University, New Brunswick NJ. Jonathan Levy is the FCC Deputy Chief Economist and, like Evan Kwerel and Chuck Needy, works in the FCCs Office of Strategic Planning and Policy Analysis. Mark Uretsky works in the FCCs International Bureau and Tracy Waldon in the FCCs Media Bureau. All authors are economists except for John Williams, an engineer consultant who advises the FCC on spectrum issues. 相似文献
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