Testing separability of public consumption in household decisions

In this paper we propose a sequential strategy, based on the microeconomic approach of the demand theory, in order to test for separability between private and public consumption. The aim of the present work is to verify, using a conditional almost ideal demand system, whether the different components of public consumption exert conditioning effects on the allocative structure of private spending. The empirical estimation of the model and the separability tests are developed for both a demand system in five functional categories of private spending, and for a demand system in six categories, where the private expenditures on those goods and services which can also be offered by the public sector are enclosed in a single functional category. The results of the separability tests, obtained using UK data for the 1974–2000 period, show that public individual consumption plays an important role in modifying consumer choices, while public collective consumption does not affect private consumption behaviours. The relationships between the different components of private spending and public individual consumption are both of substitutability and complementarity; in particular, we find that public individual consumption and the corresponding private expenditures on ‘Health, education, recreation and social protection’ are complements.     

EXOGENEITY IN A RECENT EXCHANGE RATE MODEL: A REPLY

In this note we show that the real exchange rate was indeed weakly exogenous in some of the specifications in MacDonald and Ricci (2004), but argue this was in all likelihood a function of the relatively limited degrees of freedom. We demonstrate here that by increasing the degrees of freedom, we can satisfy the weak exogeneity condition, whilst at the same time producing equilibrium estimates of the Rand which are quantitatively and qualitatively the same as those reported in MacDonald and Ricci (2004).     

International Risk Sharing and the Transmission of Productivity Shocks

This paper shows that standard international business cycle models can be reconciled with the empirical evidence on the lack of consumption risk sharing. First, we show analytically that with incomplete asset markets productivity disturbances can have large uninsurable effects on wealth, depending on the value of the trade elasticity and shock persistence. Second, we investigate these findings quantitatively in a model calibrated to the U.S. economy. With the low trade elasticity estimated via a method of moments procedure, the consumption risk of productivity shocks is magnified by high terms of trade and real exchange rate (RER) volatility. Strong wealth effects in response to shocks raise the demand for domestic goods above supply, crowding out external demand and appreciating the terms of trade and the RER. Building upon the literature on incomplete markets, we then show that similar results are obtained when productivity shocks are nearly permanent, provided the trade elasticity is set equal to the high values consistent with micro-estimates. Under both approaches the model accounts for the low and negative correlation between the RER and relative (domestic to foreign) consumption in the data—the "Backus–Smith puzzle".     

Nonlinear Transmission of Financial Shocks: Some New Evidence

Financial shocks generate a protracted and quantitatively important effect on real economic activity and financial markets only if the shocks are both negative and large. Otherwise, their role is quite modest. Financial shocks have become more important for economic fluctuations after 2000 and have contributed substantially to deepening the recessions of 2001 and 2008. The evidence is obtained using a new econometric procedure based on a Vector Moving Average representation that includes a nonlinear function of the financial shock. This method is a contribution of the present work.     

LEGAL INSTITUTIONS,INNOVATION, AND GROWTH

We analyze the relationship between legal institutions, innovation, and growth. We compare a rigid legal system (the law is set before the technological innovation) and a flexible one (the law is set after observing the new technology). The flexible system dominates in terms of welfare, amount of innovation, and output growth at intermediate stages of technological development—periods when legal change is needed. The rigid system is preferable at early stages of technological development, when commitment problems are severe. For mature technologies, the two legal systems are equivalent. We find that rigid legal systems may induce excessive R&D investment.     

THE WELFARE GAINS OF AGE‐RELATED OPTIMAL INCOME TAXATION

Using an overlapping generations model with skill uncertainty and private savings, we quantify the gains of age‐dependent labor income taxation. The total steady‐state welfare gain of switching from age‐independent to age‐dependent nonlinear taxation varies between 2.4% and 4% of GDP. Part of the gain descends from relaxing incentive–compatibility constraints and part is due to capital‐accumulation effects. The welfare gain is of about the same magnitude as that which can be achieved by moving from linear to nonlinear income taxation. Finally, the welfare loss from tax‐exempting interest income is negligible under an optimal age‐dependent labor income tax.     

THE EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM IN A DIFFERENTIATED DUOPOLY WITH NETWORK EXTERNALITIES*

The existence of a pure‐strategy subgame‐perfect equilibrium in qualities and prices is investigated in a duopoly model of vertical differentiation where quality improvements require a quadratic variable cost and network externalities operate. We show that there exists a parameter region where the incentive to predate at the quality stage prevents firms from reaching a pure‐strategy non‐cooperative equilibrium with prices above marginal costs. If network externalities are sufficiently large, a Bertrand equilibrium with zero profits may arise, although the amount of product differentiation is strictly positive.     

Legal Institutions, Sectoral Heterogeneity, and Economic Development

Poor countries have lower PPP-adjusted investment rates and face higher relative prices of investment goods. It has been suggested that this happens either because these countries have a relatively lower TFP in industries producing capital goods or because they are subject to greater investment distortions. This paper provides a micro-foundation for the cross-country dispersion in investment distortions. We first document that firms producing capital goods face a higher level of idiosyncratic risk than their counterparts producing consumption goods. In a model of capital accumulation where the protection of investors' rights is incomplete, this difference in risk induces a wedge between the returns on investment in the two sectors. The wedge is bigger, the poorer the investor protection. In turn, this implies that countries endowed with weaker institutions face higher relative prices of investment goods, invest a lower fraction of their income, and end up being poorer. We find that our mechanism may be quantitatively important.     

Unequal Contributions from Symmetric Agents in a Local Interaction Model

The main findings of the theory on the private provision of public goods under the assumptions of symmetric agents and normality are that (1) there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in which everybody contributes the same; and (2) this pattern is stable. We show that these findings no longer hold in a context characterized by local interaction. In this context, it is always possible to find preferences satisfying the assumption of normality such that the symmetric Nash equilibrium is unstable, and there exist asymmetric Nash equilibria which are locally stable.