Trigger happy or gun shy? Dissolving common‐value partnerships with Texas shootouts

The operating agreements of many business ventures include clauses to facilitate the exit of joint owners. In so‐called Texas Shootouts, one owner names a single buy‐sell price and the other owner is compelled to either buy or sell shares at that named price. Despite their prevalence in real‐world contracts, Texas Shootouts are rarely triggered. In our theoretical framework, sole ownership is more efficient than joint ownership. Negotiations are frustrated, however, by the presence of asymmetric information. In equilibrium, owners eschew buy‐sell offers in favor of simple offers to buy or to sell shares and bargaining failures arise. Experimental data support these findings.     

Shotgun mechanisms for common-value partnerships: The unassigned-offeror problem

Shotgun clauses are commonly included in the business agreements of partnerships and limited liability companies (LLCs), but the role of offeror typically remains unassigned. In a common-value, one-sided asymmetric information setting, unequal and inefficient outcomes occur with an unassigned offeror. Experimental results are aligned with our theory.     

Deterrence, Lawsuits, and Litigation Outcomes Under Court Errors

This article presents a strategic model of liability and litigationunder court errors. Our framework allows for endogenous choiceof level of care and endogenous likelihood of filing and disputes.We derive sufficient conditions for a unique universally divinemixed-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium under low courterrors. In this equilibrium, some defendants choose to be grosslynegligent; some cases are filed; and some lawsuits are dropped,some are resolved out of court, and some go to trial. We findthat court errors in the size of the award, as well as damagecaps and split awards, reduce the likelihood of trial but increasefiling and reduce the deterrence effect of punitive damages.We derive conditions under which the adoption of the Englishrule for allocating legal costs reduces filing.     

Dollarization and the inflation threshold

Abstract.  Empirical evidence suggests non-linearity in the impact of inflation on financial intermediation and real activity. Evidence also suggests that high inflation affects financial intermediation through the substitution of dollars 'under the mattress' for savings in domestic banks. We model an economy where inflation and real activity are positively related at low levels of inflation. However, when the inflation rate exceeds a threshold, agents substitute dollars for deposits issued by domestic banks, reducing the scale of financial intermediation and investment. As a consequence, at high levels of inflation, capital stock and output become negatively related to the inflation rate.