Subterranean Commodification: Informal Housing and the Legalization of Basement Suites in Vancouver from 1928 to 2009

This article draws on Margaret Radin's theorization of ‘contested commodities' to explore the process whereby informal housing becomes formalized while also being shaped by legal regulation. In seeking to move once‐informal housing into the domain of official legality, cities can seldom rely on a simple legal framework of private‐law principles of property and contract. Instead, they face complex trade‐offs between providing basic needs and affordability and meeting public‐law norms around living standards, traditional neighbourhood feel and the environment. This article highlights these issues through an examination of the uneven process of legal formalization of basement apartments in Vancouver, Canada. We chose a lengthy period—from 1928 to 2009—to explore how basement apartments became a vital source of housing often at odds with city planning that has long favoured a low‐density residential built form. We suggest that Radin's theoretical account makes it possible to link legalization and official market construction with two questions: whether to permit commodification and how to permit commodification. Real‐world commodification processes—including legal sanction—reflect hybridization, pragmatic decision making and regulatory compromise. The resolution of questions concerning how to legalize commodification are also intertwined with processes of market expansion.     

Optimal regulation under imperfect enforcement: Permits,tickets, or both?

Economic activity is often regulated through both permits and tickets (subsequent inspections). We study the effectiveness of such policies where corruption and an underground economy make enforcement imperfect. In the theoretical model, asymmetric information justifies regulatory action which is enforced by corruptible bureaucrats. We find that regulation through permits alone is useless when corruption exists, while tickets still offer some benefit. Surprisingly, we also find that a system with both permits and tickets achieves welfare that is higher than that which can be achieved with only tickets—that combining the two mechanisms has an effect that is greater than the “sum of the parts.”     

National levels of corruption and foreign direct investment

We model the relationship between bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) and the level of corruption in multinational firms’ (MCNs’) home and host countries. We construct and test a model of bilateral FDI between countries that differ in their levels of corruption. FDI is affected negatively both by the level of corruption in the host country and by differences in home- and host-country corruption. Our model emphasizes that MNCs develop skills for dealing with home-country corruption, and these skills become a competitive advantage in similarly corrupt host countries. We test the model using data on bilateral FDI stocks among a large number of home and host countries, using a variety of specifications and estimation strategies to provide robustness. Our results show that the effects of host-country corruption and of differences in corruption levels between home and host countries are statistically and economically significant.     

Attitudinal loyalty and trust in entrepreneurship: building new relationships

This paper studies the impact of attitudinal loyalty and trust in entrepreneurship, following a client-focused strategy. In this context, trust and commitment are the cornerstone of relationship marketing, and contributes positively to achieving attitudinal loyalty, which is suitable for the maintenance of relationships over time. This variable also acts as a facilitator or mediator on the influence satisfaction has on loyalty. We show that satisfaction has a positive impact on trust and attitudinal loyalty. Following structural equation modelling methodology we test all the relationships in a sample composed by travel agency customers.     

The Abatement Market A Proposal for Environmental Cooperation among Asymmetric Countries

We present a model of interaction among technologically asymmetriccountries whose use of an open-access environmental resource generatesmutual externalities. We show that countries can improve bothenvironmental quality and their individual welfare levels by buying/sellingpollution abatement. This market mechanism, which reduces incentive forfree-riding, is more effective the larger the technological gap betweencountries.     

Creative Destruction and the Rise of Inequality

Common wisdom interprets the rise in inequality of the last two decades as the result of a skill-biased labor demand shift. This explanation does not account for two important observations: (i) within-group inequality has also markedly risen, and (ii) the rise of inequality has been accompanied by a rise of the volatility of earnings. This paper argues that a dual labor market structure, where some workers are paid efficiency-wages can account for the empirical regularities, in the absence of skilled biased technological change. The analysis demonstrates that an unbiased innovation, as well as North–South trade, can contribute to the efficiency wage premium, and thus to wage inequality, by increasing labor turnover.     

Short‐term monitoring of fiscal policy discipline

Under the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), European Union (EU) Member States commit themselves to avoid excessive deficits over 3% of GDP and to pursue the medium‐term objective of budgetary positions close to balance or in surplus. The SGP also provides regulation for the surveillance of budgetary positions. An analysis of tools for the surveillance of budgetary positions is the focus of this paper. In particular, it addresses two open issues in the empirical public finance literature which are crucial for monitoring fiscal policy discipline in the EU. First, the estimation of the structural component of the fiscal balance ratio. Second, the computation, when only annual fiscal data are available, of quarterly budget balance ratios, using relevant information from quarterly measured macroeconomic series. An econometric model that addresses both issues is presented and estimated. Additionally, this modelling framework allows us to answer questions such as: what is the safety margin that will prevent a particular country from reaching, with certain probability, a budget deficit that breaches the 3% upper bound? Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.