The Financial Performance of a Socially Responsible Investment Over Time and a Possible Link with Corporate Social Responsibility

This paper empirically examines the financial performance of a UK unit trust that was initially “conventional” and later adopted socially responsible investment (SRI) principles (ethical investment principles). Comparison is made with three similar conventional funds whose investment objectives remained unchanged. Analysis techniques employed in previous studies find similar results: mean risk-adjusted performance is unchanged by the switch to SRI, with no evidence of over-or under-performance relative to the benchmark market index by any of the four funds. More interestingly, changes in variability of returns over time are also modelled using generalised autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity models, not previously applied to SRI funds so far as is known. Results show a temporary increase in variability of returns, followed by a return to previous levels after around 4 years. Evidence shows the increased variability to be associated with the adoption of SRI rather than with a change in fund management. Possible explanations for the subsequent reduction in variability include the spread of corporate social responsibility activities by firms and learning by fund managers. In addition to reporting on a previously unobserved phenomenon, this paper raises questions for further research.     

Efficiency and Technical Change in Intertemporal Intersectoral DEA

A new procedure for the measurement of efficiency and technical change is presented, using DEA with three-dimension data (box data), pooling over sectors, regions and time. Until now, when pooling the data in panel applications it has been assumed that technology remained unchanged, so productivity change was entirely attributed to technical efficiency change. However, patterns of technology change and the decomposition into efficiency and technical change elements can be accomplished by means of restrictions on the general structure of the technology indexes. Under the assumption of non-regressive technical change, upper and lower bounds for efficiency and technical change are obtained. The new methodology is illustrated in an analysis of productivity growth in 13 manufacturing sectors in the Spanish regions from 1980 to 1992.     

STOCHASTIC-COMPUTERIZED-ACTIVITY-BUDGETING FOR SHEEP ENTERPRISES*

Stochastic-computerised-activity-budgeting (SCAB) facilitates and extends the traditional gross margins analysis for sheep activities. SCAB is one of the very few computerised management aids so far developed for Australian farm management situations. In the deterministic mode SCAB calculates gross margins based on point estimates of all the relevant parameters. In stochastic mode it generates a distribution of pay-offs (gross margins) based on the manager's subjective probability distribution for the relevant major uncertain paramaters. The variance of this distribution of pay-offs represents a measure of the risk associated with the activity given the manager's current knowledge and expectations.     

Social enterprises and social markets: models and new trends

Strengthening of the “disinterested” is key in the current economic situation (Bourdieu 1986). It can provide new values and ways of managing the markets and enterprise organizations; social enterprises are emerging as instruments to make this possible. This work studies the different traditions and analyzes social enterprises and social entrepreneurs, with particular attention to Spain. It also examines trends deriving from the new emerging models, first making an approximation of social markets: a market experience based on building a production, distribution, financing, and responsible consumption network that overcomes the limits of individual companies, engaging all the market’s economic agents. Finally, the risks and opportunities that these models present for a supportive and Social Economy are analyzed.     

Incidence,effects, dynamics and routes out of overqualification in Europe: a comprehensive analysis distinguishing by employment status

This study aims to improve our understanding of overqualification by incorporating distinctions in employment status (i.e. self-employed workers, private employees and public employees) in the analysis of the incidence, effects, dynamics and routes out of overqualification. To this end, we apply discrete choice – ordered and nonordered – and count models to the data obtained from the European Community Household Panel for the EU-15. Our results indicate that the incidence of overqualification varies by employment status, where self-employed workers report the lowest occurrence. Furthermore, this analysis suggests that overqualification is a permanent phenomenon and demonstrates that successful pathways out of overqualification differ by employment status. The implications of these results for education and labour market policies are also discussed.     

Are false own-account workers less job satisfied than true ones?

This article compares job satisfaction of true and false own-account workers. The latter group refers to own-account workers who are employed with the same tasks by the same employer for whom they previously worked as employees. To create a valid comparable group, the former workers are defined as paid employees who independently started a new business as own-account workers. Using data drawn from the European Community Household Panel for the EU-15 and controlling for possible self-selection issues, we observe that false own-account workers, compared with true ones, have less job satisfaction in terms of type of work, number of working hours, working times, and working conditions and environment. Our results are consistent with existing policies aimed to combat false self-employment developed by many OECD countries.     

ON THE OPTIMALITY OF LINE CALL CHALLENGES IN PROFESSIONAL TENNIS*

We study professional tennis players’ decisions of whether to challenge umpires’ calls using data on over 2,000 challenges in 35 tennis tournaments. The decision to challenge, which is simple to characterize, trades off reversing the umpire’s call against losing subsequent challenge opportunities. Qualitatively, players are more likely to challenge when the stakes are greater and when the option value of challenging is lower, as theory predicts. Quantitatively, players’ actual behavior is close to an optimal challenging strategy prescribed by a simple dynamic model. Our findings illustrate that professional decision makers develop decision rules that can approximate optimal behavior quite well.