How sensitive are bargaining outcomes to changes in disagreement payoffs?

We use a human-subjects experiment to investigate how bargaining outcomes are affected by changes in bargainers’ disagreement payoffs. Subjects bargain against changing opponents, with randomly drawn asymmetric disagreement outcomes that vary over plays of the game, and with complete information about disagreement payoffs and the cake size. We find that subjects only respond about half as much as theoretically predicted to changes in their own disagreement payoff and to changes in their opponent’s disagreement payoff. This effect is observed in a standard Nash demand game and a related unstructured bargaining game, in both early and late rounds, and is robust to moderate changes in stake sizes. We show theoretically that standard models of expected utility maximisation are unable to account for this under-responsiveness, even when generalised to allow for risk aversion. We also show that quantal-response equilibrium has, at best, mixed success in characterising our results. However, a simple model of other-regarding preferences can explain our main results.     

ON THE TIMING OF PRODUCTION DECISIONS IN MONETARY ECONOMIES

In most macroeconomic models inflation tends to be harmful. In this article, we show that by simply changing the timing of production decisions by firms from “on demand” to “in advance,” some inflation can boost welfare as long as goods are sufficiently perishable. The main conclusion from this research is that by effectively hiding the strategic interaction between supply and demand, assuming production on demand is not without loss of generality.     

Intraday Behavior of Stock Prices and Trades around Insider Trading

Our evidence indicates that insiders' trades provide significant new information to market participants and they are incorporated more fully in stock prices as compared to noninsiders' trades. We find that market professionals do not front-run insiders' trades. Both insiders' purchases and sales result in significant contemporaneous and subsequent price impact, while sales by large shareholders result in a contemporaneous stock price decline that is subsequently reversed. The arrival of insider purchases reverse the prevailing negative order imbalances from third party trades and lead to piggy-backing by market professionals resulting in subsequent market purchase orders as well as stock price increases.     

An efficient privatization mechanism

We consider the privatization of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) of which markets can be opened to competition once privatization takes place and competitors can compete successfully against them in a few years. The currently used “Revenue Maximization (RM)” scheme maximizes the government revenue from privatization but does not provide incentives for the privatized SOE to charge a price lower than the monopoly price until competition arises. We propose the “Welfare Maximization (WM)” scheme, which induces the privatized SOE to charge a competitive price without resorting to regulation. Also, WM provides greater incentives for post-privatization cost reduction.     

Relative Responsiveness of Bargaining Solutions to Changes in Status-quo Payoffs

It is a well-known fact that several prominent bargaining solutions are responsive to changes in status-quo (i.e., disagreement or fallback) payoffs. When an agent’s status-quo payoff increases, his solution payoff either stays the same or increases. A fully general result for these solutions’ status-quo point ranking is impossible to establish. In this paper, using an important class of bargaining problems, a ranking of the relative status-quo point responsiveness of prominent bargaining solutions is obtained. Using the Constant Elasticity of Substitution class of bargaining problems, regardless of the concavity of the Pareto frontier and the level of increase in one’s status-quo payoff, we find the equal gains solution is the most responsive with respect to changes in status-quo payoffs, followed by the Nash solution. The equal sacrifice solutions is the least responsive, followed by the Kalai/Smorodinsky solution.

How do quotes and prices evolve around isolated informed trades?

This article investigates the order imbalance and price behavior of trades and quotes around isolated informed trades intraday. Different patterns of order flows around informed trades are documented because of the originating stock exchange, the type of informed trader, the size of the order, and the type of the firm whose shares are traded. The informed trader acts contrarian to prior trades. Informed purchases follow price declines, and sales are after price increases. The informed trade is recognized by the market maker. The purchase is executed at a significantly higher price, while the sale is executed at a significantly lower price. Trades contain more information if the insiders are at small firms. Larger orders and orders by top executives also contain more information. The order imbalance changes around an informed trade. Orders are seller-initiated prior to the purchase and become buyer-initiated after the trade. On the other hand, the order imbalance changes from buyer- to seller-initiated right around insider sales. Reversals in order imbalance are more pronounced for informed trades in small firms, for larger trades, and by top executives. There are important policy implications of the results. The recognition of informed trades by market makers justifies more scrutiny by the Securities and Exchange Commission in order to ensure fair trading.     

Intersectoral size differences and migration: Kuznets revisited

That researchers look for the inverted-U shape in inequality in the arbitrary periods of arbitrary countries underlies the divergent empirical evidence across studies. To point to the right context for the pattern, this paper establishes a formal mechanism in line with Kuznets' explanation that relates to the industrialization-cum-urbanization phases of closed trade regimes. The mechanism involves an interaction among urban–rural sectoral size differences, agricultural tastes/income, and migration, and predicts an inverted-U shape in inequality in the following way: (i) widening differences in the sizes of urban and rural sectors due to exogenous shocks affect negatively the agricultural tastes/income, worsening inequality; (ii) increasing sectoral size differences and decreasing agricultural tastes/income jointly foster intersectoral migration; (iii) migration acts, in turn, as an equilibrating effect, improving the income distribution. Empirically testing these predictions, non-Sub-Saharan developing countries' data support the mechanism, while data from developed and Sub-Saharan African countries provide little support, as per our prior expectations. This highlights a contrasting evidence on the inverted-U shape across country groups of differing development stages.     

Comparing Bargaining Solutions in the Shadow of Conflict: How Norms against Threats Can Have Real Effects

In many economic environments agents make costly and irreversible investments (in “guns”) that may enhance their respective threat payoffs but also shrink the utility possibilities set. In such settings, with variable threats and a variable utility possibilities set, it becomes possible to rank different bargaining solutions in terms of efficiency. We compare bargaining solutions within a class in which the influence of the threat point on the bargaining outcome varies across solutions. Under symmetry, we find that the solution in which the threat point is least influential—the equal sacrifice solution—Pareto-dominates the other solutions. Since the equal sacrifice solution puts the least weight on the threat point, norms against threats (that can be seen in many seemingly rhetorical pronouncements in adversarial relations) can mitigate some of the costs of conflict and therefore have efficiency-enhancing effects. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C78, D30, D70, D72, K42.     

Strategic vote manipulation in a simple democracy

In both the Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) and employee buyouts, the common and crucial phenomenon is that some workers have two sources of income, namely wages and shares of profit. We analyze that phenomenon in an economy where workers are nonunionized and wages are determined by voting. If the employers sell a certain amount of shares of the capital stock to some non-risk-loving workers, these workers vote for the lowest possible wage along with the employers. As a result, all workers become equally worse off because of the competition among workers to buy those shares.     

Evolutionary stability of bargaining and price posting: implications for formal and informal activities

In this paper we study the co-existence of two well known trading protocols, bargaining and price-posting. To do so we consider a frictional environment where buyers and sellers play price-posting and bargaining games infinitely many times. Sellers switch from one market to the other at a rate that is proportional to their payoff differentials. Given the different informational requirements associated with these two trading mechanisms, we examine their possible co-existence in the context of informal and formal markets. Other than having different trading protocols, we also consider other distinguishing features. We find a unique stable equilibrium where price-posting (formal markets) and bargaining (informal markets) co-exist. In a richer environment where both sellers and buyers can move across markets, we show that there exists a unique stable dynamic equilibrium where formal and informal activities also co-exist whenever sellers’ and buyers’ net costs of trading in the formal market have opposite signs.