Mood and Judgment of Subjective Probabilities: Evidence from the U.S. Index Option Market

Numerous psychological studies show that weather conditions affect people'smood and that mood states are correlated with people's subjective evaluationof future probabilities. In this paper, a new approach is developed and assetmarket data are employed to test the mood-subjective probability relation. Cloudcover and precipitation volume serve as two mood proxies. Our statistical analysissuggests that bad mood states are characterized by investors placing higher probabilitieson adverse events.     

Bayesian and Frequentist Inference for Ecological Inference: The R×C Case

In this paper we propose Bayesian and frequentist approaches to ecological inference, based on R × C contingency tables, including a covariate. The proposed Bayesian model extends the binomial-beta hierarchical model developed by K ing , R osen and T anner (1999) from the 2×2 case to the R × C case. As in the 2×2 case, the inferential procedure employs Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods. As such, the resulting MCMC analysis is rich but computationally intensive. The frequentist approach, based on first moments rather than on the entire likelihood, provides quick inference via nonlinear least-squares, while retaining good frequentist properties. The two approaches are illustrated with simulated data, as well as with real data on voting patterns in Weimar Germany. In the final section of the paper we provide an overview of a range of alternative inferential approaches which trade-off computational intensity for statistical efficiency.     

Human capital acquisition as a competitive response to the promotion distortion

Waldman shows that under the assumption that prospective employers observe whether a worker was promoted, but cannot observe his ability, the promotion policy is inefficient. In the current paper, we show that human capital acquisition made after the players (both worker and employer) observe the worker's ability reduces this inefficiency, even though such an investment is not optimal in some setups.     

Decision-making under uncertainty – A field study of cumulative prospect theory

The presented research tests cumulative prospect theory (CPT, [Kahneman, D., Tversky, A., 1979. Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica 47, 263–291; Tversky, A., Kahneman, D., 1981. The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. Science 211, 453–480]) in the financial market, using US stock option data. Option prices possess information about actual investors’ preferences in such a way that an exploitation of conventional option analysis, along with theoretical relationships, makes it possible to elicit investor preferences. The option data in this study serve for estimating the two essential elements of the CPT, namely, the value function and the probability weighting function. The main part of the work focuses on the functions’ simultaneous estimation under CPT original parametric specification. The shape of the estimated functions is found to be in line with theory. Comparing to results of laboratory experiments, the estimated functions are closer to linearity and loss aversion is less pronounced.     

Theories of choice under risk: Insights from financial markets

To date, the plausibility of theories of choice under risk hinges are mainly on experimental evidence. This paper devises and implements an approach amenable of assessing the performance of three families of models (expected utility, rank-dependent expected utility, and the cumulative prospect theory) using information from financial asset markets. Our findings unequivocally support reference-point dependence, diminishing marginal sensitivity, loss aversion, and nonlinear weighting of (gain and loss) physical probabilities. The empirical observations are found to be robust to, inter alia, the parameterization of the utility and probability weighting functions, “day-of-the-week effects”, the choice of a reference point, and the introduction of possible, low-probability market crashes (peso component).     

Transfers in a polarized country: bridging the gap between efficiency and stability

We consider a political economy model of country whose citizens have heterogeneous preferences for a national policy and some regions may contemplate a threat of secession. The country is efficient if its breakup into smaller countries leads to an aggregate utility loss. We show that in an efficient country whose citizens' preferences exhibit a high degree of polarization, a threat of secession cannot be eliminated without inter-regional transfers. We also demonstrate that if majority voting is used to determine the redistribution schemes within the country, then a high degree of polarization yields the full-compensation scheme as the unique political equilibrium.     

Payoffs in Nondifferentiable Perfectly Competitive TU Economies

We show that a single-valued solution of nonatomic finite-type market games (or perfectly competitive TU economies underling them) is uniquely determined as the Mertens value by four plausible value-related axioms. Since the Mertens value is always in the core of an economy, this result provides an axiomatization of a core-selection (or, alternatively, a competitive payoff selection). Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, D51, D61.     

HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE PROBABILITY OF DIVORCE

Concern about the high poverty rates experienced by children in female‐headed households has led to policies aimed at increasing these households' income. In this paper we present a model that analyses decisions made before and during marriage to invest in the human capital of parents and children. These decisions result from a variety of anticipated post‐divorce monetary transfers between spouses.     

Tournaments and piece rates revisited: a theoretical and experimental study of output-dependent prize tournaments

Tournaments represent an increasingly important component of organizational compensation systems. While prior research focused on fixed-prize tournaments where the prize to be awarded is set in advance, we introduce ‘output-dependent prizes’ where the tournament prize is endogenously determined by agents’ output—it is high when the output is high and low when the output is low. We show that tournaments with output-dependent prizes outperform fixed-prize tournaments and piece rates. A multi-agent experiment supports the theoretical result.     

Effects of Expected Effort on Females in the Labor Market

We introduce expectations regarding the amount of exerted effort by males and females into the “standard” labor market equilibrium. Using a theoretical model, we show that the gender wage gap increases when the expected effect is incorporated into the model. Based on a survey, we find that there are inaccurate expectations regarding the amount effort exerted by males and females. We argue that biased expectations lead to paying females lower wages and a higher gender wage gap than should be expected on the basis of effort exerted. We suggest marketing females' efforts as a policy tool to counteract these biased expectations.