Decentralizing antipoverty program delivery in developing countries

We study the effects on accountability in government service delivery of decentralizing administration of an antipoverty program. While governments at both central and local levels are vulnerable to antipoor policy biases owing to political capture, centralized delivery systems are additionally prone to bureaucratic corruption, owing to problems in monitoring bureaucratic performance. Decentralizing the delivery system promotes cost-effectiveness and improves intraregional targeting at low program scales. But interregional targeting may deteriorate, as central grants to high-poverty regions shrink, owing to high capture of local governments by local elites in such regions.     

Institutions matter,but which ones?

The purpose of this paper is to go beyond the narrow focus of the current institutional economics literature in development on the institutions protecting individual property rights, and to look at the economic effects of some other aspects of institutional quality on the development process (like democratic participation rights and institutions to address coordination failures). Another purpose is to suggest an alternative instrumental variable in quantifying the effects of property rights institutions. Finally, we speculate how, on account of distributive conflicts, institutions that have an adverse effect on economic performance often tend to persist for long periods of time in many poor countries.     

Wealth inequality and collective action

We study the effect of inequality in the distribution of endowments of private inputs (e.g., land, wealth) that are complementary in production with collective inputs (e.g., contribution to public goods such as irrigation and extraction from common-property resources) on efficiency in a class of collective action problems. We focus on characterizing the joint surplus maximizing level of inequality, making due distinction between contributors and non-contributors, in a framework that allows us to consider a wide variety of collective action problems ranging from pure public goods to impure public goods to commons. We show that while efficiency increases with greater equality within the groups of contributors and non-contributors, so long the externalities (positive or negative) are significant, there is an optimal degree of inequality between these groups.     

Valuing Mortgage Insurance Contracts in Emerging Market Economies

We develop a new option-based method for the valuation of mortgage insurance contracts in closed form in an economy where agents are risk neutral. While the proposed valuation method is general and can be used in any market, it may be particularly useful in emerging market economies where other existing methods may be either inappropriate or are too difficult to implement because of the lack of relevant data. As an application, we price a typical Serbian government-backed mortgage insurance contract.     

Global Financial Integration and Real Estate Security Returns

Have globalization and increasing economic and financial integration affected the rates of return of publicly traded real estate companies around the world? Using a set of multifactor models for annual data for 946 firms from 16 countries over the sample period, 1995–2002, we estimate the impact of a country's economic openness on returns of publicly traded real estate firms, controlling for the effects of global capital markets, domestic macroeconomic conditions and firm‐specific variables. We find that a country's real estate security excess (risk‐adjusted) returns are negatively related to its openness. The results are robust across different multifactor model specifications and are a testament to increasing global financial integration and its interplay with the real estate sector.     

ON THE CONCEPT OF POWER IN ECONOMICS

In this paper we start with the standard definition of power and indicate how orthodox neoclassical economics fails to handle some of the key issues of power. In Sections II and III we discuss in the context of recent advances in economic theory some of the battlefields, so to speak, for the exercise of power: bargaining games in Section II and economic organizations and capitalist authority relations in Section III. In all of this we focus on the underlying structural factors. In the last Section we discuss some problems with both the behavioral and structural concepts of power.     

The role of manufacturing practices in mediating the impact of activity-based costing on plant performance

We study the impact of activity-based costing (ABC) on adoption of world-class manufacturing (WCM) practices and plant performance. In contrast to earlier research that estimates the direct impact of ABC on plant performance, we develop an alternative research model to study the role of world-class manufacturing practices as a mediator of the impact of ABC. Analysis of data from a large cross-sectional sample of US manufacturing plants indicates that ABC has no significant direct impact on plant performance, as measured by improvements in unit manufacturing costs, cycle time, and product quality. We find, however, that WCM practices completely mediate the positive impact of ABC on plant performance, and thus advanced manufacturing capabilities represent a critical missing link in understanding the overall impact of ABC. Our results provide a different conceptual lens to evaluate the relationship between ABC adoption and plant performance, and suggest that ABC adoption by itself does not improve plant performance.