The effect of information releases on the pricing and timing of equity issues

With time-varying adverse selection in the market for new equityissues, firms will prefer to issue equity when the market ismost informed about the quality of the firm. This implies thatequity issues tend to follow credible information releases.In addition, if the asymmetric in information increases overtime between information releases, the price drop at the announcementof an equity issue should increase in the time since the lastinformation release. Using earning releases as a proxy for informativeevents, we find evidence supporting these propositions.     

THE IMPACT OF PRICES AND CONTROL POLICIES ON CIGARETTE SMOKING AMONG COLLEGE STUDENTS

Smoking among youths and young adults rose throughout the 1990s. Numerous policies were enacted to try to reverse this trend. However, little is known about the impact these policies have on the smoking behavior of young adults. This article uses a dichotomous indicator of daily smoking participation in the past 30 days, an ordered measure representing the frequency of cigarette consumption, and a quasi-continuous measure of the number of cigarettes smoked per day on average to examine the impact of cigarette prices, clean indoor air laws, and campus-level smoking policies on the smoking behaviors of a 1997 cross section of college students. The results of the analysis indicate that higher cigarette prices are associated with lower smoking participation and lower levels of use among college student smokers. Local- and state-level clean indoor air restrictions have a cumulative impact on the level of smoking by current smokers. Complete smoking bans on college campuses are associated with lower levels of smoking among current smokers but have no significant impact on smoking participation. Bans on cigarette advertising on campus as well as bans on the sale of cigarettes on campus have no significant effect on the smoking behavior of college students.     

Asymmetric information and the medium of exchange in takeovers: theory and tests

In a model of takeovers under asymmetric information, we identifya separating equilibrium in which the value of the bidder firmis revealed by the mix of cash and securities used as paymentfor the target. The model predicts that the revealed biddervalue is monotonically increasing and convex in the fractionof the total offer that consists of cash. We examine the modelrestrictions using data from Canada, where mixed offers areboth relatively frequent and free of the confounding tax-relatedoptions characterizing mixed offers in the United States. Wefind that the average announcement-month bidder abnormal returnin mixed offers is large and significant. However, maximum likelihoodestimates of parameters in both linear and nonlinear cross-sectionalregressions fail to support the model predictions.     

European monetary union and asymmetric shocks in a new Keynesian model

This paper attempts to quantify the costs imposed by asymmetricshocks under European Monetary Union compared to free floating.A simple two-country model is examined where policy is set inan optimal, time consistent manner. Nominal and real rigiditiesare present in both economies, but prices are set in a forwardlooking manner and expectations are rational. Results suggestthat the costs of asymmetric shocks under EMU may be significantlyhigher than under free floating, particularly if fiscal policyis not used for demand management.