Golden cages for showy birds: Optimal switching costs in labor contracts

Under what circumstances do workers sign contracts with high quitting penalties? Our answer points to market transparency. When the worker's performance is privately observed by the incumbent firm, alternative employers face an adverse selection problem. As a result, efficient separations can only take place through involuntary layoffs and there is no role for quitting fees. In contrast, when performance is public, quitting fees are useful devices to appropriate the surplus from workers’ reallocation. Separations are amicable and take the form of quitting after downwardly renegotiating the fees. Qualitative features of contracts are independent of the distribution of ex-post bargaining power. The impact of switching costs on total welfare and its distribution depends on the degree of market transparency and the ex-ante distribution of market power.     

Delegation and polarization of platforms in political competition

Summary. We consider a model of political competition among two ideological parties who are uncertain about the distribution of voters. The distinguishing feature of the model is that parties can delegate electoral decisions to candidates by nomination. It is shown that if the credible platform commitments of the candidates is feasible, then at least one of the parties nominates in equilibrium to a candidate who has an ideology that is more radical than the delegating party's ideology. In a variety of circumstances, this, in turn, yields a polarization of equilibrium policy choices of the candidates. It is thus argued formally here that strategic nomination of the candidates may well be one of the major reasons behind the well documented observation that the platforms associated with the political parties in two-party democracies are often surprisingly polarized. Received: January 10, 2002; revised version: May 8, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We thank Alberto Alesina, Levent Ko?kesen, Antonio Merlo, Ronny Razin, Vijay Krishna, Alessandro Lizzeri, and seminar participants at Alicante, Columbia, Copenhagen, and NYU for helpful comments. We also thank an anonymous referee for its useful suggestions. A good fraction of this research was conducted while Ok was a visitor in the Department of Economics at University of Alicante; he thanks for the kind hospitality of this institution. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education through grant CICYT BEC2001-0535 (Faulí-Oller) and BEC2001-0980 (Ortu?o-Ortín). Correspondence to:I. Ortu?o-Ortin     

Welfare reducing licensing

In this paper, we characterize situations where licensing a cost reducing innovation to a rival firm using two-part tariff contracts (a fixed fee plus a linear per unit of output royalty) reduces social welfare. We show that it occurs if (i) the firms compete in prices, (ii) the innovation is large enough but not drastic, and (iii) the goods are close enough substitutes. Moreover, we show that, regardless of the type of competition, first, the optimal contract always includes a positive royalty and, second, even drastic innovations are licensed whenever the goods are not homogeneous.     

All in the family or public? Law and appropriative costs as determinants of ownership structure

We examine how the legal protection of outside shareholders and the appropriative costs that they induce influence the incentives for private firms to go public. A higher degree of protection of shareholders can increase the appropriative costs associated with the conflict between managers and shareholders. To counteract this effect the managers/owners increase the share of the firm they retain so that, overall, higher protection of outsiders increases the likelihood of going public. In addition, we examine how the share of funds raised used to finance the firm affects both appropriative costs and the decision to sell.For helpful comments we thank participants at the conference on Corporate Governance at UC Irvine (February 2002), seminar participants at the Athens University of Economics and Business, and worskshop participants on the New Organization of Labour at the 2002 CESifo summer Institute in Venice. Skaperdas gratefully acknowledges support from a grant for Research and Writing from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.     

Urban destination loyalty drivers and cross-national moderator effects: The case of Barcelona

The objective of this paper is to analyze the loyalty of tourists to urban tourism destinations, studying the differences existing on the basis of nationality of origin. The review of the academic literature identified perceived value and satisfaction as antecedents of loyalty. A theoretical model was constructed which was tested empirically with a total of 927 surveys of Italian and American tourists in the city of Barcelona. In the study of the data, structural equation models (SEM) were used, by means of a multi-group analysis. The empirical results show that the causal relationships among perceived value, satisfaction and loyalty and the moderating effect of nationality are partially confirmed. This study contributes to better knowledge of the processes that lead tourists to be loyal to an urban tourism destination.     

The Design and Efficiency of Loyalty Rewards

The goal of this paper is to reexamine the optimal design and efficiency of loyalty rewards (LRs) in markets for final consumption goods. Although the literature to date has emphasized the role of LRs as endogenous switching costs (which distort the efficient allocation of consumers), l analyze instead the ability of alternative designs to foster consumer participation and increase total surplus. First, the efficiency of LRs depends on their specific design. A commitment to the price of repeat purchases can involve substantial efficiency gains by reducing price‐cost margins. However, discount policies imply higher future regular prices and are likely to reduce total surplus. Second, firms may prefer to set up inefficient rewards (discounts), especially in circumstances where a commitment to the price of repeat purchases triggers Coasian dynamics.     

Marketing for hospitality & tourism and tourism marketing a comparative review of two marketing textbooks from an Asian perspective

Marketing for Hospitality and Tourism. By Philip Kotler, John Bowen and James Maken, Prentice‐Hall. (Upper Saddle River, NJ 07458) ISBN: 0–13–395625–3, 1996, xv + 704‐pp. (tables, charts, photographs, references, index) $ 70.00 (hardcover).

Tourism Marketing. By Les Lumsdon, International Thomson Business Press. (Berkshire House, 168–173 High Holbora, London WC1V 7AA, UK) ISBN: 1–86152–045‐X, 1997, xiv + 290‐pp. (tables, charts, references, select bibliography, index) $ 32.95 (soft).     

Stock returns and volatility: Another look

Most empirical work examining the intertemporal mean-variance relationship in stock returns has tended to use relatively simple specifications of the mean and especially of the conditional variance. We augment the information set to include economic variables that other researchers have found to be important and use GARCH-M models to explore the relation between volatility and expected stock returns. We find that the additional variables have little impact on the conditional variance and that any intertemporal relationship between volatility and stock returns is weak or unstable. Our results signal the need for theoretical models of the intertemporal volatility-return relationship, and call for further studies of the determinants of the conditional variance of stock returns.     

Import Dependency and Structural Adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa

One of the effects of structural adjustment programs in Sub-SaharanAfrica has been the reduction of imports in the face of scarceforeign exchange. This article takes the analysis of importdemand beyond the traditional income and price determinantsto account for factors likely to be important to Sub-SaharanAfrican countries in the 1990s. First, the effect of demandon imports is reflected by the level of absorption rather thanthe less direct income variable. Second, because adjustmentprograms may cut government consumption and, through increasesin interest rates, reduce investment, these components of absorptionare also considered independently to assess their differentialeffect on imports. Third, import barriers are often set in dollarterms to limit the use of foreign exchange. Because reliableand complete data for import restrictions are not available,the ratio of exports to debt is included as an indicator offoreign exchange availability to reflect its effect on tradebarriers and thus imports. The findings suggest that this morecomprehensive assessment of import demand will be needed ifthe size and even direction of changes in import demand in responseto policy reform is to be understood and anticipated.