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We study all‐pay contests with an exogenous minimal effort constraint where a player can participate in a contest only if his effort (output) is equal to or higher than the minimal effort constraint. Contestants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) that affects their cost of effort. The designer decides about the size and number of prizes. We analyze the optimal prize allocation for the contest designer who wishes to maximize either the total effort or the highest effort. It is shown that if the minimal effort constraint is relatively high, the winner‐take‐all contest in which the contestant with the highest effort wins the entire prize sum does not maximize the expected total effort or the expected highest effort. Rather, a random contest in which the entire prize sum is equally allocated to all the participants yields a higher expected total effort as well as a higher expected highest effort. 相似文献
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We analyze the subgame perfect equilibrium of the round‐robin tournament with one strong (dominant) and two weak players, and we compare this tournament and the one‐stage contest with respect to the players' expected payoffs, expected total effort, and their probabilities of winning. We find that if the contest designer's goal is to maximize the players' expected total effort, then – if the asymmetry between the players is relatively low – the one‐stage contest should be used. However, if the asymmetry is relatively high, then the round‐robin tournament should be used. 相似文献
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In the current study, we examine how cognitive load affects economic decision‐making. We asked participants to bid for lottery tickets with and without an alternative income. We demonstrate that the tendency to ignore opportunity costs is stronger under a greater cognitive load. Furthermore, cognitive load causes participants to invest fewer cognitive efforts in choice tasks and take more risks. 相似文献
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