A Note on Clean Technology Adoption and its Influence on Tradeable Emission Permits Prices

In this paper, we give an example in which the price of tradable emission permits increases despite firms’ adoption of less polluting technology, a result that is in contrast with Montero (J Environ Econ 44:23–44, 2002) and Parry (J Regul Econ 14:229–254, 1998), among others. If two Cournot players switch to a cleaner technology, the price for permits may increase due to an increase in the net demand for permits and a decrease in the net supply of permits after the clean technology is adopted. This is only the case when output demand is quite elastic.     

(Un)stable vertical collusive agreements

In this paper, we extend the concept of stability to vertical collusive agreements involving downstream and upstream firms, using a setup of successive Cournot oligopolies. We show that a stable vertical agreement, the unanimous vertical agreement involving all downstream and upstream firms, always exists. Thus, stable vertical collusive agreements exist even for market structures in which horizontal cartels would be unstable. We also show that there are economies for which the unanimous agreement is not the only stable one. Furthermore, the Stigler statement according to which the only ones who benefit from a collusive agreement are the outsiders need not be valid in vertical agreements.     

Free entry in successive oligopolies

In the present paper, we propose an extension of Spengler's (1950) analysis of successive oligopolies, to study the effects of entry in the downstream and upstream markets. Free entry is analyzed using replica economies à la Debreu and Scarf (1963) . We find that free entry may have different effects in the upstream and in the downstream market. Namely, the usual convergence of the price to the corresponding marginal cost only occurs in the downstream market.     

UPSTREAM MARKET FORECLOSURE

This paper investigates how an incumbent monopolist can weaken potential rivals or deter entry in the output market by manipulating the access of these rivals in the input market. We analyse two polar cases. In the first one, the input market is assumed to be competitive with the input being supplied inelastically. We show that this situation opens the door to entry deterrence. Then, we assume that the input is supplied by a single seller who chooses the input price. In this case, we show that entry deterrence can be reached only through merger with the seller of the input.     

Tax havens compliance with international standards: A temporal perspective

This paper contributes to the debate centering on the fight against aggressive tax avoidance practices through the release of international standards. We develop a model in which identical tax havens decide upon their compliance date while competing for onshore capital. The timing of these decisions depends on the effects of two opposing forces. One force is linked to the tax sensitivity of international capital and the other to the reaction of nearby potential capital. When the former force dominates, asynchronous compliance arises, which occurs even with identical tax havens and perfect information. However, when the latter force dominates, tax havens comply simultaneously. In any case, the loss of tax base within the onshore region is minimized when compliance is simultaneous and occurs at the earliest possible date. Surprisingly, compliance of just one tax haven is not necessarily better than no compliance at all.     

Financial openness,disclosure and bank risk-taking in MENA countries

In this paper, we analyze the risk-taking behavior of banks in emerging economies in a context of international capital mobility. Our paper highlights a new channel through which depositors can exercise pressure to control risk-taking. Depositors can reallocate their savings away from their home country to the more protective system of a developed economy. We recover a classical result according to which increased competition resulting from more international financial openness induces banks to take excessive risks. We find however that sufficiently high financial openness is necessary for a positive link between financial transparency and safe risk management. Finally, we test the relationship between disclosure, financial openness and bank risk-taking for a panel of 258 banks from the MENA region and Turkey.     

On uncertainty when it affects successive markets

In this paper, we examine how uncertainty can affect successive markets, when uncertainty can affect both upstream and downstream markets' conditions. The main result of the paper is that the equilibrium solution depends on how much dependent are the events.     

Migration: A theoretical comparison on countries’ welfare

We compare the effects of migration on the production of public goods, on income taxes, and on the welfare of residents in the sending and receiving countries. Migration is driven by income differences between countries. Alternative wage adjustment scenarios are considered: fully flexible wages, upward rigidity, and unemployment. We show that in all scenarios, emigration is detrimental to welfare for the origin country. Migration improves welfare for the destination country in the presence of flexible wages and upward rigidity, but it has detrimental effects in the presence of unemployment.     

Migration,wages and income taxes

We analyze labor migration flows between two countries (regions) with different-sized populations and different levels of productive efficiencies to determine the effects of such flows on income taxation. The residents are heterogeneous because they incur different migration costs, although they are otherwise identical. Each resident compares her post-tax revenue at home with that obtained abroad, including migration costs, and each country’s government maximizes tax receipts. We study the existence of an equilibrium for any configuration of wages and for any difference in the relative sizes of the countries (regions). Then, we compute and characterize the equilibrium, whenever it exists, for any set of parameters, sizes and wage differentials. Finally, we show that equilibrium migration flows affect the level of income taxation in both the origin and destination countries.     

Random encounters and information diffusion about product quality

This paper explores how social interactions among consumers shape markets. In a two-country model, consumers meet and exchange information about the quality of the goods. As information spreads, demand evolves, affecting the prices and quantities manufactured by profit-maximizing firms. We show that market prices with informational frictions reach the duopoly price with full information at the limit. However, this convergence can take different paths depending on the size asymmetry between countries. In particular, when the country producing the low-quality good is relatively large, the single market does not immediately turn into a duopoly and can be temporarily trapped in a situation of price instability where no Nash equilibrium in pure (but only in mixed) strategies exists and prices can fluctuate between their monopoly and duopoly levels. It follows that the classical price-reducing effects of international trade may take longer to appear. In view of an intense globalization process, understanding how social meetings affect market outcomes is critical for understanding the performance of international economic integration.