On the Use of Nonfinancial Performance Measures in Management Compensation

It is often claimed that (i) managers work too hard on operational issues and do not spend enough effort on strategic activities, and (ii) something can be done about this by introducing nonfinancial performance measures, as for instance with a balanced scorecard. We give an explanation for both claims in a formal model. The distortion toward operational effort arises because with financial performance measures strategic effort can only be rewarded in the future. But renegotiation-proof long-term compensation plans entail too weak variable components in the future. This problem can be reduced by introducing performance measures that help to disentangle strategic and operational effects.     

Management Changes,Reputation, and “Big Bath”—Earnings Management

We study the effects of managerial turnover on earnings management activities in a model in which managers care about their external reputation. We develop an overlapping generations model showing that both outgoing and incoming managers bias reported earnings such that typically very low returns are reported in the first period after a manager has been replaced. Outgoing managers shift earnings forward to their last period in office as they will not benefit from earnings realized after that. Incoming managers can have an incentive to shift earnings to the second period in office as reported earnings will, immediately after a management change, only be partly attributed to their own ability. Deferred compensation can reduce incentives for earnings management.     

Envy and Compassion in Tournaments

Many experiments and field studies indicate that most individuals are not purely motivated by material self-interest but also care about the well being of others. In this paper, we examine tournaments among inequity averse agents, who dislike disadvantageous inequity (envy) and advantageous inequity (compassion). It turns out that inequity averse agents exert higher efforts than purely self-interested agents for a given prize structure. Contrary to standard tournament theory, first-best efforts cannot be implemented when prizes are endogenous. Furthermore, the choice between vertical and lateral promotions is examined and it is shown that inequity costs have to be traded off against losses in human capital .     

Risk Taking in Asymmetric Tournaments

Abstract. A tournament is examined in which two agents with different abilities choose efforts as well as risks. According to the previous literature, the more (less) able agent should choose a low (high) risk strategy, because the first one does not want to imperil his favorable position, whereas the last one can only gain by increasing risk. We show that this is not necessarily true. Risk taking affects equilibrium efforts as well as winning probabilities. Depending on both effects diverse equilibria are possible. For example, the low and the high ability agent may both choose high risks or both choose low risks.     

Organizational structure and innovative activity

A model is analyzed in which agents exert effort to create innovations within an organization. When payments are infeasible, the decision on the implementation of a proposal is shown to be made by simple monotonic decision rules. Organizational structure is then determined by a collection of decision rules. A trade-off arises between the use of information and the incentives created by a rule. If the former dominates it will currently be optimal to install a hierarchy. Otherwise decentralization by granting autonomy to innovators may be better. Requiring unanimous decision-making is optimal if a strong filtering of proposals is necessary.Received: June 2001, Accepted: May 2002, JEL Classification: D23, D71, L22I am grateful to Anke Kessler, Matthias Kräkel, Sabine Lindenthal, Patrick Schmitz, Urs Schweizer and Thomas Tröger as well as two anonymous referees for helpful comments and discussions. I am especially grateful to one anonymous referee who made numerous extremely useful suggestions.     

Job rotation and employee performance – evidence from a longitudinal study in the financial services industry

Job rotation, i.e. a lateral transfer of an employee between jobs within a company, is frequently used as a means to develop employees, learn about their abilities as well as to motivate them. We investigate the determinants and performance effects of job rotation empirically by analyzing a large panel data-set covering the German banking and financial services sector. In particular, we study (i) how prior individual performance affects the propensity to rotate and (ii) how performance changes after the rotation. We find that while both, low- and high-performers rotate, lateral moves are more frequent among low performers. However, those having been rotated between jobs achieve a higher performance in subsequent years as compared to other non-rotating employees in a comparable position. Interestingly, this effect is driven by high performers, whereas for low performers, we find no significant relationship between job rotation and future performance. The results thus suggest that firms should focus their job rotation programs on high performers and should not expect that low performers achieve performance gains when being rotated to a different function.     

The anatomy of performance appraisals in Germany

We investigate the use of performance appraisal (PA) in German firms. First, we derive hypotheses on individual and job-based determinants of PA usage. Based on a representative German data set on individual employees, we test these hypotheses and also explore the impact of PA on performance pay and further career prospects. The results include that PA is positively linked to an individual's willingness to take risks. The performance of older employees and woman is evaluated less often. Furthermore, larger firms evaluate the performance of their employees more. We find evidence for a non-monotonic relation between the hierarchical level and usage of performance appraisal: The performance of employees with very high or very low responsibilities is assessed less often.     

How to hire helpers? Evidence from a field experiment

How to hire voluntary helpers? We shed new light on this question by reporting a field experiment in which we invited 2859 students to help at the ‘ESA Europe 2012’ conference. Invitation emails varied non-monetary and monetary incentives to convince subjects to offer help. Students could apply to help at the conference and, if so, also specify the working time they wanted to provide. Just asking subjects to volunteer or offering them a certificate turned out to be significantly more motivating than mentioning that the regular conference fee would be waived for helpers. By means of an online-survey experiment, we find that intrinsic motivation to help is likely to have been crowded out by mentioning the waived fee. Increasing monetary incentives by varying hourly wages of 1, 5, and 10 Euros shows positive effects on the number of applications and on the working time offered. However, when comparing these results with treatments without any monetary compensation, the number of applications could not be increased by offering money and may even be reduced.     

Evidence on performance pay and risk aversion

Making use of a unique representative data set, we find clear evidence that risk aversion has a highly significant and substantial negative impact on the probability that an employee's pay is performance contingent, which confirms the well known risk-incentive trade-off.