Portfolio Capital Flows: Hot or Cold?

A distinction is often made between short-term and long-termcapital flows: the former are deemed unstable hot money andthe latter are deemed stable cold money. Using time-series analysisof balance of payments data for five industrial and five developingcountries, we find that in most cases the labels "short-term"and "long-term" do not provide any information about the time-seriesproperties of the flow. In particular, long-term flows are oftenas volatile as short-term flows, and the time it takes for anunexpected shock to a flow to die out is similar across flows.long-term flows are also at least as unpredictable as short-termflows, and knowledge of the type of flow does not improve theability to forecast the aggregate capital account.     

ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF EXTERNAL FINANCE: A SURVEY

For many developing countries, alternative forms of externalfinance—all forms of finance that are not guaranteed byor mediated through the public sector—have become increasinglyimportant as traditional financing to the public sector hasebbed. Yet a survey of the literature reveals few recent analyticalinsights about alternative financing, which includes foreigndirect investment, project lending, portfolio investment, closed-endequity funds, private nonguaranteed debt, licensing, joint ventures,quasi-equity contracts, and other forms of private, nonrecourselending to private borrowers. The literature offers little solidguidance for distinguishing between alternative and traditionalfinancing with respect to country risk, for establishing themost appropriate and efficient incentive structures and restrictionsin the host country, or for identifying the optimal financingmodes for international firms investing in developing countries.This gap in the analytical literature has important implicationsfor policy formulation. It is not always clear whether a countryis developing incentives and establishing safeguards (for ensuringadherence to project performance requirements) that are mosteffective in attracting alternative forms of finance.      

Competition in the Financial Sector: Overview of Competition Policies

Competition in the financial sector, as in other sectors, mattersfor allocative, productive, and dynamic efficiency. Theory suggests,however, that unfettered competition is not necessarily bestgiven the special features of financial services. The authordiscusses these analytical complications before reviewing howto assess competition in the financial sector and its determinants.It is shown that competitiveness varies greatly across countries,in perhaps surprising ways, and that it is not driven by financialsystem concentration. Rather, systems with greater foreign entryand fewer entry and activity restrictions tend to be more competitive,confirming that contestability—the lack of barriers toentry and exit—determines effective competition. The authorthen analyzes how competition policy in the financial sectorhas generally been conducted and how changes in competitionin the financial services industries should affect competitionpolicy going forward. In part based on comparison with otherindustries, the author provides some suggestions on how competitionpolicy in the financial sector could be better approached aswell as what institutional arrangements best fit a modern viewof competition policy in the sector. The specific competitionchallenges for developing countries is also highlighted. Theauthor concludes that practices today fall far short of theneed for better competition policy in the financial sector. JEL codes: G10, G18, G28, L1, L5     

Competition and Scope of Activities in Financial Services

This article analyzes the costs and benefits of different degreesof competition and different configurations of permissible activitiesin the financial sector and discusses the related implicationsfor regulation and supervision. Theory and experience demonstratethe importance of competition for efficiency and confirm thata competitive environment requires a contestable system—meaningone that is open to competition—but not necessarily alarge number of institutions. A competitive banking system canimprove the distribution of consumer credit, enhance the corporatesector's access to financing, and mitigate the risks of financialcrises. In an open market, in which services and products areprovided in response to market signals, financial institutionsrespond by offering a wider scope of financial services. Theoptimal institutional design for supervisory functions is lessobvious.      

The Emergence of Equity Investment in Developing Countries: Overview

Equity flows to developing countries have increased sharplyin recent years. Foreign equity investment can be beneficialto developing countries because of its risk-sharing characteristicsand effects on resource mobilization and allocation. Empiricalevidence shows that the stock markets of developing countrieshave become more, although not fully, integrated with worldfinancial markets, and this increased integration implies alower risk-adjusted cost of capital. Constraints to furtherincreasing the flows and expanding the benefits are macroinstability,poorly functioning stock markets, and insufficiently open financialmarkets. Empirical evidence does not support the view that equityflows are more volatile than other types of capital flows orthat equity flows have a negative impact on the volatility ofstock prices.     

The global financial crisis: How similar? How different? How costly?

This paper provides a brief analysis of three major questions raised in the context of the recent global financial crisis. First, how similar is the crisis to previous episodes? We argue that the crisis featured some close similarities to earlier ones, including the presence of credit and asset price booms fueled by rapid debt accumulation. Second, how different is it from earlier episodes? We show that, as much as it displayed some similarities with previous cases, it also featured some significant differences, such as the explosion of opaque and complex financial instruments in a context of highly integrated global financial markets. Third, how costly are recessions that followed these types of crises? Although the latest episode took a very heavy toll on the real economy, we argue that this was not a surprising outcome. In particular, historical comparisons indicate that recessions associated with periods of deep financial disruptions result in much larger declines in real economic activity. We discuss the implications of these findings for economic and financial sector policies and future research.     

Corporate Governance and Development

The literature shows that good corporate governance generallypays—for firms, for markets, and for countries. It isassociated with a lower cost of capital, higher returns on equity,greater efficiency, and more favorable treatment of all stakeholders,although the direction of causality is not always clear. Thelaw and finance literature has documented the important roleof institutions aimed at contractual and legal enforcement,including corporate governance, across countries. Using firm-leveldata, researchers have documented relationships between countries’corporate governance frameworks on the one hand and performance,valuation, the cost of capital, and access to external financingon the other. Given the benefits of good corporate governance,firms and countries should voluntarily reform more. Resistanceby entrenched owners and managers at the firm level and politicaleconomy factors at the level of markets and countries partlyexplain why they do not.