水资源管理制度改革、农业生产与反贫困

根据我们在黄河流域四个大型灌区的实证研究发现，传统上村级的集体水资源管理制度正在逐渐被用水协会和承包管理所代替。由于改革具有很明显的自上而下的特征。因而很多改革流于形式；而只有那些建立了有效节水激励机制的水资源管理制度才能实现节水的目标。我们进一步的实证研究表明。具有节水激励机制的水资源管理制度的改革会导致小麦单产的降低，但不会对玉米和水稻的单产以及农民收入产生显著影响，而且贫困状况也不会因此而恶化。     

水资源管理制度改革、农业生产与反贫困

根据我们在黄河流域四个大型灌区的实证研究发现,传统上村级的集体水资源管理制度正在逐渐被用水协会和承包管理所代替.由于改革具有很明显的自上而下的特征,因而很多改革流于形式;而只有那些建立了有效节水激励机制的水资源管理制度才能实现节水的目标.我们进一步的实证研究表明,具有节水激励机制的水资源管理制度的改革会导致小麦单产的降低,但下会对玉米和水稻的单产以及农民收入产生显著影响,而且贫困状况也不会因此而恶化.     

Managers' Trading Around Stock Repurchases

We analyze personal open market trades by managers around stock repurchases by tender offer. With the exception of Dutch auction offers, managers trade their firm's shares prior to repurchase announcements as though repurchases convey favorable inside information to outsiders. Prior to fixed price repurchase offers that do not follow takeover-related events, managers increase their buying and reduce their selling of their firm's shares. Prior to repurchases that follow takeover-related events, only a decrease in selling is found. No abnormal trading precedes Dutch auction repurchase offers.     

The Walk‐down to Beatable Analyst Forecasts: The Role of Equity Issuance and Insider Trading Incentives*

It has been alleged that firms and analysts engage in an "earnings‐guidance game" where analysts first issue optimistic earnings forecasts and then "walk down" their estimates to a level that firms can beat at the official earnings announcement. We examine whether the walk‐down to beatable targets is associated with managerial incentives to sell stock after earnings announcements on the firm's behalf (through new equity issuance) or from their personal accounts (through option exercises and stock sales). Consistent with these hypotheses, we find that the walk‐down to beatable targets is most pronounced when firms or insiders are net sellers of stock after an earnings announcement. These findings provide new insights on the impact of capital‐market incentives on communications between managers and analysts.     

Executive Financial Incentives and Payout Policy: Firm Responses to the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut

We test whether executive stock ownership affects firm payouts using the 2003 dividend tax cut to identify an exogenous change in the after‐tax value of dividends. We find that executives with higher ownership were more likely to increase dividends after the tax cut in 2003, whereas no relation is found in periods when the dividend tax rate was higher. Relative to previous years, firms that initiated dividends in 2003 were more likely to reduce repurchases. The stock price reaction to the tax cut suggests that the substitution of dividends for repurchases may have been anticipated, consistent with agency conflicts.     

Charter Value, Risk-Taking Incentives, and Emerging Competition for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

This paper examines two forces that may soon increase competition in the U.S. secondary conforming mortgage market: (1) the Federal Home Loan Bank mortgage purchase programs, and (2) the adoption of revised risk-based capital requirements for large U.S. banks (Basel II). We argue that this competition is likely to reduce the growth and relative importance of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and hence reduce their charter values and effective capital. Such developments could, in turn, lead to more risky behaviors by these two companies. This last consequence warrants greater supervisory awareness and legal authorities.