Collective Risk Control and Group Security: The Unexpected Consequences of Differential Risk Aversion

We provide an analysis of odds‐improving self‐protection for when it yields collective benefits to groups, such as alliances of nations, for whom risks of loss are public bads and prevention of loss is a public good. Our analysis of common risk reduction shows how diminishing returns in risk improvement can be folded into income effects. These income effects then imply that whether protection is inferior or normal depends on the risk aversion characteristics of underlying utility functions, and on the interaction between these, the level of risk, and marginal effectiveness of risk abatement. We demonstrate how public good inferiority is highly likely when the good is “group risk reduction.” In fact, we discover a natural or endogenous limit on the size of a group and of the amount of risk controlling outlay it will provide under Nash behavior. We call this limit an “Inferior Goods Barrier” to voluntary risk reduction. For the paradigm case of declining risk aversion, increases in group size(wealth) will cause provision of more safety to change from a normal to an inferior good thereby creating such a barrier.     

An extended multinomial-Dirichlet model for error bounds for dollar-unit sampling*

Abstract. This paper describes an extension of the Tsui, Matsumura, and Tsui (1985) procedure, which is based on a multinomial distribution model within the dollar-unit sampling framework, with a Dirichlet prior distribution. The extended model and a different Dirichlet prior are used in this study to generate upper and lower bounds and two-sided confidence intervals for situations in which both understatement and overstatement errors are possible. The reported simulation study indicates that the achieved confidence levels of the proposed estimates are usually close to or greater than the nominal levels in repeated sampling for the populations studied. Résumé. Les auteurs décrivent une extension du procédé de Tsui, Matsumura et Tsui (1985) basée sur un modèle de distribution multinômiale dans le contexte de l'échantillonnage en unités monétaires, avec une distribution a priori de Dirichlet. Les auteurs utilisent l'extension du modèle et une distribution a priori de Dirichlet différente pour obtenir des limites supérieures et inférieures, et des intervalles de confiance bilatéraux pour les cas où des erreurs de sous-évaluation aussi bien que de surévaluation sont envisageables. L'étude de simulation qui fait l'objet du compte rendu montre que les niveaux de confiance obtenus relativement aux estimations proposées se rapprochent habituellement des valeurs nominales où les excèdent lorsqu'on procède à des échantillonnages répétés des populations à l'étude.     

AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION

We provide a simple theoretical model to explain the mechanism whereby the privatization of international airports can improve welfare. The model consists of a downstream (airline) duopoly with two inputs (landings at two airports) and two types of consumers. The airline companies compete internationally. We show that the outcome in which both airports are privatized is always an equilibrium, whereas that in which no airport is privatized is an equilibrium only if the degree of product differentiation is large. We also discuss airport congestion problems within the model framework.     

SIMULTANEOUS PRICE CHANGES,INFORMATION ACQUISITION ON COMMON COMPETITORS AND WELFARE*

We investigate a model where two firms choose whether to acquire information on a common competitor. We find that strategic complementarity on information acquisition exists, yielding multiple equilibria. In addition, we investigate welfare implication of information acquisition. We find that information acquisition reduces both consumer surplus and the total profits of the firms.     

ON THE ROBUSTNESS OF PRIVATE LEADERSHIP IN MIXED DUOPOLY

We investigate a mixed duopoly where a state‐owned public enterprise competes against a profit‐maximising private enterprise. We analyse whether private leadership or public leadership is robust in the observable delay game. We find that private leadership is always risk dominant. We also investigate how ownership structure in a public firm affects the equilibrium distribution of roles. We find that the roles are as follows: (1) Cournot, when the degree of privatisation is low, (2) private leadership, when it is middle, (3) both private leadership and public leadership, when it is high. The result implies that private leadership is again more robust.     

Altruism,Liquidity Constraint,and Investment in Education

In Japan and other East Asian societies, household educational expenditures per child (especially private tutoring expenditures) have increased sharply, perhaps to an excessive degree. This paper suggests a rationale for many families to invest extensively in education, whereas other relevant literature rarely addresses the possibility of excessive educational investment. Introducing altruism and liquidity constraints into a model in which parent and child interact for determining investment in the child's education, we show that educational investment may be excessive unless the family is profoundly liquidity‐constrained. Our result extends previous findings incorporating the Samaritan's Dilemma. We also discuss public policy designed to remedy the inefficiency in educational investment.     

项目管理成熟度模型(PMMM)研究与应用

对项目的管理能力和技术水平进行客观的、定量的评价模型，一般称之谓项目管理成熟度模型(PMMM)，它表达一个组织(或企业)具有按照预定的目标和条件成功地、可靠地实施项目的能力。它可以对企业的项目管理组织与过程进行持续的改善起重要作用。章介绍了项目管理成熟度模型的概念、应用的原因、时间、范围、主体等基本知识，以及三种名的模型，并展望了今后其的发展前景。     

MARKET COMPETITION,R&D AND FIRM PROFITS IN ASYMMETRIC OLIGOPOLY*

We investigate a Cournot model with strategic R&D investments wherein efficient low‐cost firms compete against less efficient high‐cost firms. We find that an increase in the number of high‐cost firms can stimulate R&D by the low‐cost firms, while it always reduces R&D by the high‐cost firms. More importantly, this force can be strong enough to compensate for the loss that arises from more intense market competition: the low‐cost firms' profits may indeed increase with the number of high‐cost firms. An implication of this result is far‐reaching, as it gives low‐cost firms an incentive to help, rather than harm, high‐cost competitors. We relate this implication to a practice known as open knowledge disclosure, especially Ford's strategy of disclosing its know‐how publicly and extensively at the beginning of the 20th century.     

A NONCOOPERATIVE SHIPPING COURNOT DUOPOLY WITH LINEAR‐QUADRATIC TRANSPORT COSTS AND CIRCULAR SPACE*

The mixed strategy equilibria in a location quantity duopoly model with circular markets are investigated. We find that a continuum of equilibria exists when the transport cost function is linear. However, if costs are strictly concave or convex, most strategies fail to qualify as equilibria. For any integer n, there are nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibria in which each firm locates at n possible locations with equal probability. This result explains possible outcomes in which firms’ on‐path locations are not minimally or maximally differentiated.     

REALIZED COST‐BASED SUBSIDIES FOR STRATEGIC R&D INVESTMENTS WITH EX ANTE AND EX POST ASYMMETRIES*

We discuss stochastic cost‐reducing R&D investments and examine efficient subsidies. We discuss a two‐stage duopoly model in which each firm chooses R&D levels (innovation size and probability of success) in the first stage and competes à la Cournot in the second stage. We find that simple subsidies depending on the realized cost differences induce the efficient levels of R&D with respect to the innovation size and probability of success by two firms regardless of ex ante and ex post asymmetries between the two firms.